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... JAMES WILSON: PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALIST 
Bradley Jay Caffee 
December, 2003 
This essay is a biography and ideological interpretation of James Wilson. Wilson 
was an important member of the Revolutionary generation whom historians and political 
theorists too often overlook. Moving from the rise of historical interest in Wilson and 
reasons why Wilson deserves study, this essay tells the story of Wilson's ideological 
development from the opposition Whig struggles of the 1760s until his law lectures in 
1790 and 1791. Originally willing to accept Lockean ideas of contractualism in the 
British constitution he, like many Americans, rejected such contractualism during the 
Revolution in favor of an un-transferrable popular sovereignty that could only convey 
instrumental powers. The American constitutions were instruments of the People, not 
contracts. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that Wilson's understanding of 
popular sovereignty, instrumentalism and, ultimately, the 1787 federal Constitution, was 
couched in a progressive vision of civil society. For Wilson, such concepts were not 
clever manipulations used to establish power and conservatism in government, but rather, 
appreciable discoveries drawn from the American experience. 
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WILSON AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
 A progressive State is necessary to the Happiness and Perfection of Man.  
 Whatever attainments may be already possessed, attainments still higher  
 ought to be pursued. It is our Duty, therefore, to press forward, and to  
 make increasing Advances in every Thing that can support, improve,  
 refine and embellish Society.                    ~ James Wilson, 1788 
 
 In 1998, the historians Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood sounded a 
pessimistic chord concerning both the state of early American studies and the place of the 
United States in the contemporary world.  Molho and Wood thought that American self-
perception and historic interest were concurrently experiencing a diminution, arguing that  
the lack of interest in early American history among students had a direct connection to a 
more general disillusionment about the American destiny.  They linked the American 
sense of importance to a sense of exceptionalism arguing that American exceptionalism 
was on the wane.1  But Molho’s and Wood’s analysis can be questioned.  Historian 
Daniel T. Rodgers, though in agreement with Molho and Wood, admitted that uniqueness 
is distinct from exceptionalism.  Every nation on Earth can claim some uniqueness, but 
exceptionalism is a belief in a culturally inherent immunity to the more general currents 
of  history.2  It is questionable if exceptionalism was ever that important to the American 
psyche, given that uniqueness of any sort may be sufficient to suggest a global mission, 
                                                          
1 Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, “Introduction” in Imagined Histories: American Historians 
Interpret the Past, ed. Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
3-16. 
2 Daniel T. Rodgers, “Exceptionalism” in Imagined Histories ed. Molho and Wood, 21-22. 
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 all immunities to history aside.    
 Nonetheless, Molho and Wood’s implication may be right that Americans are 
coming to question exactly what their mission in history is, just as they are coming to re-
assess the role of the United States in the community of nations.  Though interest in early 
American history was declining in the late 1990s the decline may have been more due to 
the siren’s call of the dot-com boom than a growing pessimism in the American destiny.3  
In any case, given that America faces a possible reconfiguration in its own vision, it is 
imperative that Americans understand who they are, and what previous generations 
hoped they would be.  Therefore, the study of history, particularly the American 
Revolution, is perhaps more important than ever and it is unfortunate that many potential 
students have lost interest.   
 This essay focuses on the life and intellect of one, key participant in the American 
Revolution, James Wilson.  Interest in Wilson has steadily increased over the last forty 
years because a greater focus on ideology among historians of early America has made 
his ideologically astute orations and law lectures more valued.   
 A Scottish immigrant, Wilson quickly climbed the social ladder of colonial 
Pennsylvania and proved to be a dedicated opposition Whig both before and after the 
American decision to embrace independence.  Broadly acknowledged in his own day to 
be one of the best educated and most insightful lawyers in the fledgling United States, 
James Wilson played a central role in the 1787 federal convention.  He spoke more in the 
convention than any other single delegate after Rufus King, and his influence in the 
convention was second only to James Madison’s.4  Wilson brilliantly defended the 
                                                          
3 Molho and Wood, “Introduction” in Imagined Histories, ed. Molho and Wood, 16. 
4 Robert Green McCloskey, “Introduction” in The Works of James Wilson, Vol. I, James Wilson, ed. 
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 proposed Constitution in Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention, constructing arguments 
that would inform Federalists in later ratifying contests.  He remained an ardent 
Federalist for the remaining decade of his life and President George Washington 
appointed him to the Supreme Court, where he became one of its founding members.5  
 Wilson accepted the idea of un-transferable popular sovereignty as it arose from 
the Revolution, remaining perpetually loyal to broad and equitable representation of the 
People in government.  What is demonstrated in Wilson’s thought on the Constitution 
and its relationship to the people is a philosophy of sovereignty that was uniquely 
American, at least in application, and was neither Lockean or Hobbsean in origin.  To 
make such a claim is not to say that Wilson, or any of the other Founders and their 
Revolution were impervious to the currents of history -- they were not examples of 
American exceptionalism themselves.  Heavily influenced by previous European thought 
and history, they grasped at various threads of thought, winding them together into a new 
and unique synthesis.6  But the Founders were not always in perfect agreement, and 
Wilson certainly varied in his thought from the majority of his colleagues on certain 
points while agreeing on others.  
 Wilson, in both the Pennsylvania ratification convention and his later law lectures 
at the University of Pennsylvania, rejected the idea of the Constitution as a contract.  For 
Wilson, the Constitution, a document that he played a central role in framing, was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Robert Green McCloskey (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 1-6.  
5 Ibid., 28-29. 
6 A central assumption of  the influential neo-Whig interpretation of the American revolutionary generation 
is that they were heavily influenced by European political thought, both common-place and radical.  It was 
certainly Jean-Marc Pascal’s focus when dealing with James Wilson.  See Bernard Bailyn, Ideological 
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967); 
Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Heritage of the Constitutional Era: The Delegates’ Library (Philadelphia: 
The Library Company of Philadelphia, 1986; Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Jean-Marc Pascal, The Political 
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 essentially an instrument of the “people at large” rather than a contract between them and 
a set of governors.7  Its purpose was not only to secure liberty for Americans but to lay 
the foundation of future civil and moral progress.8  This essay argues that Wilson’s 
adherence to the sovereignty of the people and the legal instrumentality in 
constitutionalism was intimately connected to a belief in a human right to perpetual, self-
initiated progress and the duty of government to facilitate that progress.  In short, Wilson 
was an eighteenth century progressive.    
 The significance of James Wilson may seem a strange claim to some because he 
has by no means received the same attention as several others such as Thomas Jefferson, 
George Washington, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, to name but a few.  Yet, 
any in-depth reading of Madison’s Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, 
should convince the reader rather quickly of Wilson’s importance, as well as his devout 
faith in popular government.9  Similarly, reading Wilson’s law lectures, as unfinished as 
they are, suggests why Wilson’s colleagues held his legal understanding in such high 
esteem.10  Nonetheless, only two standard biographies, each in a single volume, have 
been written on Wilson.  The first by historian Andrew Bennett in 1928 was a sparse 
account of events in Wilson’s life.11  The second, far better and more involved work of 
scholarship was written by Charles Page Smith and published in 1956.  Smith’s 
monograph filled out the details of Wilson’s life very well, but paid scant attention to the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ideas of James Wilson, 1742-1798 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991). 
7 George M. Dennison, “The ‘Revolution Principle’: Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of 
James Wilson” The Review of Politics Vol. 39 (1977), 174-179; Pascal, Political Ideas, 29-44. 
8 Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798 (Columbia: University 
of Missouri Press,  1997), 179-186; Pascal, Political Ideas, 263-268 and 332-334. 
9 See James Madison, Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1966).                         
10 See Wilson, Works, Volumes I and II, ed. McCloskey. 
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 details of Wilson’s thought.12  However, Wilson’s law lectures, with some of his core 
orations included, have been published four times.13  
 Part of the reason that Wilson has not received the same attention as other 
Founders may be that he died in ignominy.  He had vastly over-invested in pyramid 
schemes in western lands.  Even before the bottom fell out of the market in the late 
1790s, Wilson was financially in over his head, having to take out loans just to keep 
afloat.14  It was probably his financial difficulties that caused Washington to appoint him 
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, rather than Chief Justice.  The fact that he 
was not appointed Chief Justice surprised many.  When the pyramid schemes in western 
lands collapsed, Wilson was ruined.  As the historian Charles Page Smith expressed the 
situation, Wilson could barely clothe his family when he fled to North Carolina to escape 
his creditors.  The Associate Justice was eventually jailed there but was bailed out by his 
son, Bird Wilson, only to die an untimely death in a hotel room, without a cent to his 
name.15  
 Another reason that Wilson has not received as much attention as he deserves is 
that Wilson experienced no achievements that normally draw amateur historians and 
therefore the more general book-buying public.  Wilson was not a President, a pithy 
inventor, a fiery polemicist, a doomed foil for Thomas Jefferson, or a transformative 
jurist in the American tradition of law -- though the later was not from a lack of attempt 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 3.   
12 Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 3; See Charles Page Smith, James Wilson: Founding Father, 1742-
1798 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956). 
13 These editions include one published by James Wilson’s son, Bird Wilson in 1804.  Also see James 
Wilson Selected Political Essays of James Wilson, ed. Randolph G. Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1930); James Wilson The Works of James Wilson, Volumes I and II, ed. James DeWitt Andrews (Chicago: 
Callaghan and Company, 1896); Wilson, Works, Volumes I and II, ed. McCloskey.                                                                    
14 Smith, James Wilson, 304-306, 369-375. 
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 on Wilson’s part.  For example, Wilson’s influence was central in the Supreme Court’s 
1798 ruling in Chisholm vs. Georgia.16  The state of Georgia claimed that the citizen of 
another state could not sue it because it was a sovereign.  The Court, led by Wilson, 
rejected Georgia’s argument maintaining that the states were not sovereign, rather the 
people of the United States were sovereign.  The people had established the federal 
government to exist over the state governments through ratification.  And the federal 
judiciary was, by design, established to resolve interstate disputes between parties.  
Therefore, Georgia could be sued in a federal court.  The nationalistic and judicial 
implications of the ruling were far reaching and probably would have secured Wilson’s 
place in juridical history as a pivotal Supreme Court justice.  But the states reacted by 
ratifying the Eleventh Amendment prohibiting litigation by citizens against states within 
which they did not reside, blotting out the effect of the entire ruling.  The day had been 
stolen from Wilson, and the foundation was laid instead for John Marshall with his 
unique approach to federalism.17  
 Historian Robert Green McCloskey has pointed out yet another reason that 
Wilson has been often overlooked.  Wilson was awful as a correspondent; he would only 
write occasionally.  Friends often complained that he let too much time pass before 
writing.  As a result, very little Wilson correspondence has survived, particularly when 
compared to that of contemporaries like Madison or Jefferson.  It is notoriously difficult, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
15 Ibid., 380-388. 
16 Chisolm vs. Georgia, 2 U.S (2 Dallas), 419-479 (1793). 
17 Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 169-173; McCloskey, “Introduction” in Works, Vol. I, Wilson, 31;  
Pascal, Political Ideas, 276-279; Chisolm vs. Georgia, 2 U.S (2 Dallas), 419-479 (1793). For the approach 
of John Marshall see William E. Nelson, Marbury vs. Madison: The Origin and Legacy of Judicial Review 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 54-83. 
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 therefore, for historians to comprehend the personal Wilson.18
 Nonetheless, some scholarship on Wilson has appeared and the literature has 
slowly accumulated, building up more quickly over the last forty years.  Numerous 
articles and specialized monographs have focused on Wilson’s nationalistic, legal and 
political thought.  And historical opinions on Wilson, even the briefest, have generally 
been far from unkind.  Even Charles A. Beard, the godfather of materialist interpretation 
in early American history, was compelled to note Wilson’s ideological integrity.   
 Beard’s 1913 An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States 
was a reaction to better than one hundred years of Whig interpretation that was more 
patriotic than scholarly.  Beard also reacted against the highly formalistic “Institutional” 
and “Imperialist” schools.  The “Institutionalist” historians focused on the evolution of 
governmental institutions, while a sub-set of the “Institutionalists” developed, known as 
the “Imperialists,” who saw the Revolution as an episode in the larger, trans-Atlantic 
British institution of Empire.  Beard wanted to use new historical approaches pioneered 
in Europe that emphasized deterministic, material factors in the making of history.19   
 In An Economic Interpretation Beard argued that personal economic motives 
directed the Founders.  The Constitution resulted from a need for economic security by 
the elites leaders of the Revolution, a security threatened by popular government in the 
states.  Tension in the convention resulted from competing economic interests, with the 
holders of public securities on one side and holders of western lands on the other.  Taking 
this position necessarily meant arguing or assuming that the Founders, for the most part, 
                                                          
18 McCloskey, “Introduction” in Works, Vol. I, Wilson, 7.  
19 Forest McDonald, “A New Introduction” in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States, Charles A. Beard (New York: The Free Press, 1986), ix-xii; John Phillip Reid, Constitutional 
History of the American Revolution Abridged Edition, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), x-
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 did not mean what they said about cultural principles and political ideas such as liberty 
and popular sovereignty.   
 Yet when coming to Wilson, Beard said that he “was among the philosophers of 
the period who had seriously pondered on politics.  He took a democratic view on several 
matters.”  After citing some examples of Wilson’s support for popular government, Beard 
added “He...opposed...property qualifications of voters.”  This last point should have 
been a worrisome point for Beard, and yet he passed it by without qualification.  Beard 
tried to make Wilson fit into his deterministic thesis by pointing to Wilson’s support for a 
strong judiciary, reasoning that Wilson thought a strong judiciary sufficient to check the 
“democratic legislatures” of the states.20  Though Beard’s interpretation of Wilson does 
not hold up to close analysis, as will become apparent in the later portion of this essay, 
what is interesting about it is that Beard was willing to take Wilson at his word -- 
something he was not willing to do for many of the other Founders.   
 Equally interesting is what evidence Beard failed to use, particularly in regard to 
Wilson.  James Wilson maintained a consistent ideological position throughout the 
constitutional convention that was both nationalistic and democratic, but he was also 
involved with an incident at the convention that would have supported Beard’s general 
view of the Founders quite well.  When small-state delegate Daniel Carroll of 
Massachusetts suggested that a clause be struck out, protecting the western lands of larger 
states from division and use without their consent, Wilson, a holder of western lands, 
reacted passionately.  Wilson countered that a political society should not be “torn 
asunder without its own consent.”  Luther Martin then implied that Wilson was guilty of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
xi. 
20 Beard, An Economic Interpretation, 215-216. 
8 
 hypocrisy, saying that “he wished Mr. Wilson had thought a little sooner of the value of 
political bodies.”  Wilson had, before this exchange, forcefully rejected the claims of the 
small states that they required protection from the larger states through the perpetuation 
of equal representation.21  Though no reason exists to accept Martin’s accusation as 
accurate, the episode would have served Beard well.  Yet, in Beard’s discussion of 
Wilson, it is never mentioned.  One wonders if the omission involved a failure of 
research or an uncharacteristic respect for Wilson that made Beard hold back.  
 In any case, even if Beard had discussed the previous episode, his over all 
argument would have still been weak.  What is amazing about the Beardian argument is 
not how easily it was pulled apart by revisionists in the 1950s and 60s, but how long it 
retained ascendancy.  Beard’s argument held sway over historical thinking about the 
federal constitution for most of the first half of the twentieth century.  And it gave 
preeminence to materialistic interpretations of the whole Revolutionary era.  One 
explanation put forward by historian Forrest McDonald for the fall of the Beardian thesis 
is that following World War II the number of historians began to increase and that, by the 
1950s, primary records, and even secondary works, had become vastly more accessible to 
the body of historians.  These changes, combined with the weakness of Beard’s chief 
work made revision likely in the 1960s.22  The implication of McDonald’s explanation 
then is that Beard’s argument had been protected by fifty years of too few historians with 
too little access to primary sources.    
 During the same period that Beard’s interpretation gained acceptance 
                                                          
21 Calvin C. Jillson and Cecil L. Eubanks “The Political Structure of Constitution Making: The Federal 
Convention of 1787” American Journal of Political Science, 28 (August, 1984): 452-453; Madison, Federal 
Convention, 555-557. 
22 McDonald, “A New Introduction” in An Economic Interpretation, Beard, xxiii-xxvi. 
9 
 Progressivism became a force in American politics, and some historians interested in 
supporting the Progressive movement took an interest in Wilson.  Such historians were 
particularly interested in Wilson’s support for a powerful nationalistic government as 
well as his devotion to democratic principles.23  The legal historian Randolph C. Adams 
is an excellent example of this type of Wilson scholarship.  He focused on Wilson’s 
democratic and nationalistic thought, but more important for Adams was what Wilson 
had to say about international law.  Adams, a supporter of a more proactive body of 
international law, showed how Wilson thought international law was possible without a 
superior governing body to administer it.  Indeed, Adams implied, echoing Wilson,  a 
strong and democratic international law would be a natural outgrowth of the fundamental 
principles of American politics.24
 Another distinctive group of historians showed interest in Wilson during the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Religious scholars took interest in Wilson’s theology and 
epistemology and how the Founder connected that thought to his political understanding.  
Several articles and two monographs were produced by this group.25  Perhaps the most 
important historian in this group, for later Wilson scholars, was the historian Arnaud B. 
Leavelle.  Leavelle introduced the idea that Wilson was heavily influenced by Scottish 
Common Sense thought.  Leavelle outlined the link between common sense philosophy, 
as perpetuated by Thomas Reid, and Wilson’s acceptance of concepts such as popular 
                                                          
23 Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 2-3. 
24 Randolph C. Adams, “The Legal Theories of James Wilson” in University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
and American Law Register, 68 (June, 1920): 337-355. 
25 Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 3. Hall cited two monographs from the group: William F. Obering, 
The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1938) and 
May G. O’Donnell, James Wilson and the Natural Law Basis of Positive Law (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1937).   
10 
 consent, nationalism and judicial review.26  Late twentieth-century scholars still accepted 
that common sense had an influence on Wilson though they argued who in the tradition 
had the most influence.  The historian Jean-Marc Pascal argued convincingly that Francis 
Hutchison had been a far greater influence on Wilson than Thomas Reid.27  Fifteen years 
later, Mark David Hall argued that though Hutchison’s influence was dominant, Reid’s 
thinking was also important to Wilson.28 The common sense influence on Wilson’s 
thought will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 7.  
 When Leavelle wrote, economic and social historians with deterministic 
assumptions still dominated in academic histories of the Revolution, but that was about to 
change.  In 1956, the historian Edmund S. Morgan spoke at a meeting of the Mississippi 
Valley Historical Association, calling for a general re-assessment of the Revolution.  
Morgan pointed out that interpretations of the Revolution throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century had generally called into question the sincerity of the Founding 
generation, and had pointedly attacked the older Whig interpretation.  But these later 
revisions had serious holes from his point of view, giving numerous examples within the 
context of each school of interpretation.29  Particularly interesting to him was how many 
historians had argued that a conflict existed between human rights and property in the 
Revolution.  To the contrary, Morgan pointed out that in the eighteenth century, “liberty 
and property rights were one and inseparable.”  He went on to discuss how broadly land 
                                                          
26 Arnaud B. Leavelle, “James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to American Political 
Thought” in Political Science Quarterly, 57 (September, 1942): 394-410. 
27 Pascal, Political Ideas, 59-92. 
28 Hall, Political and Legal Philosophy, 68-89.  
29 Edmund S. Morgan, “The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising” in The American 
Revolution : Two Centuries of Interpretation ed. Edmund S. Morgan, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 
Inc., 1965), 166-179.  Morgan refers to a school of social interpretation and a school of economic 
interpretation that this author has combined under the label “materialist.” He also mentions other schools of 
11 
 was distributed in eighteenth-century Massachusetts, and accused his colleagues of using 
nineteenth and twentieth century paradigms to judge a very different eighteenth-century 
America.  He ended declaring that “the Whig interpretation of the American Revolution 
may not be as dead as some historians would have us believe.”30  
 Even as Morgan called for a new interpretation, some historians were providing 
the first important answer to it. The first revisionism to effectively challenge the 
Beardians and other materialists (not all materialists held to Beard’s specific arguments) 
was the “liberal interpretation.”  This school, that tended to focus on the importance of 
John Locke, did not topple the predominance of the materialists but it played an 
important role.  The liberal revisionists dared to take the Founders at their word and tried 
to make connections between the Revolution and the liberal tradition developing in 
England.  These historians saw the Revolution as essentially conservative -- Lockean 
ideas became broadly accepted in British America because the colonies already lived in a 
very Lockean political reality within their respective colonies.  When the Revolution 
became necessary, the colonists used Lockean, liberal principles to justify and guide their 
activity.31  The colonists launched the independence movement, and fought its appended 
war attempting to preserve a liberal status quo, rather than produce a revolution in 
politics and society.  Another important element of the liberal revision was that it offered 
an essentially ideological model.  Contrary to the materialist school, which assumed that 
human history was primarily a reaction to material stimuli acting on individuals and 
groups, liberal revisionists emphasized the power of political culture to restrain or compel 
                                                                                                                                                                             
thought that are less relevant to this essay and so have been  omitted from the discussion. 
30 Morgan, “Revisions in Need of Revising,” 177. 
31 Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept” in The Journal of American History, 79 
(June, 1992): 12-13. 
12 
 historic activity.32  
 However, as historian Daniel T. Rodgers argued, the liberal re-interpretation had a 
central weakness in that it could not explain the revolutionary generation’s anxieties or 
their internal conflict.  Materialist historians were too happy to point out that if the 
revolutionary generation had been consistently dedicated to, and overwhelmingly 
motivated by the same rationalistic, Lockean political doctrine, then the internal strife 
that they had documented would not have occurred.  The liberal revisionists had a 
difficult time explaining away the revolutionary generation’s in-fighting -- particularly 
when dealing with the eventual divide between Federalists and Republicans.33   
 It was within this environment that the historian Bernard Bailyn first published 
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.  The implications of Bailyn’s 
arguments have served as lightning rods for re-interpretation of the Revolutionary Era 
over the next thirty years.  Looking at hundreds of pamphlets from the Revolutionary Era, 
Bailyn came to the conclusion that the Revolutionary and Founding generation had been 
heavily influenced by the anti-authoritarian literature of the Glorious Revolution and the 
opposition Whigs that followed.  No single monolithic doctrine existed, but numerous 
political and social assumptions did, that together, created a distinct political culture for 
eighteenth century British Americans.  It was an opposition Whig political culture, 
exported from England that informed the colonists, first in opposition to Parliament, and 
then in open rebellion against Parliament and the King.   
 Bailyn’s interpretation was similar to the early attempt of the liberal revisionists 
in numerous ways.  He saw the initial motivations of the Revolutionaries as essentially 
                                                          
32 Jillson and Eubanks, “The Political Structure of Constitution Making,” 436-437. 
33 Rodgers, “Career of a Concept,” 14. 
13 
 ideological and conservative, and Bailyn operated on the presumption that, for the most 
part, the men who wrote the pamphlets that he studied meant what they were saying.  The 
colonists did what they believed they had to do to protect their liberty, which was 
threatened by an aggressive and overreaching British Parliament.  But the role of Locke 
was minimized in The Ideological Origins as was the importance of contract theory, and 
concepts of natural rights.  Civil property rights as a guarantee of liberty, representation 
as a guarantee of property rights, and an abiding belief in, and anxious fear of the 
corruption of power, took central importance.34   
 Bailyn additionally argued that Whig principles radically transformed in the battle 
for American independence and the political experimentation that accompanied it.  The 
Whig heritage was diverse, and as Americans tried to make sense of that heritage in their 
new situation, ideological fissures developed.35   
 It was on this foundation that what eventually became known as the republican 
consensus was built.  Following The Ideological Origins, students of Bailyn began to 
publish influential books that supported, while extending and diversifying, Bailyn’s 
original view.  Like Bailyn, Gordon S. Wood argued in The Creation of the American 
Republic, 1776-1787 that opposition Whig thought had dominated the political culture of 
the Revolutionaries and that the struggle for independence forced transformations in that 
thought.  Wood, however, gave additional emphasis to the importance of virtue, equality 
and antique models of civil society, pointing out the importance of republican Rome as 
an ideal vision.  And he, perhaps inspired by the historian Cecelia M. Kenyon,36 gave 
                                                          
34 See Bailyn, Ideological Origins. 
35 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 272-319. 
36 See Cecelia M. Kenyon, “Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old Fashioned 
Interpretation” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 19 (April, 1962): 153-182.  Kenyon was operating 
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 these convergent threads of political thought a name -- republicanism.   
 Republicanism was the chief driving and restraining force of the Revolution, and 
yet was itself transformed by the Revolution.  But the greatest transformation that that 
ideology had undergone in the Revolutionary Era, came about with the creation and 
ratification of the federal Constitution of 1787.  The men who desired the new 
Constitution had grown fearful that excessive democracy had grown up in the states, 
according to Wood, and sought a new, more aristocratic federal structure as a check to 
state democratization.  Necessarily, Wood had to emphasize the ideological differences 
between “republicanism” and “democracy.”  Implicitly, of course, Wood’s analysis was 
somewhat neo-Beardian, having to assume that, when coming to the Constitution, the 
revolutionaries had ceased saying what they meant, and viewing the chief struggle over 
the Constitution as a struggle between pro-democratic state and anti-democratic 
nationalistic forces.37  James Wilson offers a counter-point to this part of Wood’s 
argument as will be seen in Chapter 5.  In any case, the republican model embodied in the 
Constitution differed from classical republicanism in many of its political assumptions, 
according to Wood, and unintentionally laid the foundation for the future liberalization of 
society.38   
 Three years after Wood published The Creation of the American Republic, 
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 Pauline Maier published another influential book, From Resistance to Revolution.  Maier 
focused on British American opposition to Parliament from 1765 to 1776.  She argued 
that republican ideology was indeed important to the development of the colonial 
opposition, going into deeper detail about the opposition movement, and the civil unrest 
that it often produced, than had either Bailyn or Wood.39  Though Maier did not offer a 
discussion of the Constitutional Convention, her brief comments suggested a more 
optimistic view than Wood.  She viewed the Constitution as a logical culmination of 
constitutional and political experimentation that began with the decision to embrace 
independence.40  
 Another important tome was added to the republican interpretation with the 
publication in 1975 of The Machiavellian Moment by J.G.A. Pocock.  Pocock argued that 
“country opposition” ideology guided the American Revolution, and had its cultural roots 
in the Renaissance political thought of the Florentine commune. It was an anti-corruption 
philosophy centered around concepts of civic virtue and a fear of societal decay.  
Florentine thought had been adopted by opposition Whigs in England who in turn 
inspired the thinking of the American Founders.  The Revolution could be explained in 
terms of court versus country as could the eventual polarization of the Founders into 
Federalists and Republicans.  Unlike Bailyn and his students, however, Pocock was not 
interested in how the experience of the Revolutionaries transformed Whig political 
assumptions, but was instead fascinated with continuity.  Pocock focused on how 
opposition Whig thought (that he called “country ideology”) was not fundamentally 
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 changed by the Revolution and even, he believed, still resided at the core of American 
civic religion well into the twentieth century.  Pocock also drew a strict division between 
Whig thought and liberalism, wholly rejecting the importance of John Locke in any 
aspect of the Revolution.  For Pocock, liberalism was a pointed antagonist of the Whig 
tradition.  A circle quickly formed around Pocock in St. Louis that included historians 
such as Lance Banning and Andrew McCoy.41   
 According to the historian Daniel T. Rodgers, a rivalry developed between the St. 
Louis circle and Bailyn’s old students, over the postwar history of republicanism in 
America.  Nonetheless, a kind of consensus did eventually form between these groups, as 
the St. Louis scholars recognized that Pocock’s “country ideology” was Wood’s 
“republicanism” and they quickly picked up the term “republicanism” in their own 
works.42    
 Fortunately, disagreements between historians of republicanism were not the 
weakness for that school of interpretation that it would have been for others.  All of these 
historical interpretations had always recognized that republicanism was not a monolithic 
doctrine, but a political worldview that drew upon numerous strands of thought.  The real 
disagreement for these historians (and the men they studied) was on which strands of 
thought had the most importance and how.  The influence of the republican, ideological 
model(s) of the Revolution expanded throughout the 1970s, winning over first social and 
then numerous legal historians in the late 1970s and early 1980s.43   
 It was in the 1980s that the republican consensus gained an ascendancy 
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 comparable to the one that the Beardians had enjoyed in the early twentieth century.  The 
Beardian interpretation had been left shattered in the dust, and interpretations of the 
Revolution that tried to explain it in purely materialistic ways became eclipsed.  The shift 
in historiography did not mean that economic or class related conflict became irrelevant 
to historians, because they did not.  But economic causes and class tensions were more 
often placed within an ideological context, or at least the concurrent importance of 
ideology became almost universally recognized.  Economic causes and conflicts became 
a current within the broader ideological views of what the Revolution was about.44   
 The republican consensus was not without its detractors, but even its most 
consistent antagonists like the historian Joyce Appleby did not  proffer neo-Beardian or 
materialist alternatives, but rather has argued for ideological alternatives.  More recently, 
in the mid-1990s, the legal historian John Phillip Reid argued that political historians 
within the republican consensus tradition had underplayed constitutionalism while 
emphasizing factional political thought.  According to Reid, constitutional thought played 
a key role in the fissures that developed between Britain and British America in the 1760s 
and 70s, and ultimately led to the Revolution.  Yet, even Reid professed no desire to 
supplant the republican consensus, rather he saw his work as a corrective to an oversight 
within the broader tradition, that had ignored legal thought as its own force.45
 A pejorative term, “neo-Whig” had been sometimes used for these contemporary 
ideological interpretations, implying that they simplistically accepted the words of the 
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 Revolutionary generation as truth.  Yet, as of 1987, the legal historian Stephen A. Conrad 
used the term neo-Whig in a purely descriptive sense, applying it to a general school of 
thought, with which he clearly identified.46  The neo-Whigs, if indeed that is what they 
were, had come far.   
 The general ascendancy of ideological interpretations of the Revolution, in the 
later half of the twentieth century, has had an effect on the popularity of Wilson among 
scholars.  Indeed, the peaked interest in Wilson over the last forty years can be partially 
attributed to the neo-Whig atmosphere in history.47   
 For all of the political and institutional experimentation of the Revolutionary era, 
and the anticipated improvements in society that those changes would instigate, the 
Revolutionary generation never produced a Locke or a Machiavelli.  No one but John 
Adams tried to produce a representative treatise of fundamental political theory for his 
generation.  But Adams’ attempt, A Defense of the Constitutions of the United States was 
a failure among the generation that it proposed to represent.  The treatise held old, even 
reactionary thinking by the time it was penned in 1787, enough so that contemporaries 
gave A Defense a cold reception.48  Thomas Jefferson used it to factional ends, blasting 
the treatise as the product of a monarchist mind.49   
 Other than Adams, James Wilson came the closest to penning a treatise for his 
generation.  And Wilson’s philosophy, though in some ways eccentric, was perhaps more 
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 representative of his generation’s thought following the establishment of the 1787 federal 
Constitution than was Adams’. Wilson, in his law lectures given at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1790, brought together the various threads of radical American political 
thought, both “republican” and “liberal.”  He forcefully rationalized these political views, 
interconnecting them with a philosophy about humanity and its society that was both 
metaphysical and practical.  Historians can never know what would have been produced 
if  he had not been interrupted by his mounting financial difficulties, but even in their un-
edited and half completed condition, Wilson‘s law lectures are an impressive testimony 
to his conceptual abilities. 
 Another reason that Wilson’s popularity has grown may be the fact that Wilson’s 
highly democratic and progress-centered vision of the United States government 
coincidentally matched what the United States government has become in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, better than the visions of any of the other Founders.  Wilson 
envisioned a nationalistic and democratic federal government, replete with a powerful 
judiciary.50   
 Since the late sixties a flurry of articles on Wilson have been produced, and five 
monographs focusing on Wilson’s thought have been published.  Historian Mary T. 
Delahanty’s monograph on Wilson was the first of these in 1969.  In The Integralist 
Philosophy of James Wilson, Delahanty focused on Wilson’s ability to unite apparently 
contradictory threads of thought, particularly “Aristotelian” civic humanism and 
Christian morality.  Like Aristotle, Delahanty pointed out, Wilson emphasized the 
importance of civil society in achieving the good life and a secular moral code that 
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 perpetuated civil society.  Wilson integrated these Aristotelian ideas with traditional 
Christian moral precepts. Delahanty marked the similarities in argument between Wilson 
and Aristotle on the one hand, and certain religious thinkers on the other.  But, ultimately, 
Delahanty is not convincing, because the very premise of her work is plagued by over-
simplification.  Certainly parallels can be found between Wilson’s thought and thinkers 
such as Aristotle or the early church fathers, but this parallel does not suggest an 
immediate, formative influence per se.  What Delahanty’s work really demonstrates is the 
dual influence of both Aristotle, Christian decretists and protestant writers on the whole 
canon of Western thought, a tradition of thought that Wilson drew from as a Westerner.  
In his law lectures Wilson occasionally quoted Aristotle and religious theorists but he 
used Enlightenment philosophes, English opposition writers and British jurists even 
more.  Therefore, calling Wilson an “Aristotelian,” as Delahanty does, is deceptive.  
Nonetheless, the idea that Wilson is important as an integralist thinker has not gone 
away.51
 Even before Delahanty, Robert Green McCloskey had noted Wilson’s ability to 
“synthesize” various threads of thought.  For McCloskey, the tenuous forces that Wilson 
integrated were concerns for property rights versus localism and a desire for a stable, 
commercial society versus populism in government.  Ever since, the issue of Wilson’s 
integration and synthesis of such “contradictory” thoughts has been an underlying theme 
of most histories on the Founder.  Though that theme has been consistently more of the 
McCloskey mold than the Delahanty mold.52  
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  The legal historian Stephen A. Conrad latched onto Wilson’s tendency toward 
intellectual integration in his article “Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense 
in James Wilson’s Republican Theory.”  Conrad described a Wilson, conscientious of the 
conflict between liberal thought and republican thought, determined to find a unifying 
thread to bind the two contradictory philosophies together.  Wilson found a solution, 
according to Conrad, in an optimistic vision of polite citizenship, by which, individuals 
would rationally consent to evident social need, and society would allow room for 
individual sensitivities and industry.53   
 The problem with Conrad’s hypothesis is that no evidence exists for it in the 
primary sources.  Wilson never acknowledged the existence of two monolithic political 
philosophies, pulling apart his generation.  Wilson never worried in his writings over the 
contradictory attractions of “liberalism” and “republicanism” or “democracy” and 
“commercialism.”54  And, though a man very willing to brag on the apparent 
achievements of his generation, Wilson never noted a conciliation between any such 
“contradictory” political philosophies as being part of those achievements.  The fact that 
Wilson did not see the contradictions between what contemporary historians might deem 
as “liberalism” and “republicanism” is highly suggestive.  As the most concise and in-
depth political and legal philosopher of that generation, Wilson would have perceived the 
intellectual conflicts if anyone was to see them.   
 Historian Lance Banning, in answering the criticism of  historians Isaac Kramnick 
and Joyce Appleby, has been compelled to blur the lines between “liberalism” and 
“republicanism” that republican historians of the Pocockian school have traditionally 
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 drawn so darkly.  Banning admitted that, 
 Logically it may be inconsistent to be simultaneously liberal and 
 classical. Historically, it was not. Eighteenth-century opposition  
 thought was always a complex blend of liberal and classical ideas. 
 So was the thought of America’s Revolutionary generation.55
The overarching argument of Banning’s article is that the inherent differences between 
republican civic philosophy and liberal humanism were never realized by the Founders 
because their English intellectual heritage had been mercifully ambiguous.  
 A problem exists with Banning’s supposition when approaching Wilson, 
however. Wilson was far from ambiguous in his political philosophy, and drew definitive 
connections to “liberal” ideas such as the human compulsion, even right, to progress and 
the need for civic virtue among the nation’s citizenry.  Wilson’s work suggests that 
Banning is not going far enough.  In fact, “liberalism” and “republicanism” may not have 
even been logical contradictions, as the Founders utilized them.  Though radical, the 
Revolutionary generation was not extremist -- except for their willingness to act 
militantly, when scruples necessitated such action.  For example, no evidence exists that 
they ever envisioned the personal sacrifice involved in civic virtue to be all consuming 
within times of peace.  Civic virtue was never trumpeted to extremes, any more than was 
profiteering individualism.  Indeed, a contributive factor in the success of the American 
Revolution is that the Revolutionary generation understood practicality as a virtue and 
did not fall into the trap of dogmatic extremism that defined so many failed revolutions in 
history.  These points move far beyond the goals of this essay but Wilson’s intellectual 
discourses are suggestive on these points.  Hopefully, that suggestiveness will be 
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 apparent in this essay.  
 The next Wilson monograph to be published, after Delahanty’s, was Geoffrey 
Seed’s  James Wilson.  Seed concerned himself with Wilson’s political thought, focusing 
on its democratic nature and ideological consistency.  The biography lacked depth on the 
whole, but gave a thorough analysis of Wilson’s activity in the federal convention of 
1787.56  Most important in Seed’s work is his treatment of Wilson’s support for common 
law.  On the surface, Wilson’s support for strong common law seemed to contradict his 
devotion to popular sovereignty and legal instrumentality.  But as Seed demonstrated, on 
deeper analysis, the contradiction did not exist for Wilson.  For Wilson the common law 
was simply the product of the popular sovereignty of past generations.  Present 
generations continued to exercise their sovereignty over it through the rare exercise of 
legislation, but more importantly through sitting as jurors.  In regard to the last point, 
Seed reminded the reader that in Wilson’s time juries found for points of law as well as 
fact, and therefore had a potentially transformative power over points of law.  And this 
legal process  Wilson wholeheartedly supported as necessary in a free society.57
 One of the better works on Wilson’s thought was Jean-Marc Pascal’s 1991 book, 
The Political Ideas of James Wilson, 1742-1798.  Pascal placed Wilson within the 
republican tradition, connecting his thought with Enlightenment thinkers in continental 
Europe, as well as opposition Whigs in Britain.  Another historian, George M. Dennison, 
had argued fourteen years earlier that Wilson propounded a “revolution principle.”  The 
revolution principle was grounded in an instrumental view of law, and ultimately 
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 constitutionalism.  Government and law were simply instruments of the people that could 
be changed whenever the people felt it to be necessary.  For Wilson, this principle had 
been properly embodied in the amendment process of the Constitution of 1787 -- a 
process that would allow for peaceful and popular “revolution” in the system.  Pascal 
concurred with Dennison on this point, comparing Wilson’s legal instrumentalism and 
popular sovereignty to Jean Jacques Rousseau's, and drawing a strong contrast between 
Wilson‘s constitutional philosophy and Lockean contractualism.58  Wilson’s ideas about 
popular sovereignty and constitutional instrumentality will play a crucial role in this 
essay, and will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters. 
 Historian Mark David Hall has brought together the various studies on Wilson’s 
thought while correcting what he thinks to be certain imbalanced views of Wilson’s 
philosophy.  Nothing particularly unique can be found in Hall’s Wilson monograph, so 
that the value of his work is as a historiographical synthesis and minor corrective.59  
Perhaps most important was Hall’s discussion of Wilson’s federalism, which rescues 
Wilson’s view from mere metaphor or the misguided interpretation that Wilson was 
promoting divided sovereignty.  Wilson thought that sovereignty resided in a single 
source -- the people at large.  When Wilson spoke of the people distributing power as 
they wished between the federal and state governments he was not speaking of sovereign 
power, but day to day instrumental powers.60  Though Hall agreed with the legal historian 
Stephen A. Conrad that Wilson hoped the federal nature of American government would 
help to cultivate good citizens, Hall would not relegate Wilson’s “federalism” to a 
metaphorical status, symbolizing the general concept of constitutional republicanism.  
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 Hall  recognized the more practical role of the states in Wilson’s thinking, as additional 
countervalence in government (versus the federal government) to guard against official 
corruption.61  
 The latest monograph to be published on James Wilson focuses on four of the 
Founders, including Wilson.  James H. Read’s Power vs. Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, 
Wilson and Jefferson compares the thought of these men concerning the relationship of 
liberty to political power.  Jefferson provides the ideological backdrop to the others 
because, according to Read, Jefferson, unlike the other men, continued to see political 
power as an inherent bane to liberty.  Hamilton is Jefferson’s polar opposite, who 
assumed that the entire idea of power contradicting liberty was either archaic or 
universally incorrect.  Madison and Wilson hold the middle ground in Read’s 
interpretation.  These two acknowledged that power could destroy liberty, but that power 
was also necessary to sustain it.62   Necessarily, Read discusses topics related to power 
and liberty, including sovereignty and rights.  The work does not disclose anything new 
about Wilson, but it is valuable as a comparative study.  
 In the present thesis the view of Wilson as consistently democratic and 
nationalistic, as provided in the previous described works, will be embraced.  As Pascal 
and Dennison assert, Wilson did not think of the Constitution of 1787 as a contract, and 
Wilson’s instrumental approach to the Constitution was heavily influenced by his 
concurrent dedication to contemporary popular sovereignty.  These arguments bear 
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 restatement and have an important place in the overall thesis of this essay.  However, an 
additional intellectual element existed, directing Wilson’s instrumental approach to 
constitutional government.  The purpose of government and law, according to Wilson, 
was not only to protect the good order of society, but was to facilitate its civil progress.  
Contractualism of any sort would have been too rigid to sustain such a progressive vision. 
 In a contract, the people would only have a right to actively change government if 
the government committed a breach of contract.   For Wilson, not only was it 
unacceptable to think that sovereignty had been transferred to the government under 
contract, it was also unacceptable that instrumental powers be conferred contractually.  
The people had to be empowered to change their government whenever they found it 
advantageous for their progress. 
 For the purposes of the present argument the terms progressivism or progressive 
is meant to indicate a general philosophical sensibility contradistinguished by 
conservatism. The word “progressive” specifically has been chosen because it generally 
implies a willingness to affect rapid change and because it was Wilson’s word of choice 
in presenting his own philosophical position. (Progressive will not mean anything 
necessarily reflecting the very particularistic political platforms of the early twentieth-
century Progressive movements.)    
 Conservatism is an ancient world-view demanding that slow or non-extant change 
is always preferable to rapid change -- rapidity always doing more harm than good.  So 
governmental activity to affect rapid change should be avoided and revolutionary 
changes in private society should be resisted.  The progressive sensibility, on the other 
hand, considers rapid change as capable of being overall productive, and even preferable 
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 in many instances.  Government, or other forces in society, may legitimately and 
hopefully exert positive force to begin or exacerbate proper advances in society with all 
due haste.  It will be shown that Wilson’s thought was, at center, progressive.  In 
Wilson’s usage “progress” referred to a pro-active advancement of either a material, 
sociopolitical or moral nature.  But Wilson’s thought interwove these categories of 
progress -- understanding them to exist in a symbiosis.  And the nexus of every truly 
progressive movement was to be found in the will of the People at large; advancement 
was derived from the liberal activities of the People and their instruments.   
 Two general formats were available to choose from for discussing Wilson’s life 
and thought.  The first, and perhaps most popular in intellectual biographies, was used by 
Seed and Hall in their monographs on Wilson.  The first sections of the monographs were 
general biographies of Wilson and his career.  Each chapter afterward involved some 
aspect of Wilson’s philosophy.  Both Seed and Hall used this style very effectively, but it 
is not without its dangers.  The thought of the subject might be represented, incorrectly, 
as independent of the larger historical changes surrounding him.  And, connected to this, 
the subject’s philosophy might appear unchanging, which is rarely the case.  For 
example, when reading either Seed’s or Hall’s work, the reader gets the impression that 
Wilson’s thought concerning popular sovereignty was unchanging, but that was not the 
case.  Though it is not the central goal of this work, it will be shown that Wilson initially 
embraced a contractual theory of government, at least loosely.  It was sometime between 
the controversy over independence and the federal convention of 1787 that Wilson 
rejected contractualism, adopting an instrumental view of constitutionalism.     
 The second possible format is well represented in historian Eric Foner’s 
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 intellectual biography of Thomas Paine.63  This style describes the thinking of the subject 
while chronologically describing the events in their lives.  It is a style that can best reflect 
the changes in a subject’s thinking, and emphasize what led them to their new 
conclusions.  It is this later stylistic format that will be employed to tell James Wilson’s 
story and describe his thought.  At times it may seem as if Wilson’s story has given way 
to the larger stories of the Revolution in Pennsylvania or general American constitutional 
development. At others, the story will appear repetitive.  If so, it is only because Wilson’s 
thinking cannot be truly appreciated if separated from its historical context.  At times it 
will be expedient to dwell on certain tangential issues, the relevance of which will 
become apparent later in the text.   
 The next chapter of this essay examines Wilson’s first years in America.  After a 
brief discussion of Wilson’s life in Scotland and immigration to British America in 1765, 
the narrative progresses up to 1777 when Wilson’s first Congressional career came to an 
abrupt end due to factional travails.  It was in this time frame that Wilson adopted radical 
Whig principles.  Chapter 2 also demonstrates Wilson’s early acceptance of contractual 
principles of government, at least in relationship to the British monarch.  Though the 
precise experiences that convinced him to embrace instrumentality in the law cannot be 
known, some informed speculation will be proffered. 
 In Chapter 3 Wilson’s continued dedication to American revolutionary principles 
is demonstrated, while explaining the reasons for popular suspicion against him.  At first 
being misunderstood as an aristocrat, Wilson was able to re-obtain a seat in Congress.  
And by 1786 Wilson’s second Congressional career became secure from the factional 
strife between Constitutionalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania.   
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  Building worries over the health of the American states under the Articles of 
Confederation is central in Chapter 4.  Wilson proved to be a continental nationalist 
supportive of stronger central government. Yet, unlike many others who came to support 
stronger central government by 1787, Wilson was not goaded by a fear of socio-political 
dissolution in the United States.  Wilson saw the United States as a single political 
society long before the constitutional convention of 1787.  As a result, Wilson did not 
value the new constitution as a conservative instrument, but an instrument reflecting 
progressive realities.      
 Chapters 5 and 6 examines Wilson’s career as a constitution maker and his 
understanding of popular sovereignty and legal instrumentalism within the context of 
those constitutions.  His dedication to popular sovereignty and centralized government 
dictated that he champion continental and democratic institutions.  The depth of Wilson’s 
sincerity becomes apparent in Chapter 5 when looking at his activities in the federal 
convention of 1787.  This work will not attempt to re-interpret the whole of the 
constitutional convention, that would be a goal too great for this essay.  For a more 
general and in-depth interpretation of the constitutional convention, this author suggests 
the work of historian Jack N. Rackove.64  However, the activity of Wilson in the 
convention will be extensively explored.  James Madison’s Notes On The Debates Of 
The Federal Convention is the key primary source for Wilson’s activity, and indeed, on 
the activity of the federal convention in general. 
 Wilson’s continued dedication to popular government is demonstrated in Chapter 
6.  His partisanship during the ratification controversy, and his leadership in framing the 
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 Pennsylvania state constitution of 1790 will be the focus.   
 Chapter 7 focuses on Wilson’s progressivism and his law lectures given at the 
University of Pennsylvania toward the end of his career.  In his lectures Wilson brought 
rhetorical clarity to his philosophy and vision for an American future.  Wilson makes 
clear the constitutional connection between popular sovereignty and civil progress, and 
how they were to be understood within the American system that he helped mold.   
 Chapter 8 concludes with a restatement of the thesis.  And the present author’s 







FROM OPPOSITION WHIG TO REVOLUTIONARY  
 
   Wilson’s dedication to the American colonial cause stretched back to at least the 
1765 Stamp Act controversy.  Always a staunch Whig, Wilson would, over time, prove to 
be one of the most convinced populists and nationalists of the revolutionary generation.  
In the first years of Wilson’s life in America, the Scottish immigrant achieved 
prominence as a lawyer and dedicated Whig, was branded an aristocrat by his enemies, 
and became an experienced and well-liked member of Congress.65     
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  Born in Fife, Scotland, in 1742, James Wilson was the son of conservative 
Presbyterians. William and Alison Lansdale Wilson, his father and mother, were 
dedicated to retaining the old strict covenant in the face of a rising trend of liberalism and 
centralization in the Scottish Church.  James Wilson had been marked by his parents for 
an ecclesiastical career from an early age.  His family sent him and his three younger 
brothers to a grammar school near their home in Caskardy, and it was there that Wilson 
was first introduced to Latin writers such as Cicero and Sallust.  At the age of fourteen 
Wilson won a bursar’s scholarship from the University of St. Andrews only a few miles 
from Caskardy, and matriculated to the University in 1757 to study for the ministry.66
 In the College of Saint Salvator at St Andrews the young and impressionable 
Wilson submersed by his teachers in the philosophy of the Enlightenment.  Historian 
Charles Page Smith argued in his biography of James Wilson, Wilson’s thinking was 
lured away from the strict Calvinism of his parents to the “softer...doctrines of the 
Enlightenment.”  James Hutchison, Thomas Reid, Hugo Grotius, David Hume, and other 
Enlightenment thinkers were doubtlessly made available to Wilson in his philosophy 
classes.  These theorists would later prove prominent in Wilson‘s thinking.67      
 Wilson’s academic career at St Andrews abruptly ended, however, when his 
father died.  Being the eldest son in a family that had no other males in their majority, his 
father’s death forced Wilson to attend to the economic well being of his mother, brothers 
and sisters.  He left school to support his family and he secured a job tutoring young 
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 boys.  During his short career as a tutor Wilson made up his mind that he would never 
become a minister.  In addition, he found teaching relatively unrewarding.  He wanted 
more than the life of a countryside grammarian.  Wilson was finally freed from the 
bondage of low-paying pedagogy in 1765 when one of his sisters married and some of his 
brothers having become older, became economically viable and supported their mother 
without James’ help.  He traveled to Edinburgh to study bookkeeping and accounting.68   
 Though he found Edinburgh sufferable, Wilson’s attention was gradually turning 
to British America.  Before Wilson had come to Edinburgh his cousin and friend Robert 
Annan had achieved the Presbyterian ministry and relocated to southern Pennsylvania.  
Other relatives had made their way across the Atlantic as well and sent back positive 
descriptions of their new homes.  Finally, becoming determined to make the crossing 
himself, he had only to overcome the protestations of his mother and obtain the money to 
make the crossing.  Once he convinced his mother, Wilson’s relatives in Fife raised 
money for his voyage.69  
 Arriving in New York in the fall of 1765, Wilson continued on to Philadelphia.  
Bearing a letter of introduction to Reverend William Smith, the trustee of the College of 
Philadelphia, Wilson secured a position as a Latin tutor.  The College proved kind to 
James Wilson and he must have impressed the faculty.  Just one year later, in 1766, he 
received an honorary masters degree from the College along side Joseph Reed.70  
 Yet, Wilson was again feeling restless.  In the land of lawyers that was colonial 
America it became evident to Wilson that the most prominent men in Pennsylvania were 
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 lawyers.  The respect, wealth and power that many lawyers held must have been 
attractive to Wilson, who was beyond doubt an ambitious young man.  So, later in the 
same year that he received his master’s degree from the College of Philadelphia, Wilson 
left the College and apprenticed himself under John Dickinson to study law.   
 In order to pay Dickinson’s fee, Wilson bought a small farm on credit from his 
cousin Robert Annan.  Wilson then sold the farm to Dickinson for money to pay 
Dickinson’s fee and have money to live on throughout the apprenticeship.71  It is ironic 
that this introduction to land speculation as a source of wealth allowed Wilson to enter 
the world of law.  Just as most of Wilson’s later accomplishments involved law and the 
philosophy of law, he was financially troubled and then ruined in later life by incredibly 
reckless land speculations.  That financial failure stagnated his judicial career, tarnished 
his reputation and eclipsed his significance.72   
 Wilson’s study of the law under Dickinson ranged from procedural matters of 
contract and torts to the 1701 constitution of colonial Pennsylvania and the history of the 
colony’s governors.  Wilson was also immersed deeply into legal theory.  Looking for 
evidence of what Wilson studied in his meticulous study notes, Wilson’s biographer 
Charles Page Smith found a broad treatment of legal theory.  Hume, Montesquieu, 
Ferguson, Blackstone, Hooker, Bacon, Bolingbroke, Locke and Sidney all share 
influence on Wilson’s notes according to Smith.  Wilson also wrote down general 
categories of law.  Probably suggested to him by Dickinson, these categories of law were 
Natural, Revealed, “General Customs, Maxims, Particular Customs, (and) Statutes.”73  
Twenty-four years later Wilson would again put great importance in such a categorization 
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 of the law in structuring his law lectures at the College of Philadelphia.  The particular 
categories had, however, changed.  By 1790, Wilson had decided to organize law in a 
way closer to Richard Hooker’s: law eternal, law celestial, laws of matter, laws of natural 
man and oracular law.74    
 Dickinson’s influence aside, the colonial world in which Wilson lived was 
transforming his thinking.  When he landed in New York angry mutterings continued to 
abound over the Sugar Act of the previous year.  And opposition politics reached a 
fevered pitch throughout the colonies over news of the Stamp Act by the time Wilson 
received his M.A. from the College of Philadelphia.75  Though Pennsylvania’s 
conservative, Quaker dominated Assembly failed to send delegates to the Stamp Act 
Congress, radical politics was alive and well in Philadelphia.  Joseph Galloway’s 
conservatives had won the day in the Assembly by only one vote, but through the use of 
committees, Philadelphians organized to resist Parliament.  They convinced the city’s 
appointed stamp agent, John Hughs, not to exercise his duties and the city’s merchants 
formed a boycott against imported British goods.76   
 Wilson’s newfound mentor, John Dickinson, was drawn into Philadelphia’s 
radical committee politics by the mid-1760s.77  It was shortly after Wilson finished his 
tutelage that Dickinson penned his famous “Farmer’s Letters” to defend the cause of 
Whig resistance in colonial America.  The public success of the “Farmer’s Letters” in 
1767 inspired Wilson to pen his own opposition piece, Considerations on the Nature and 
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 Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, later in the same year.  Yet, 
Considerations on...Parliament would not be published until 1774.78
 Wilson had finished his apprenticeship under Dickinson by February of 1767, 
approximately half a year after he had begun.  Soon after, Wilson was practicing in the 
Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia and was, by summer, working his way out into 
the western circuit.  Shortly after Wilson moved his practice to Reading, on the borders 
of the Pennsylvanian frontier, he submitted his Considerations on...Parliament to Dr. 
Francis Alison for an opinion.  Alison was an older professor of Metaphysics and Logic 
and vice-provost of the College of Philadelphia.  Billy White, through whom Wilson sent 
his work, criticized Wilson that it should have gone instead to Dr. John Ewing, professor 
of Natural Law.  The reason why Wilson did not prefer to send Considerations 
on...Parliament to Ewing is unknown.79  He may have developed a closer relationship to 
Alison while at the College.  And Wilson was probably sure of his work’s natural law 
foundations, but was still concerned whether or not he had reasoned well from those 
foundations.   
 Wilson’s choice in the matter may seem of small consequence but it is in fact very 
telling of the young Wilson’s thinking on epistemology and law.  An older Wilson, 
delivering law lectures at the College of Philadelphia, elucidated on these issues, 
demonstrating a deep grounding in Scottish common sense thought.  He asserted that 
Thomas Hutchinson had been right when he said that morality was the perception of 
God‘s law or natural law (Wilson never made a distinction between the two.)  In addition, 
Wilson thought that all human beings had this moral perception.  But what could actually 
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 be perceived were fundamental moral precepts (an example for an older Wilson would 
probably be sovereignty.)  But taking those fundamental precepts and applying them to 
specific situations in the ever-changing world required reasoning.  And, unlike moral 
perception, reasoning was not an equally distributed faculty.  Though reason was 
necessary for human beings to apply their moral understanding to the day to day world, 
poor or corrupted reasoning was the root of corruption and evil in the everyday world.  
Poor reasoning could corrupt the application of morality or even cloud moral perception 
itself.  Indeed, later on, corruption would be how Wilson explained not only evil in the 
world but immorality among the uncivilized -- their power to reason had not been 
cultivated and refined.80  
 Though Wilson did not write on epistemological issues until he was an older man, 
he had probably come early to his concept of moral perception, reason, and their 
relationship to law.  He had been exposed to these concepts originally as a boy at St. 
Andrews.  And his immersion in law under Dickinson probably inspired Wilson to an 
early effort to fit together Scottish common sense thought and law as it existed in the 
trans-Atlantic British world.  In looking for criticism, it was consistent for Wilson to seek 
out advice on his reasoning, but not the fundamental precepts upon which he based his 
argument.  To believe Wilson’s own claims in the Advertisement at the front of 
Considerations on...Parliament when he finally published the pamphlet, the conclusions 
he reached had surprised even him.81   
 Alison claimed to like Considerations on...Parliament but thought it overly 
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 radical.82  He warned Wilson against publishing it because conservatives still controlled 
politics in Philadelphia.  The response to Dickinson’s “Letters” had by no means been 
entirely positive in the city.83  When the non-importation agreement between Philadelphia 
merchants fell apart from factional in-fighting, Wilson conceded to Alison’s opinion.  
Wilson would later cite the failure of the non-importation agreement as the central reason 
for not publishing in 1767.84      
 When Considerations on...Parliament was published, many in the radical 
movement were already coming to the same conclusions that Wilson had in his pamphlet.  
By 1774, it held no surprises.85  But within the context of 1767, Wilson’s reasoning had 
been far ahead of its time. 
 Dickinson, in his “Letters” had argued that Parliament could legislate for British 
America in cases of external regulation in the interest of promoting the wealth of the 
whole empire.  They could not regulate the internal affairs of the colonies and especially 
could not do so to raise revenue.  Otherwise, the colonists would be denied their core 
English right to be taxed only by their own representatives.  Wilson’s argument was not 
dissimilar but went much further than Dickinson’s and denied Parliament the right to 
regulate for the colonies in any case whatsoever.86   
 First, Wilson moved through examples of how Parliament could be as corrupt and 
threatening to liberty as the King.  According to Wilson, Parliaments could be kept 
virtuous only through frequent elections, among other checks on power.  The British 
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 constitution guaranteed the election of parliamentary representatives by free, propertied 
Britons.   Parliament had an authority to legislate because “the commons” had given their 
consent to it in the understanding that their liberties would be protected.  That trust could 
be extended because Parliament’s “interests, and that of their families, friends, and 
posterity, cannot be different from the interests of the rest of the nation.”  Popular 
representation in the legislative process was not only a right of all propertied British 
subjects but a constitutional check on the power of Parliament.  Legislative power could 
not be constitutional if it was not established and maintained by consent.  Wilson ignored 
the idea of parliamentary sovereignty and assumed that parliamentary power was purely 
delegatory.  He did not yet use the words “sovereignty of the people” or “popular 
sovereignty,” but Wilson was implicitly arguing that the supreme power had been derived 
from the people, and had been vested in the British constitution, not British Parliament.87    
 Using these principles, firmly rooted in British constitutional thought as colonists 
understood it, Wilson cited cases in law that supported British America’s Whig 
opposition.  Central in Wilson’s examples was Lord Coke’s judgment that the Irish could 
not be taxed because they had no representatives in Parliament.  Wilson concluded that 
“The American colonies are not bound by the acts of the British Parliament, because they 
are not represented in it.”  Wilson made no distinctions between internal and external 
regulations.88   
 Yet like most British Americans -- even British American radicals until 1775 -- 
Wilson was still willing to pay deference to the authority of the monarchy, and the idea 
that contractual obligations between the King and his subjects existed.  The obligation of 
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 dependence that the colonies owed to Great Britain only existed through the person of the 
King.  Citing Francis Bacon for legal support, Wilson argued that “the only dependency 
which they (the colonists)...ought to acknowledge, is a dependency on the crown.”  It was 
the only dependency that had precedence and “the colonists ought to be dependent on the 
king, because they enjoy...his protection.”  The allegiance of subject to monarch existed 
within a reciprocal relationship.  In return for protection, subjects owed their king 
obedience and the protection of the king was a birthright.  “An Englishman, who removes 
to foreign countries” Wilson continued, “owes the same allegiance to his king...(and 
is)...still entitled to the advantages promised by law (and) to the duties of it.”  Wilson 
even sounded what appears to be an ultra-conservative note concerning monarchy.  
Because the King protects subjects even when they are children, before their allegiance 
can be meaningful, every subject had a debt of allegiance to the king for services already 
rendered.89     
 Nonetheless, the power of the monarchy was also limited by the British 
constitution -- the embodiment of the contract between the King and his subjects.  The 
British monarchy did not exist to protect life alone, but also existed to protect liberty.  
The constitution dictated that not even the king could compel the colonies to 
unconstitutional actions like obeying Parliament.  As Wilson pointed out in the middle of 
his discussion on Parliament’s authority “the Americans are bound neither by the assent 
of the king, nor by the votes of the lords, to obey acts of British Parliament.”90   
 In his last paragraphs Wilson described a federal idea of empire predating John 
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 Adam’s argument for the same thing six years later.91  Describing the appropriate 
imperial powers of the king, Wilson wrote “he has a negative on the different legislatures 
throughout his dominions, so that he can prevent any repugnancy in their different laws.”  
The British King’s purpose was to ensure imperial comity and equity, while British 
Parliament is denied special status in this statement.  Britain’s Parliament was merely one 
of a multitude of legislatures in the King’s dominions.  Under the British constitution, 
King and Commons were to act as countervailing powers that “checked the progress of 
arbitrary power” and the colonies had their own Commons in the form of their local 
assemblies.  These local assemblies had the sole right to legislate for their respective 
colonies and should exist in a constitutional balance with the monarchy, like British 
Parliament in Great Britain.92   Historian Mark David Hall has written that Wilson 
“developed the concept that would be later known as the...‘commonwealth’ status of 
English colonies.”   “Developed” is probably too strong of a word.  Wilson was 
proposing a hazy vision deeply rooted in a well-remembered pre-existing tradition of 
imperial/colonial interaction.  Wilson, and later Adams and Jefferson, described the 
actual nature of the empire before war debt made Parliament more jealous of its own 
imperial influence; the empire had been better for British Americans before the Seven 
Years War.93  But they were also arguing for something new because their immediate 
peril forced them to envision a new, positive codification of that older arrangement that 
would extend even into “external” regulation.  British Americans wanted an arrangement 
that would guarantee British American liberty from the avaricious powers that appeared 
to be growing in Britain itself.  
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  Considerations on...Parliament is interesting for a number of reasons.  It suggests 
the speed with which Wilson embraced radical thinking in British America as well as his 
ability to think ahead, particularly on key theoretical issues.  A blend of general 
influences can also be seen in this work from Enlightenment thought to the concerns of 
the Commonwealth writers with corruption.  A strict adherence to what legal historian 
John Philip Reid has called the common law constitutional tradition, can also be seen. 
Wilson’s pamphlet places great emphasis on legal precedence as would be expected in a 
common law argument.  Most important, these passages evidence Wilson‘s continued 
dedication to the monarchy, as well as his implicitly contractual conceptualization of 
government and popular rights.94     
 After deciding not to publish his first opposition pamphlet, Wilson turned to his 
business in Reading, Pennsylvania.  Reading was a western town with an economy based 
in farming and the processing of beaver pelts.95  Moving into western Pennsylvania, 
Wilson hoped to make his legal practice more profitable by taking advantage of land 
controversies between litigious settlers.   But this idea was the hope of many lawyers.  
Wilson found the western settlements well populated by fellow professionals.  
Nonetheless, Wilson proved a highly proficient practitioner and his business profited.  He 
intermittently rode the western circuit while maintaining his Philadelphia contacts.  In 
1769, he began arguing cases in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at Philadelphia.  By 
1770, when he moved to the Cumberland Count seat at Carlisle, Wilson’s legal career 
was in rapid ascension.  In 1771 he married his first wife, the prominent Rachael Bird of 
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 Berks County, bringing with her the wealth of an heiress.  And by 1772, James’s and 
Rachael’s first child, Polly, was born.96
 The British American colonies also reached a new bar in 1772.  Parliament had 
retained the tea tax from the failed Townshend Duties in 1770.  Yet, as was always the 
case with Britain’s attempt to establish duties over the colonies, the tea duty proved 
difficult to enforce.  Parliament was, nonetheless, determined to see the tax enforced and 
in 1772 tried to empower its colonial officials to enforce it.  British Americans reacted.  
The British vessel, Gaspee ran aground chasing a ship in Rhode Island and was burned by 
a crowd.  And Sam Adams went to work forming Committees of Correspondence to 
promote uniform resistance throughout the colonies.97  
 Philadelphia’s opposition leaders, reacting to Sam Adam’s call, set up their own 
Committee of Correspondence and reinvigorated their resistance movement.  Under the 
shadow of Parliament’s Coercive Acts against Massachusetts in 1774, the Philadelphia 
Committee effectively usurped much of the political influence of the intransigently 
conservative Governor and colonial Assembly.  The various counties of Pennsylvania 
formed committees as well, connecting outlying towns to the committee movement in 
Philadelphia.98   
 Many prominent citizens in Carlisle involved themselves in the standing 
Cumberland Committee of Correspondence.  Wilson was one of the movement’s 
formative leaders.  He helped draw up the resolutions creating the Cumberland 
Committee.  Echoing the Committee in Philadelphia, these resolutions condemned the 
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 Coercive Acts and called for a Continental Congress.  Within days after its formation, the 
Cumberland Committee sent out a group of delegates, that included Wilson, to convene 
with others at a Provincial Convention in Philadelphia, and discuss the upcoming 
Continental Congress.99    
 Events moved quickly in Philadelphia and in British North America in general.  
The Provincial Convention in Philadelphia drafted instructions to the Pennsylvania 
Assembly.  Primarily the work of John Dickinson, and edited by a special committee that 
included Wilson and Joseph Reed, the instructions demanded the appointment of 
delegates to the Continental Congress.  The Assembly, feeling intense political pressure, 
acquiesced to the Convention’s demands.100  But to mitigate the effect of the first 
Continental Congress, conservatives in the Assembly appointed a heavily conservative 
delegation that included Joseph Galloway himself.  Only one member of the delegation, 
Thomas Mifflin, was known to be sympathetic to the radical committee movement.101
 Fortunately for the Pennsylvania Whig opposition, Galloway and his allies did not 
undermine the pro-active nature of the Congress.  Though conservatives dominated the 
Pennsylvania delegation, Mifflin and Dickinson were better connected politically with 
the delegates of the other colonies than Galloway and his followers.  The radical 
committeemen had been communicating for years with opposition leaders in the other 
colonies while inward looking conservatives, like Galloway, ignored external relations.  
Galloway also miscalculated the popularity of the opposition movement in the other 
colonies.  He assumed (wrongly it turned out) that the delegations from the other colonies 
would be predominantly conservative like his own.  The fact that they would convene in 
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 Philadelphia also probably gave Galloway a false sense of security.  The cold truth of 
Galloway’s political impotence probably began to occur to him when the Congress chose 
to convene in Carpenter’s Hall, the headquarters of radical committee activity in 
Philadelphia since its inception.102  
 Emboldened by the Suffolk Resolves, the Continental Congress recommended a 
non-importation agreement among the colonies and Committees of Association to 
enforce it.103  Radical committeemen called another Provincial Convention in 
Philadelphia to support and act upon the recommendations of Congress in January 1775.  
The second Provincial Convention also suggested that programs be established to 
promote domestic production.104  Wilson again played a key role, this time by delivering 
the Convention’s only formal oration.  Shortly after the first Provincial Convention, 
Wilson had finally published his Considerations On...Parliament.  Perhaps the timely 
pamphlet, exceedingly well argued though no longer ahead of its time, was enough to win 
him the honor of delivering the singular oration.  And Wilson’s dedication to the 
committee movement would have also been apparent, by this time, to the rest of the 
radical leadership.  In his speech, Wilson outlined the complaints of British America 
against a tyrannical British Parliament, described the events that necessitated the 
acceleration of American resistance, and lamented the lack of understanding that the 
British people themselves had shown.  He re-argued his main theme in 
Considerations...On Parliament, but more boldly implicated that the king may be at fault 
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 and referred to the colonial assemblies as parliaments.105     
   In the summer of 1774, as the Continental Congress was still meeting, radicals 
won an electoral victory in Pennsylvania.  They took many seats in the colonial 
Assembly, Dickinson himself winning a seat.106  By mid-1775, in the wake of the 
bloodshed at Concord and Lexington the colonial assemblies agreed to convene another 
Continental Congress.  Again, the Pennsylvania Assembly sent delegates to Congress, but 
this time the delegation would be dominated by dedicated opposition Whigs.  The 
Assembly appointed Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, and Thomas Willing to the loss 
of the Galloway conservatives.107  With this appointment, Wilson took his first step into 
continental politics.   
 In Congress, Wilson busied himself with committee work.  Congress first 
appointed Wilson to a committee for considering a letter from Massachusetts's Provincial 
Congress at Watertown.  The letter asked two questions: should the Provincial Congress 
take over governing Massachusetts?  And, would the Continental Congress send someone 
to take over the army surrounding Boston?  On the later question Congress answered in 
the affirmative, eventually selecting a Virginian with extensive military experience, 
George Washington.108  On the first question, however, the congressional committee’s 
answer was nebulous.  It advised that the Assembly take on whatever responsibilities they 
thought necessary to save their country and maintain the union of the colonies.109  Yet, 
Congress placed an interesting caveat on its advice.  The Massachusetts Provincial 
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 Congress was to act defensively only until “a Governor of His Majesty’s appointment, 
will consent to govern the colony according to its charter.”  The mentality of the 
congressional majority rings out in this statement.  As late as the Spring of 1775, the 
colonies were still uniting, and fighting to get back into the British Empire on more 
equitable terms, not out of the British Empire -- yet.  They continued to hope that King 
George III would come to their rescue.   
 The King could not and did not want to help the cause of local representation in 
British America.  Though British Americans did not acknowledge it, Parliament was 
sovereign in Britain, not the King or the mixed constitution.110  Paradoxically, though 
George III certainly wanted to control Parliament he had no aspirations of becoming a 
supreme monarch.  The King disliked the American idea of multiple assemblies under the 
Crown because it would have strained his ministry’s finances.  Sustaining the necessary 
systems of patronage to keep them all in line would have been too difficult and 
expensive.  It was simply easier to focus on a single Parliament than many.111   
 But few colonists understood this new British reality.  Even if they had, it would 
have offended them.  So, when George III ignored the Olive Branch Petition it irritated 
the colonists.  And when he declared the colonies to be in rebellion, most in the colonies 
were dumbfounded.  The one constitutional connection that British Americans believed 
existed between themselves and Great Britain was the monarchy.112  After the King 
condemned them, their own constitutional arguments left them with only two options: 
either capitulate or declare war on the monarch.  In doing the latter, geography made it 
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 impossible to overthrow the British monarch and replace him with another.  Therefore, 
making war against the king would have to mean separation -- independence.113  The fact 
that they eventually chose the latter says a lot about them, but so does their reticence in 
accepting that ultimate solution.  
 Shortly after the King’s rejection of the American cause and his concurrent 
accusation that their goal was independence, Continental forces met disaster in Canada.  
Canadians repelled the American attempt to liberate Quebec, resulting in the maiming of 
one of America’s finest military leaders, Benedict Arnold.  It was in this disheartening 
atmosphere that James Wilson moved to make a declaration in response to the king’s 
charges.  In his motion Wilson acted as if Congress should prepare a rebuttal to the king’s 
claim that they wanted independence.  This alarmed John Adams whose thinking was 
ahead of most of his associates.  Adams had already come to the conclusion that 
independence was not only plausible but preferable.  He had already proposed a 
committee to draft articles of confederation but conservatives, marshaled by John 
Dickinson, had blocked the move.  Adams in turn tried, but failed to block the drafting 
committee for the proposed rebuttal.  It was just more conservative stalling in the eyes of 
Adams.  And any official rebuttal of the idea of independence could only undermine 
America’s future position, which Adams understood to rest with independence.114  
 The document that the drafting committee produced was primarily the work of 
James Wilson.  Adams came to realize that he had misunderstood Wilson -- he would not 
be the last to do so.115  Completed by February of 1776, it was titled “An Address to the 
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 Inhabitants of the United Colonies.”  Adams must have been relieved because it was no 
more a condemnation of the idea of independence than it was a promotion of it.  The 
rhetorically thick, 6000-plus word document was nebulous in its handling of the two 
opposing positions.  Conservatives were certainly disappointed in “An Address” as 
evidenced when the document was tabled and forgotten, surely to Wilson‘s irritation.116   
 “An Address” attempted to issue a consensus message by Congress to the people 
of the colonies, and in doing so, diffuse the confusion that many feared was gnawing at 
the foundations of colonial solidarity.  But new factions had formed, and began to 
dominate Congress by 1775.  Anti-independence conservatives led by Dickinson and pro-
independence radicals led by Adams had no use for consensus messages to the public that 
did not strongly support their particular factional views.  And “An Address” may not 
have served its purpose well in any case, because the document could itself be confusing.  
Congress was equivocating over the issue and “An Address” reflected the confused 
opinions of Congress too well to simplify the controversy for any common reader.  It was 
perhaps Wilson’s lone dialectic failure in the arena of written political controversy.         
 In “An Address,” Wilson argued the justice of the colonial cause: “The Calamites 
which threaten us would be attended with the total Loss of those Constitutions, formed 
upon the venerable Model of British Liberty” he wrote.  In this statement the committee 
reminded the reader of the threat to the colonial charters as well as the British 
constitution as a whole.  They also direct the reader to the meaning of those constitutions 
-- “British Liberty.”117   
 Perhaps answering Tory criticism, the committee added, “To avert those 
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 Calamities we are under the Necessity of making temporary Deviations from those 
Constitutions.”  It had long been the argument of British America’s Whig opposition that 
they were dedicated to protecting the British Constitution against the caprice, first of an 
overreaching monarchy, and then of an overbearing Parliament.  Colonials saw their 
charters as being extensions of that larger constitution and therefore constitutions in 
themselves.  Liberty, of course, depended on the integrity of those constitutions and had 
to be defended.118  Yet, many Tories rebutted the Whig argument in the later phase of 
colonial struggle by pointing out that many opposition actions were technically 
unconstitutional.  The opposition had, after all, set up extra-legal committees that usurped 
official governmental powers even within the purely local context.  The Sons of Liberty 
that had evolved out of the Loyal Nine in Boston was an obvious example119 as was the 
burgeoning and ever more radical committee movement in Congress’s host colony of 
Pennsylvania.  And indeed, the Continental Congress itself could be cited as an 
unconstitutional institution!120  
 The standard Whig counter-argument was twofold.  “Necessity” was part of the 
British Constitution.  Legal precedence existed for justification by necessity in 
temporarily suspending laws and even constitutional forms.  The argument for necessity 
had been made by the winning sides of both the English Civil War and the Glorious 
Revolution.  It was particularly justifiable if the greatest possible good of the British 
Constitution, liberty itself, was at stake.121  It is important to note that the colonial Whig 
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 opposition claimed to be deviating from “those Constitutions” but never admitted to 
acting unconstitutionally.  The second, potentially more radical argument, was based on a 
natural right of rebellion against injustice.  This rationale was assumed to exist at the 
primeval root of the British constitution, the liberty it protected.122  The natural law 
foundations of the constitution were accepted in Britain as well as British America.  To 
base the justification of American opposition solely on natural law, however, would have 
been unusual.  Congress would not make such an argument until July of 1776.123   “An 
Address” referenced the earlier purely constitutional argument to justify extra-legal 
activity by the opposition.    
 Yet, perhaps most important was the committee’s description of authority.  
Toward the end of “An Address” the power of Congress was justified with “the sacred 
Authority of the People, from whom all legitimate Authority proceeds.”124  Here, the 
committee moved beyond the representative ethic of the common law British 
Constitution.  It is one thing to argue that legislatures must be elected by the people they 
tax to protect property and therefore liberty, quite another to say that “all legitimate 
Authority” must be founded on the people.  The first is a constitutional check on 
legislative authority; the later implied a popular check on all forms of governmental 
authority.  John Dickinson, in editing the committee’s work tried to strike out the entire 
sentence, but Wilson was adamant about retaining it.125    
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  Another curiosity of the statement is the use of present tense.  The committee 
maintained that authority “proceeds” rather than proceeded from the people.  Previous 
political philosophers and jurists from Hugo Grotius to David Hume and John Locke 
agreed that authority had historically or prehistorically been derived from human society.  
But in the case of Grotius and Hume, it was thought that when the people gave away 
power to government the transferal was permanent.  Locke and his later followers Jean 
Jacques Burlamaqui and Emmerich Vattel, would suggest otherwise.  This later cadre 
also argued that authority had been transferred from the People to governments at some 
earlier period.  Yet, the transfer was not necessarily permanent.  That transfer had been 
achieved through contract, and if any government broke that contract then the contract 
was dissolved and sovereignty returned to its original source, the People.126  The contract 
theory, of course, is the root of the natural law theory of rebellion that would find 
expression in the Declaration of Independence.  It does not find expression in “An 
Address.”  What is significant is that the reference to popular authority in “An Address” 
suggests popular sovereignty as a contemporary root of authority rather than a historic 
one, contrary to the views of Locke, Burlamaqui and Vattel.127  Normally, a single verb 
such as “proceeds” would not be worth so much interpretation.  But, considering the 
intellectual trajectory of the founding generation, the analysis is justified.  The wording in 
“An Address” is representative of a growing new political concept among American 
Whigs in 1776. Throughout the colonies, in the struggle over independence, many began 
embracing the concept of  a contemporary and un-transferable popular sovereignty.128 It 
                                                          
126  Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Heritage of the Constitutional Era: The Delegate’s Library 
(Philadelphia: The Library Company of Philadelphia, 1986), 13-18. 
127  Ibid., 13-18. 
128  Wood, American Republic, 362. 
52 
 also suggests that Wilson’s thinking was moving ahead of many others in Congress, most 
notably John Dickinson’s, and that Wilson was beginning to reject the idea of 
contractually transferred sovereignty as early as February, 1776.   
  The document’s conclusion is that the goal of the colonies is the “Re-
establishment of the constitutional Rights of the Colonies.”  And that, though the colonies 
wanted to do so within the Empire, their first priority was “that America may be Free;” in 
other words, with independence if necessary.129   
 1775 was not an unusual time for ideological innovation.  The entire eastern 
seaboard of British North America was undergoing a transformation in thinking.  As 
Wilson worked on “An Address,” Thomas Paine‘s Common Sense offered a newer more 
radical possibility to Americans.  Paine whipped the whispered argument for 
independence into a flame that burned across the ideological landscape of the eastern 
seaboard.  Through masterful polemics, Paine told Americans that the British constitution 
had never been perfect, or even worthy of affection, and that all monarchy was evil.  Pure 
republicanism could work according to Paine, particularly in America.  Common Sense 
filled the void that followed George III’s rejection, and the American mind embraced it.  
The treason of the King and the impassioned plea of Thomas Paine would finally push a 
great number of Americans into a new vision.130  But a convinced people would have to 
cajole, threaten and pull their colonial governments and their Congressmen to the 
forefront.131  
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   Yet, even in the wake of popular acceptance of  Common Sense, many in 
Congress were not convinced, and their reticence in taking up the cause of independence 
is understandable.  Whether considered contracts or instruments, the constitutions that 
opposition Whigs had been defending were more than plans of government or sets of 
rights, they were bonds of association with Great Britain and her Empire.  Dissolving that 
association meant, at least partially, dissolving those constitutions that Whigs in America 
had fought for so long to preserve.  Independence aimed at a paradoxical goal of 
dissolving those constitutions to preserve the liberties that they had historically preserved.   
 Whigs had also glorified the mixed nature of the British constitution.  Monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy, they told themselves, had been balanced to perfection in the 
King, House of Lords and Commons.  The British constitution represented the height of 
governmental achievement and yet in the years after the Seven Years War something had 
gone terribly wrong.  Parliament had become tyrannical.  Some blamed the Ministry 
while making excuses for the king.132  Paine had tried to debunk the old Whig myth cycle 
of constitutional disintegration and reconstitution, but some like Dickinson continued to 
resist the lesson; it was a difficult vision for old Whigs to let go of even in 1776.133  
 Many who were radicals in the early 1770s because of their support for resistance 
to British parliament and support for colonial unity, became the new conservatives of 
1775 and 1776.  This transformation was what happened to John Dickinson and Thomas 
Willing.  They did not revert to conservatism; rather, colonial radicalism had outpaced 
them in the debate for independence.  Dickinson could not support independence though 
he continued to fight for the American cause outside of Congress.  He clung to the hope 
                                                          
132  Ryerson, The Revolution is Now Begun, 155-175. 
133 Paine, Common Sense. 
54 
 that a peace, advantageous to American rights within the Imperial structure, could be 
achieved.  And he was not the only one.  Most of the Pennsylvania delegation could not 
bring themselves to vote for independence when the time came.  They would not agree to 
independence, even though Pennsylvania‘s Assembly rescinded the delegates’ original, 
prohibitive instructions, in a vain attempt at political self-preservation.134  
 Dickinson’s refusal to embrace independence in 1776 temporarily cost him his 
political career in Pennsylvania, and the failure of the colonial Assembly to embrace it 
eventually led to the dissolution of the Assembly and the colonial charter of 1701.135  
Wilson’s friendly association with the conservatives almost ended his career as well.   
 In May of 1776, a radical committee of one hundred, supported by the militia and 
a majority of Philadelphians, voted to hold a constitutional convention to frame a new 
state constitution.  Pennsylvania’s peaceful coup was partially enabled by John Adams 
who stealthily pushed a resolution through Congress that advised all of the colonies to 
support only governments that supported colonial rights.136   It was custom-made to 
undermine the Pennsylvania government that had so vocally opposed independence, and 
thereby terminate Dickinson’s conservative network.  Wilson, understanding the 
resolution’s import, tried to postpone it, saying that it placed the people of Pennsylvania 
“in a state of Nature.”  For Wilson, his attempted postponement was not a conservative 
counter-ploy but proceeded from an honest fear of violent anarchy.137   
 Yet, radicals in Pennsylvania certainly saw Wilson’s failed attempt at 
postponement as a betrayal.  Responding to the angry reaction of Pennsylvania’s radicals, 
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 Congress produced an apology for Wilson entitled “In Defense of James Wilson.”  
Suggestive of the respect that even radical Congressmen held for Wilson, it was signed 
by every member of Congress.138   
  On June 10, 1776 Congress passed portions of a pro-independence resolution 
proposed by Richard Henry Lee.  Congress formed two committees -- one to consider a 
Declaration of Independence and the other to draft Articles of Confederation.  But the 
definitive question of independence itself was postponed until July.139   
 As the date of the vote approached, Wilson asked that the vote again be 
postponed.  The Pennsylvania delegation had not yet received the repeal of its earlier 
anti-independence instructions and Wilson wanted the postponement to wait for new 
instructions.  Impatient radicals in Pennsylvania viewed this request as another betrayal.  
He was refused the postponement but, fortunately, the Pennsylvania Assembly’s new 
instructions arrived before the vote.140   
 When Congress cast the vote to accept or reject the Declaration of Independence, 
Dickinson and Robert Morris refused to vote, while Charles Humphreys and Thomas 
Willing opposed it.  James Wilson, John Morton and Benjamin Franklin, unshackled by a 
fearful Pennsylvania Assembly, supported it.  By a slim margin, Pennsylvania‘s single 
vote was cast for independence.  Wilson and Dickinson had parted ways, at least on the 
issue of independence.141
 Of course, Wilson did not escape from the controversy of independence wholly 
unscathed.  Regardless of bi-partisan support for him in Congress and his eventual 
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 support for independence, radicals in Pennsylvania had come to distrust Wilson.  And it 
would be the radicals who controlled Pennsylvania after 1776, under their controversial 
constitution of 1776.  Pennsylvania’s new radical Assembly returned Wilson to Congress 
in February of 1777 only because their first choice for Wilson’s replacement, William 
Moore had declined.142   
 During his first career as a Congressman, both before and after the independence 
controversy, Wilson proved to be an active member and a consistent populist.  He was an 
active member of numerous committees including the Committee on Indian Affairs and, 
along with just four others, he served on the Board of War that oversaw military affairs.  
In the debates over the proposed Articles of Confederation, Wilson was one of those who 
campaigned for proportional representation by population in Congress, rather than equal 
state representation.  And it was Wilson who made a failed motion, seconded by John 
Adams, to open Congress to the public.  But, regardless of Wilson’s energy or populism, 
radicals in Pennsylvania continued to dislike him.  In addition, Wilson’s behavior shortly 
after his return to Congress appears to have been fatalistic, as if he deliberately intended 
to commit political suicide.  Perhaps he thought his removal from Congress was 
inevitable or his scruples necessitated a certain forwardness.  Whatever the case, as soon 
as the radical Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was complete Wilson began to criticize 
it in public and in his correspondence.  Reacting, the state Assembly removed Wilson 
from Congress in September of 1777.143  Wilson’s first career as a continental statesman 
had come to an end.  
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  Wilson’s first years in America were filled with excitement, transforming Wilson, 
as well as the North American continent.  The majority of Europeans living on the eastern 
coast of North America convulsively turned from British Americans, dedicated to the 
mixed government of the British Empire, into Americans dedicated to creating lasting, 
pure republics.  Amid all of the tumult, however, some consistencies can be found.  Many 
political ideas, certainly those that had motivated the Revolution, remained an influence.  
A belief remained in the corrupting influence of concentrated, unchecked power, the 
requirement of constitutionalism and the centrality of positive rights, embodied in actual 
representation in government for the preservation of liberty.  “Liberty” itself was, 
perhaps, the most important consistency.  Whigs had tried to preserve the British 
constitution and the colonial charters to preserve liberty, but once the constitution proved 
too corrupt to preserve they embraced independence and pure republicanism to preserve 
liberty as well.  So, if consistency counts for authenticity, the American Revolution 
would be better known as a “liberty revolution” than a “republican” or “constitutional 
revolution.”  Such was the spirit captured by Wilson when he wrote during the 
independence controversy that it was preferable to remain in the Empire, but if necessary, 
they would leave to secure their core goal -- “that America may be Free.”  The 
preservation and even progress of “liberty” was the goal.  First mixed government and 
constitutionalism, and then republicanism and constitutionalism were the tools that 
American radicals alternately depended upon to achieve the goal.   
  Of course, some were slower than others to accept that the preservation of liberty 
required independence and the construction of pure republics.  Some would never accept 
this end at all and became Tories.  Wilson certainly lagged behind the Adams’s in the 
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 realization that independence was a necessity, but so had most in Congress.  In the end, 
before the Declaration of Independence was voted on, Wilson had decided for 
independence.  He probably had also come to think of sovereignty residing 
contemporarily and un-transferrably in the people at large by 1776, like many other 



















                                                          




WILSON: EVOLVING DEMOCRAT OR CONSPIRATORIAL ELITIST? 
 
 Though a pivotal political figure of the revolutionary cause, Wilson’s enemies in 
Philadelphia often reviled him as an aristocrat, even accusing him of  being a closet Tory.  
Nothing could have been further from the truth.  But Wilson’s sloth in embracing 
independence had made him suspect, and his resistance to the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution and the later price control movement nearly cost the statesman his life. 
 As Wilson protested Pennsylvania’s constitution of 1776 from Congress, 
Pennsylvania became more factionalized over the issue.  Anti-constitutionalists began to 
organize against the new constitution, proclaiming that their goal was to amend or replace 
the radical constitution.  This movement took on the title of the “Republicans.” In 
reaction, pro-constitutionalist forces rallied as the “Constitutionalists.”145   
 The committees that seized control of Pennsylvania had depended on the support 
of the lower classes that were composed mainly of Presbyterians.  These radical 
committees had been opposed by the older Quaker/Anglican political order that had 
controlled the colonial government under the charter of 1701.  The constitution that 
radicals designed in 1776 reflected the previous decade of struggle, and can be viewed as 
a logical outcome of those struggles.  It was also one of the first new state constitutions 
following independence, and therefore one of the first constitutional experiments in pure 
republicanism in America.  Like most of the new state constitutions, Pennsylvanians 
crafted their constitution of 1776 to maximize the powers of the assembly while 
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 minimizing the powers of the executive, but the radical Pennsylvanians took these 
precepts to extremes.  The Pennsylvanians also tried to construct constitutional 
mechanisms to realize popular sovereignty in the highest echelons of the political 
process.146  
 To assuage the lower class supporters of the radical cause, the state convention 
expanded suffrage in the new state constitution to include all adult, male inhabitants who 
had resided in the state for a year and had been assessed for any tax.  Because of this 
innovation, the Pennsylvanian constitution is commonly thought to be one of the most 
democratic constitutions produced by the states, as it was then.  Yet, the test oath, 
specifically designed to alienate the Quakers and their allies (Quakers considered the 
taking of oaths to be prohibitively impious), makes the overall democratic nature of that 
constitution questionable.  The structure of government required by the constitution 
involved a unicameral legislature, a plural executive of twelve called the “Supreme 
Executive Council,” and a “Council of Censors” to assemble every seven years with the 
option of remaining in session for a maximum of one year.147   
 The legislature proved the most dominant force in the government.  Each county 
was equally represented in the assembly, but that would change after two years when a 
census was to be taken, after which representation was to be in proportion to population.  
The population of the counties would be re-assessed every seven years.148
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  The Pennsylvanian President was the chairman of the Supreme Executive 
Council.  The Council was a plural executive that was elected by popular vote.  But the 
Council’s President was selected jointly by the Councilmen and the Assembly.  The 
President could do nothing without the consent of his Council, and the whole executive 
was without a veto and nearly powerless to act without the express consent of the 
legislature.  The Council appointed all non-elected officers, including judges who would 
sit for seven-year terms rather than during good behavior.149   
 In an attempt to institutionally realize popular sovereignty Pennsylvania radicals 
had established two political mechanisms aside from the popular election of key 
government officials.  First, the legislature could not pass legislation into law without 
first publishing and distributing bills for public perusal and approval.  Second, 
amendments to the constitution could only be made by special conventions elected by the 
People to make amendments.  However, only the Council of Censors had the 
constitutional right to call for such conventions.   
 The Council of Censors would be popularly elected septennialy (one 
representative being sent from each county), to sit for one year and review laws already 
passed to determine their constitutionality.  In this way, Pennsylvania radicals searched 
for a mechanism to counter-act the constitutional decay that they believed had come to 
corrupt the British constitution -- the Censors was their solution.  If the Censors found a 
law unconstitutional then it became void.  They could also call for special conventions to 
make amendments in the constitution.150  
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  The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 proved a clumsy instrument of 
government, particularly in times of emergency.  And the sloth and impotence of the 
government that it created would only be exacerbated by the factional struggles that its 
passage initiated.              
 Analyzing votes in the Pennsylvanian Assembly along lines of wealth, regional 
affiliation and religion, historian O.S. Ireland has shown that religion was the most 
prevalent predicator of factionalism between Constitutionalists and Republicans on a 
state wide basis.  The centrality of religious issues makes sense within the context of 
Pennsylvania’s history up to 1776.  The Anglican/Quaker alliance that had controlled 
colonial politics under the old charter had been ostracized from their dominant political 
positions in 1776.  The radicals who replaced them under the new constitution of  1776 
were predominantly Presbyterian, Calvinist and Lutheran, and had placed a test oath in 
the constitution that alienated Pennsylvania’s Quakers.  Many still active Anglicans 
reacted by organizing opposition that coalesced into the anti-constitutional, Republican 
party.  Republicans focused most on the test oath over the next thirteen years of factional 
strife.151  Of course, not every Republican was an Anglican or Quaker.  Exceptions 
existed such as James Wilson, who was a Presbyterian, but the majority of core 
Republicans were certainly children of the older religio-political alliance.  
 Nonetheless, the religious and constitutional factionalists of Pennsylvania adopted 
other issues, either to bolster support for their factions or because their own convictions 
dictated that they promote an additional agenda.  The issue of price controls provides an 
excellent example.  In 1778-79, Pennsylvania, and particularly the artisans and laborers 
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 of Philadelphia, groaned under the pressure of run-away inflation. They demanded action 
and claimed that price-gouging Tory merchants were to blame.  Their solution was price 
controls.  The Constitutionalist legislature balked and the Constitutionalist Joseph Reed, 
by then President of Pennsylvania, thought the idea of price controls foolish.  
Nonetheless, in Philadelphia Constitutionalists like Tom Paine and Charles Willson Peale 
rushed to the common man’s cause of price controls, eventually setting up an extra-legal 
committee to issue and enforce prices.  These men may have had humanitarian 
convictions concerning price controls as poor relief, but many Philadelphia 
Constitutionalists saw price controls as a way to bolster support for their faction in the 
city.152   
 The factional issues of the Republicans and the Constitutionalists became even 
further complicated because elites in the respective factions often had additional scruples 
against the 1776 Constitution.  Benjamin Rush despised the constitution on the grounds 
that it was too democratic and threatened anarchy in government.  It was bad enough that 
most Republicans represented the dominant religio-political faction of pre-independence 
Pennsylvania, but when claims such as Rush’s came out of Republican meetings, 
Constitutionalists took full advantage of the anti-popular rhetoric.  Constitutionalists 
pigeonholed Republicans as closet Tories and aristocrats.153  
 James Wilson’s complaint against the 1776 constitution was three fold.  First, like 
almost every Republican, he focused on the unfairness -- the illiberality -- of the 
constitution’s test oath.  Second, Wilson complained that the various offices and powers 
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 of the constitution did not have the appropriate institutional checks and balances to guard 
against corruption.  Wilson disliked the unicameral legislature and was particularly 
suspicious of the Council of Censors, which, in its yearlong session, would hold 
exceedingly great powers.  The 1776 constitution was also, quite simply, impractical.  
Legislation was an exceedingly slow process and the septennial limitation on the 
amendment process was overly rigid.  Unlike his friend and factional compatriot Rush, 
Wilson never argued that the 1776 constitution was too popular.154  Nonetheless, 
factional strife was no place for refined discernments.  Wilson had taken up the mantle of 
a leading Republican partisan and his opponents labeled him an aristocrat for it.    
 Ejected from Congress and returning to his law practice in Carlisle, Wilson took a 
leading role in Cumberland County‘s anti-constitutional movement.  Carlisle proved to be 
predominantly Constitutionalist.  The hostile environment of Carlisle, combined with 
new business opportunities proffered by his friends in mercantile ventures, made the idea 
of returning to Philadelphia attractive.  But Philadelphia had been occupied by the British 
in 1777.  It would only be days after the British evacuation of Philadelphia in June 1778 
that Wilson would sell his house in Carlisle and return to the city.155   
 Returning to Philadelphia, Wilson began arguing cases in the Courts.  Wilson had 
become one of the most successful lawyers in Pennsylvania before he had entered 
Congress, and his reputation had not faded during his time in government service.  
 The people of Philadelphia had been enraged by the British occupation, and once 
the troops had gone, they turned their wrath against those in the city who were thought to 
be Tory.  Wilson, believing that many of the “Tories” had been wrongfully accused, 
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 joined with like-minded lawyers George Ross and William Lewis to defend them.  All of 
their defendants were accused of treason because they had aided the British during their 
occupation of the city.  Many were neutral Quakers who had, like others, cooperated with 
the British when it was expedient.  The defense attorneys put forth their best effort but in 
some instances an unfriendly, politicized jury (something that Wilson complained of 
more than once to the Court) found the accused guilty.156  It was a noble action, 
comparable to John Adam’s defense of the British soldiers and an officer following the 
Boston Massacre, but most Tory baiters in the city surely did not see the behavior so 
benignly.157  Also, when the state of Pennsylvania seized the property of the Penn family 
under the divestment act of 1779, Wilson and his friends argued before the state assembly 
in favor of compensation for the Penns.  So, Wilson’s loyalties must have appeared 
suspect to the majority of people in Philadelphia -- certainly the agitated lower classes.158    
 Wilson also allied himself with his Republican compatriots on the issue of price 
controls in 1779.  Republicans in Philadelphia formed a united voice against price 
controls, in defiance of the Constitutionalists and their extra-legal Committee of Trade. 
Merchants such as Robert Morris or men intimately involved in mercantile ventures such 
as Wilson made up the Republican leadership.159  They advocated free markets.  Wilson 
had been an advocate of the ascending theory of self-regulating markets at least since 
1774.  In his revised Considerations...On Parliament, Wilson included a footnote at the 
end that anticipated criticism of his theory of confederated Empire.  Because he had 
denied British Parliament the right to regulate American trade, Wilson understood that 
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 some would think that he was arguing for anarchy in trans-Atlantic trade.  Pre-supposing 
this criticism, Wilson rebutted, arguing that Atlantic markets could regulate themselves.   
“The stream of commerce,” Wilson had told the reader in 1774, “never flows with so 
much beauty and advantage, as when it is not diverted from its natural channels.”160  
Wilson agreed with Morris that inflation had been caused by the excess issuance of paper 
currency and not unscrupulous merchants operating within a British plot.  But the 
rejection of price controls by Morris, Wilson and the Republican Society of Philadelphia 
must have made them appear to be cold aristocrats indeed, particularly in the eyes of 
desperate laborers -- a newly politicized class of men that dominated the militia.161  
 To understand Wilson’s idea of progress, at least economic progress, it is 
necessary to understand that Wilson, at least partially, embraced a rising new ideology 
that contemporary historians have called “political economy.”  The tension that existed 
between this new ideology and older, traditional socio-economic ideas, that historians 
call “moral economy,” acted as a force on both sides of the Atlantic.  Historian Eric 
Foner demonstrated that the problems of 1779 Philadelphia were connected to this larger 
current and problem of civil development.  For centuries, economic concerns had been 
merely another moral consideration of the community and part of the moral cosmos that 
the hierarchical structure of society was supposed to maintain.  Certain economic 
arrangements existed in communities that most perceived to be beneficial to the good 
order of society.  The common people had a right to these “moral economy” 
arrangements while their social betters had a duty to maintain them.  An English example 
would be the maintenance of accessible, well supplied, farmer’s markets that opened their 
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 business for small buyers before allowing access to merchants.  If farmers tried to sell 
their goods away from markets, or showed preference for bulk-purchasing London 
merchants, their communities might react violently to protect their eroded rights, 
particularly in times of dearth.162  
 As the eighteenth century progressed, moral economy and its national, 
imperialistic cousin, mercantilism, was ever more challenged by a rising philosophy of 
free-market trade and private self-regulation known as “political economy” or free-
market capitalism.  This new manner of thinking about economics had been in 
development for at least a century before it found its most famous proponent in Adam 
Smith.  It was a philosophy chiefly promoted by the merchant-dominated gentry of the 
British trans-Atlantic world.  As it gained force among government officials the tension 
increased between supporters of political economy and moral economy, usually pitting 
gentry against commoner respectively.  That tension was very observable in the political 
struggles of 1779 Philadelphia.  
 Wilson’s economic thought was most influenced by the writings of James 
Stewart, another lowland Scot.  Wilson’s economic thought was nothing unusual because, 
until Adam Smith published Wealth of Nations, Stewart had been the most influential 
economist in America.   In his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, Stewart 
described an economy driven and stabilized by private credit.  It was to be fiscal strength 
and expansive credit that could provide society with the surplus materials that it needed 
and wanted, not trade or price regulations.  Yet, Stewart was no Smithian, or laissez-faire 
economist.  With one foot still in the realm of moral economy, Stewart thought that 
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 government had a role and duty in creating a powerful economy.  It continued to be a 
moral duty of rulers to the broader community.  He also feared a deficit of exports in 
comparison to imports, believing, like mercantilists, that specie would be drained away to 
the detriment of the state.  But the best way to correct or guard against such trade deficits 
was to maintain a healthier economy than competitor states -- through credit.  And the 
best way to promote credit and fiscal strength in the private sector was through strong 
banks, according to Stewart.  Government’s role was to be in helping these banks get 
started and lending them specie in times of economic stagnation.163   
 Wilson’s thinking was identical to Stewart’s, always insisting that strong credit 
created by strong banks was necessary for the material progress of the United States.  
And like Stewart, Wilson did not think that government interference with trade was wise, 
limiting government’s role to the promotion and regulation of banks.  It is therefore 
understandable why Wilson opposed price regulations in 1779 -- he thought the entire 
movement for price regulations foolhardy.  It was an opinion that he was outspoken on, 
and it placed him, along with many others on a collision course with the lower classes of 
Philadelphia.164      
 The lower classes of Philadelphia suffered from rampant inflation in 1779.  Grain 
and produce had been drained from the markets of Philadelphia by the demands of the 
Revolutionary war -- Continental Army troops, active militia and French troops had to be 
fed.  Inflation had also been exacerbated by an excessive issuance of paper currency by 
the Pennsylvania Assembly.  In addition, some merchants may have taken advantage of 
the situation to turn a profit, or at least, unintentionally deepened the economic crisis by 
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 continuing to export.  The merchants, nonetheless, were probably the lesser part of the 
problem, but in the view of laborers and small artisans in the city wealthy merchants were 
the chief cause.  And as the economic crisis deepened it became difficult for the 
Pennsylvania Assembly to supply its troops.165
 A popular cry went out for price controls to force merchants to sell at fair prices.  
The Assembly, though controlled by Constitutionalists, failed to pass price control 
regulation.  Local Constitutionalists in Philadelphia, however, proved more receptive.  
Constitutionalists like Charles Willson Peale began to organize laborers, small artisans, 
and ultimately militiamen, into an energetic price control movement.  Leading 
Constitutionalists formed a standing committee in May of 1779, known as the Committee 
of Trade. The Committee was to produce extra-legal price regulations, enforceable by 
either militia or civilian crowd action.  Following the Committee’s first proclamations, an 
angry crowd swarmed down to Philadelphia’s market where they forced bakers and 
butchers to lower their prices.  
 On the other side of the Atlantic an unbroken tradition of crowds enforcing price 
controls onto sellers had long existed, particularly in times of dearth.  These traditions 
provided a kind of customary law for crowd action and price controls in pre-industrial 
England.  But no such traditions existed for the Philadelphians, who had never known 
similar economic hardships before the Revolution, so no spontaneous crowd actions 
occurred before the formation of the Committee of Trade in May.  Legitimacy for crowd 
actions in Philadelphia could not be drawn from traditional law, but was to be drawn 
from popularly elected institutions like the Committee of Trade.  For Englishmen, custom 
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 gave them the authority to riot; for Philadelphians in 1779, institutionalized popular 
sovereignty replaced that traditional force.166       
 Unfortunately for the radicals, the price control movement would never be as 
effective as it was energetic.  As early as September of 1779, the Committee of Trade had 
dissolved indefinitely over internal divisions, and perhaps the realization that price 
controls could not be consistently enforced.  Many merchants continued to defy the price 
ceilings that the Committee had mandated.167   
 Because inflation was hurting the war effort, many militiamen began to associate 
the apparent greed of certain wealthy merchants with Toryism.  In October, frustrated 
militiamen seized four prisoners and paraded them in a rogue’s march through the streets 
as Tories.  Those paraded were all wealthy and suspect merchants, though none of them 
were members of the Republican Society, the local Philadelphian arm of the Republican 
Party.  Objected to by Peale because of its rashness, the goal of the parade was to 
disgrace the intransigent merchants in front of the community.  But a rumor had spread 
that the militiamen were after Wilson.  Wilson himself had petitioned the Assembly for 
protection earlier in the day but was ignored.  When the parade could not be diverted 
from moving up Chestnut Street, where Wilson lived, Wilson’s Republican allies thought 
that their worse fears had been confirmed.  Between twenty to forty men ran ahead of the 
militia and, with their guns ready, awaited the anticipated attack of Wilson’s home.168   
 When the militia reached Wilson’s house they continued marching -- they had not 
set out to attack any homes, not even Wilson’s.  But as the rear guard of the militia 
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 column reached the front of the house a Wilson supporter yelled out from an upstairs 
window.  An argument began and a shot was fired, though no one later could be sure who 
fired the shot first.  The militia column stopped and came back toward the house to lay 
siege to it.  The Republican partisans in Wilson’s home had made their worse fears come 
true.   
 Wilson and his allies kept the militia at bay.  The mob breached the house only 
once, and was then pushed out.  The enraged militia commander, Captain Ephraim 
Faulkner, sent a small group to attain a cannon.  Before the artillery could be brought, 
however, Pennsylvania’s Constitutionalist President Joseph Reed arrived and dispersed 
the militia at the head of a cavalry charge.  Many of the militiamen were arrested but 
those who had defended Fort Wilson were allowed to go free.  The Wilson defenders then 
marched in a victory parade through the streets.169  
 The militia riot has become known to history as the “Fort Wilson Riot” or “the 
Fort Wilson Incident” and it was the end of the price control movement.  The riot 
stigmatized the issue of price controls, causing elites like Peale to separate themselves 
from it and the politicized laborers/militiamen on whom the Constitutionalists had 
depended.  The removal of price controls and the lower orders from the factional arena 
opened Pennsylvania up for a sweeping Republican electoral victory seven years later 
after Robert Morris and James Wilson gave the Republicans an issue to finally win on -- 
the Bank controversy.170     
 Robert Morris, Thomas Willing and James Wilson were among the creators and 
charter members of the Bank of Pennsylvania in 1780.  They hoped that the bank would 
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 establish credit that could be used to pay war expenses and stabilize the Pennsylvanian 
economy, all while turning a nice profit.  Yet, the bank failed because the 
Constitutionalist dominated Pennsylvania Assembly refused to support it and withheld 
capital that Morris and his friends had depended upon.  Constitutionalists feared the bank 
because Republicans controlled it and because such a large concentration of capital could 
be used to corrupt state politics.171  So again, Republicans and Constitutionalists divided 
on an economic issue, this time the bank issue.  And again, the Constitutionalists had 
chosen the wrong side of history, but this time the ramifications would be more painful 
for them.  
 Small artisans had been an important group within the Constitutionalist ranks in 
the days of price controls.  They had been hurt by rampant inflation and had pre-existing 
suspicions of their suppliers that were only exacerbated by accusations of price gouging. 
On the Bank controversy, however, small artisans began abandoning the 
Constitutionalists to support Republicans.  Artisans agreed with Republicans that a bank 
could renew the energy of the Pennsylvanian economy.  The Republican argument was 
powerful enough to win over radicals like Tom Paine but not the Pennsylvanian 
Assembly.  As the 1780s progressed the Republicans gained political ground on the 
Constitutionalists while the Constitutionalist Party became marginalized as an anti-bank 
western party.172
 The first bank, spearheaded by Robert Morris, Thomas Willing and James Wilson 
was supposed to be a temporary institution to raise funds for the war effort.  It succeeded 
in raising money while the Pennsylvania Assembly proved incompetent to do the same.  
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 All of a sudden the merchants, when operating through the bank, appeared to be the best 
friends of the Revolution.  The Constitutionalists, dominating the Assembly appeared to 
be bunglers.  The failure of the Constitutionalist dominated Assembly was instrumental 
in giving the Republicans a majority in the Assembly in 1781. 
 After the first bank had dissolved, Morris and Wilson continued to strive for a 
more permanent bank.  Morris took advantage of his position as Superintendent of 
Continental Finances to propose the idea of a national bank to Congress.  Needing 
money, Congress agreed and granted Morris a charter in 1781.  Wilson was made a 
member of the Board of Trustees and began borrowing money for his own land 
transactions.173
 The elections of 1783 gave the Republicans a solid majority in both the 
Pennsylvania Assembly and the Supreme Executive Council.  And John Dickinson, 
recently returned to Pennsylvania politics as a Republican, was selected as President of 
the Supreme Executive Council.  Late in the previous year Wilson had served as an 
attorney for the state in a territorial dispute between Pennsylvania and Connecticut. 
Arguing before a special court established by Congress at Trenton, New Jersey, Wilson 
spearheaded Pennsylvania’s legal team to win a noteworthy victory for his state.  Soon 
after, the Republican majority in the Pennsylvania Assembly rewarded Wilson by 
sending him back to Congress as a delegate.174   
 Republicans also managed to gain a majority in Pennsylvania’s first Council of 
Censors in 1784.  Predictably, they issued a call for a new constitutional convention, but 
Constitutionalists undermined the process at the county level and the convention never 
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 materialized.  To many the Republicans had overreached by trying to call for a 
convention and, in 1785, Constitutionalists had regained a narrow majority in the 
Assembly.  As a result, Republican and Constitutionalist bickering over the Republican 
controlled bank reached a new apex.  Constitutionalists, once again in control of the 
Assembly, tried to repeal the Bank’s charter in Pennsylvania.   
 Wilson, still a member of Congress but also the Bank’s lawyer, argued in the 
Assembly and in print that the Pennsylvania Assembly could not repeal the charter.175   
Through a broad interpretation of the second clause of the Articles of Confederation, he 
claimed that the power to establish the National Bank was implicit to the powers of the 
confederal government.  After establishing the constitutionality of the bank, Wilson 
maintained that confederal law was implicitly superior to state law and that Pennsylvania 
could not repeal a Congressionally established institution such as the National Bank.  In 
addition, Wilson pointed out that the charter of the bank was a contract, and it was 
contrary to common law that a legislature could dissolve contracts without due 
process.176   Moving from a legal argument, Wilson ended by describing the benefits of 
the bank to both Pennsylvania and the Confederation.177    
 Though Wilson’s argument was overwhelming, the Assembly, nonetheless, 
repealed the bank charter in Pennsylvania.  But the evermore pro-bank electorate of the 
state would not prove forgiving.178  In the 1786 elections, Republicans enjoyed a massive 
victory and Wilson’s continued career in Congress was assured.179  
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  Because of his caution in accepting independence, his outspoken criticism of the 
Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 and the price control movement of 1779, and legal 
defense of accused Tories, many in Pennsylvania thought of him as a pro-British 
aristocrat.  But their prejudice against Wilson was unfounded.  Wilson always proved to 
be, philosophically, a populist.  And while others in the states grew reticent of the People 
between 1776 and 1787, Wilson was not one of them.  As will be seen in Chapter 5, 
though Wilson saw first hand the wrath of the mob he was one of the most devoutly and 
consistently democratic delegates at the federal convention of 1787.  He remained 
optimistic that the people could govern themselves, and would play a key role in the next 




















WILSON THE CONTINENTALIST AND THE CONFEDERATION
  
 The pan-state convention that met at Philadelphia in 1787 to suggest changes in 
the Articles of Confederation was the culmination of frustrations and fears that had been 
developing since before the Articles had gone into effect in 1781.  When the problems of 
the Confederation continued to grow after the end of the war in 1783, the inefficiency of 
the confederal system could no longer be blamed on the tumults of war.  And the inability 
of advocates for more centralized power to push amendments through the state 
legislatures, even during the post-war crisis years of the mid eighties, compelled them to 
revive the use of special conventions to solve the Confederation’s governmental 
problems.  Supporters of a stronger confederation grew until enough political impetus 
existed to form a working convention for reform in 1787 that represented every state but 
Rhode Island.  This Constitutional Convention, as it would later be called, proposed an 
entirely new constitution that through popular ratification, became the federal 
Constitution of 1787.180         
 Early in the Imperial and constitutional crisis that turned, finally, into a war for 
independence and republican revolution, James Wilson developed a continental 
                                                          
180 Wood, American Republic, 354-361, 393-425, 471-518; Merrill Jensen, The Making of the American 
Constitution, (New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1964), 28-38. 
77 
 sensibility like many other veterans of Congress and the Continental Army.  Still, among 
many in Congress and the states the continental spirit waned as the war dragged on, and 
was eclipsed by a new localism fearful of greater Congressional authority and the designs 
of other states.181  Wilson was not the victim of such an entropy of unifying spirit.  His 
pan-state view was more constant and emphatic than that of many of his compatriots.  So 
in 1787 Wilson would not need a fear of continental anarchy to revive his dedication to 
centralized, continental government.  Consequently, his view of the purpose of the 
resultant 1787 constitution never had the decidedly conservative coloring that appeared in 
the thinking of  some of the Founders.    
 Two facts of Wilson‘s life may explain his early continental disposition.  First, 
Wilson was not native to his home state of Pennsylvania but had emigrated there from 
another region of the British Empire in young adulthood.  Before independence he 
probably had a more cosmopolitan view of Pennsylvanians as subjects within an empire 
and after independence he naturally developed a broader view of Pennsylvanians as 
continental citizens.  Second, Wilson was alienated from governmental politics in 
Pennsylvania through much of the war and was a leader of the opposition movement that 
antagonized the Pennsylvanian establishment.  At one point a crowd that had, in his 
opinion, been misguided by Constitutionalist partisans, attacked his house.  So to Wilson 
state politics were by no means inherently preferable to continental politics.     
 As early as 1777, in the debates over the Articles of Confederation, Wilson 
expressed a continental view to the chagrin of others who were already beginning to 
worry about the evolution of Congressional power.  Along with John Adams, Wilson 
argued that Congress should approach the United States as a single political society rather 
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 than many.182  And as noted previously, Wilson advocated a proportional allotment of 
representation between the states in Congress based on population.183   
 Like at the Philadelphia Convention ten years later, the continentally-minded 
were most emphatically opposed by small state delegates who believed that their 
communities would be eclipsed if not absorbed by the larger states under a more 
centralized political structure.184  They demanded that representation of the states in 
Congress remain equal and that Congress be given as little power as possible.  But the 
small state delegates were not alone in their distrust of Congressional power.  It was 
Thomas Burke of North Carolina who added the finishing touch to the confederacy’s de-
centralized structure in the Articles of Confederation.  His amendment, passing against 
the lonely protests of James Wilson and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, stated that  
 Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every 
 power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly 
 delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.185
When Congress finally agreed to the Articles in 1777, those who opposed centralized 
power and a national structure had won on every key point.  The proposed Articles did 
not form a new nation but codified the loose military league of independent states that 
had already formed -- a league that would prove ever more fiscally inefficient as the war 
progressed.  Though notably weak, distrust of Congressional power grew fast enough in 
the states that it would still take four more years for all the states to ratify the Articles.186    
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  The Articles of Confederation divided legislative power between Congress and 
the legislatures of the states.  Each state in Congress was to have a single vote, though 
contributions were to be in proportion to surveyed lands within any given state.  And 
revenue bills had to be agreed to by the delegations of nine states in Congress and by all 
of the state legislatures before becoming law.  Congress also needed better than a simple 
majority to exercise other key legislative powers. Without the assent of at least nine state 
delegations Congress could not,  
 engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisals...nor enter into any  
 treaties or alliances, nor coin money...nor ascertain the sums and expenses 
 necessary for the defense...of the United States, nor emit bills, nor borrow  
 money on the credit of the United States...nor agree upon the number of  
 vessels of war, to be built or purchased...nor appoint a commander in chief 
 of the army or navy. 
Amendments to the Articles, like revenue bills, had to be agreed to by both Congress and 
all of the state legislatures.187   
 As may be expected among a military league of states the Articles mandated 
comity between the states in numerous instances.  “All privileges and immunities of free 
citizens” within any state including “free ingress and regress” and “all the privileges of 
trade and commerce” were to be observed in every state.  Each state was to accept the 
judgments and records of other states with “full faith and credit.”  In addition, states were 
forbidden to place imposts on goods moving from one state to another.  They were also 
forbidden to form treaties with one another or any other nation, or wage war without 
Congressional consent.  The states were to obey treaties “entered into by the United 
States in Congress.” Unfortunately, the impotence of Congress made these regulations 
unenforceable.  Though the Articles proclaimed that they should be “inviolably observed 
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 by every State” there was no mechanism to realize the claim.  The Confederation had no 
national executive or courts, or any express right to coerce individuals in the states or the 
governments of the states.188     
 When James Wilson returned to Congress in 1782 he found an inefficient and  
frustrated confederal government.  Congress had consistently proven ineffective at 
paying and supplying their troops.  In 1783, Congress moved to Princeton from 
Philadelphia, avoiding angry militiamen who had gathered outside the Pennsylvania State 
House.  The troops disbanded only when they were told that Continental troops were on 
their way to route them.189  Later in the same year, near the end of the war, Congress’s 
failure to pay troops nearly led to a general mutiny of the Continental Army at 
Newburgh, Pennsylvania.  Numerous officers had decided to abandon Congress for the 
West if the war continued and march to force funds from Congress if the war was ended.  
If it had occurred, the mutiny would have probably ended the American experiment in 
pure republicanism with dictatorship.  But the mutiny was diffused non-violently by the 
clever leadership of George Washington.  Even Robert Morris and Alexander Hamilton 
dreamed of uniting civilian creditors and Army officers to achieve a coup d’etat, 
fortunately to no avail.190  
 Yet, a small but dogged cadre of men had developed inside and outside of 
Congress dedicated to making the confederation more effective by increasing the powers 
of Congress.  The committee appointed by Congress in 1781 to put the Articles into 
effect (that included James Madison) had proposed appointing Congressional tax 
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 collectors and amending the Articles to give Congress the power to seize the property of 
states that refused to pay their assigned contributions.  Congress ignored the proposals.191  
Re-entering Congress in 1782, Wilson, always the continentalist, joined this group of 
centralizers.  In 1783, with the support of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, 
Wilson proposed an amendment to the Articles that would have increased the 
confederation’s power significantly.  It involved a general fund for disbursing the 
Confederation’s debt to be raised by a general tax and collected by agents of Congress.  
To assuage fears of economic predation by one economic region against the other, 
Wilson included the suggestion of a compound tax on land and certain imported goods 
such as salt and wine that would distribute, he thought, the tax burden fairly among the 
states.  The Wilson amendment was agreed to by Congress and sent to the states for 
ratification where it was defeated by the lone dissent of Rhode Island.  Shortly after, 
Virginia repealed its initial acceptance of the Wilson amendment.  The unanimity 
required by the Articles and a paranoid localism in the states made the confederation 
impervious to improvement.192
 To fully appreciate the depth of Wilson’s early support for continental 
government it will be productive to return to the bank controversy in Pennsylvania, 
already discussed in the previous chapter.  The present goal requires a more involved 
description, however, and from a different angle of analysis.  In 1785 a frustrated James 
Wilson pioneered a new potential way to increase the powers of the confederal 
government.  He advanced his new doctrine within the context of the bank controversy 
                                                          
191 Jensen, American Constitution, 31. 
192 Jensen, American Constitution, 28, 31-33; Rakove, Original Meanings, 23-28; Smith, Wilson, 179-182. 
82 
 between Constitutionalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania.193   
 Pennsylvania Constitutionalists distrusted the bank as a Republican tool to corrupt 
officials and electors, by which Republicans might usurp power in the state.  The 
initiators of the idea of the bank and its key officials were Republicans after all, most 
notably James Wilson and Robert Morris.  Congress had established a national bank and 
the Pennsylvania Assembly, under Republican control in 1782 provided a state charter 
for the bank.  By 1785, however, Constitutionalists had won back the Assembly.  They 
decided to repeal the state charter for the bank and declared that the national bank was 
unconstitutional.  Both as a Congressman and a lawyer for, and stockholder in the bank, 
Wilson defended the institution publicly and before the Pennsylvania Assembly. 
 Wilson argued that the power of Congress to establish a bank was implied in the 
Articles of Confederation.  Looking to Article II of the Articles of Confederation, he 
tackled those clauses guaranteeing state sovereignty and restricting Congress to powers 
“expressly delegated to the United States in congress assembled.”  The power to establish 
a North American bank over all of the states had not existed in any one of the states, 
Wilson happily pointed out, so no such power could be delegated by the states.  
Therefore, the restrictive “express powers” clause in the second Article had no relevance 
to the issue of the Bank of North America.  Continuing, Wilson contended that,  
 Though the United States in congress assembled derive from the particular 
 states no power...which is not expressly delegated..., it does not thence follow, 
 that the United States in congress have no other powers..., than those delegated 
 by the states.194  
Wilson cited Article V, that gave one of the purposes for Congress as “the more 
                                                          
193 James Wilson, “Considerations, On The Power To Incorporate The Bank Of North America” in 
Selected Political Essays of James Wilson, ed. Randolph G. Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), 
125-149. 
83 
 convenient management of the general interests of the United States.”  So there were 
“more general rights, general powers, and general obligations, not derived from any 
particular states...but resulting from the union as a whole.”  A North American Bank was 
necessary for “the general interests” of the confederacy, and yet the individual states had 
no power to institute one, so the power to institute the Bank became implicit in the 
powers of Congress.  In concluding statements that must have chilled the blood of the 
more locally minded among Pennsylvanians Wilson declared that “To many purposes, 
the United States are to be considered as one undivided, independent nation...possessed 
of all...powers...by the law of nations incident to such.”195
 Second, Wilson argued against the Pennsylvania Assembly’s power to dissolve 
the charter of the state bank.  The state bank charter could not be repealed because it was 
a contract.  It was not within the appropriate parameters of legislative power to be able to 
dissolve contracts.  Rather, a firm and certain precedent existed in common law that 
contracts were under the jurisdiction of judicial review.  For the Pennsylvania Assembly 
to arbitrarily repeal the charter would set a precedent endangering “the sure anchors of 
privilege and property,” exposing them to “every varying gust of politicks, and will float 
wildly...on the irregular and impetuous tides of party and faction.”196   
 Wilson’s argument of implied powers was an innovation, but his argument 
concerning the contractual nature of the state bank charter was not.  Nonetheless, the 
Pennsylvania Assembly dissolved the state bank charter just as they publicly disavowed 
the national bank.197   
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  Wilson’s well organized and well reasoned argument of implied Congressional 
powers was the first meaningful argument for implied powers in American constitutional 
history.  Within the Pennsylvanian context, his willingness to make such an argument 
shows a desperation to preserve an institution necessary for the stability and progress of 
Pennsylvania.  Within the broader continental context, Wilson’s ideas about implied 
powers show not only a desperation to preserve the Bank, but a strategy born of 
frustration to promote the powers of Congress.198   
 A doctrine of implied powers, accepted by the majority, may have succeeded in 
increasing the powers of Congress, bypassing the hopelessly difficult amendment process 
designated by the Articles.  But it is questionable if the majority could have been 
convinced.  Enough in Congress were convinced in regard to the Bank, but if the doctrine 
of implied powers had been extended to other issues it would have probably proved 
untenable.  History will never know for sure whether it would have worked because those 
most dedicated to increased central power under the Articles never seriously tried to 
apply it outside of the Bank controversy.  It is even uncertain how far Wilson would have 
been willing to push implied powers.  The doctrine was not embraced by those trying to 
increase the powers of Congress for two reasons.  First, most of the centralizers among 
the founding generation were also rigorous constitutionalists.  They valued constitutions 
as necessary for the preservation of liberty; constitutions were instruments of the People 
that set parameters for government -- the delegates of the People.  Those parameters only 
had value when observed and enforced, however, and a doctrine of implied powers could 
result in a soft constitutionalism in which the parameters were disregarded by those 
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 sophistic enough to style the right arguments.  Implied power, in other words, could 
quickly slip into arbitrary power and a new parliamentary tyranny.  The doctrine was too 
dangerous to use as a foundation of Congressional power.199   
 Second, another, safer way existed to by-pass the inane process of the Articles -- 
the special convention.  The special convention, drawing its legitimacy either from 
established and legitimate governments or directly from the People, was a method that 
must have appeared conservative if not strictly constitutional in every instance by 1785.  
It had been used repeatedly by British American opposition Whigs and then 
revolutionaries during the war.  Indeed, Congress itself had begun as a (presumably 
temporary) convention of state delegates.  And most of the leadership in the United States 
had earlier either involved themselves with special local conventions or been a part of 
committees that acted on their recommendations.  Even before the Articles had been 
ratified, in the four years that they hung in legal limbo, some had suggested special 
conventions to solve the impasse over the Articles.  So it was not unusual that frustrated 
supporters of Congressional power embraced the idea of a special convention to agree on 
alterations in the Articles.200
 As early as 1783, an irritated General George Washington, fretting over the 
condition of his troops, had suggested an amending convention to alter the Articles.  In 
the same year that Wilson was arguing implied powers in Pennsylvania, the legislature of 
Massachusetts suggested a convention for amending the Articles to Congress, but the 
suggestion was rejected.201  And at a convention of officials from Maryland and Virginia 
to resolve navigation disputes at Mount Vernon, a proposal was made to have a more 
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 general convention of the states at Annapolis in the following year to discuss continental 
economic and trade policy.  The Annapolis Convention in 1786 would only be attended 
by delegates from five of the states but would produce an influential proposal for a 
convention to modify the Articles of Confederation at Philadelphia, in 1787.  It was the 
seed of the Constitutional Convention.202  
 Yet, the precedents of special conventions and the impossibility of reform under 
the Articles cannot alone explain why the American leadership sought a more powerful 
central government or why they achieved it in 1787.  Special conventions and a defunct 
amendment process only formed the parameters of their activity, the impetus of their 
success lay in a political will for stronger central government that steadily increased 
among Americans throughout the period.  Fear was the foundation of that will.   
 The situation of the states, individually and as a confederation, appeared more and 
more dire to the American leadership.  As the 1780s progressed, it appeared to many that 
the thirteen American experiments in pure republicanism were on their way to self-
destruction and were about to take property, the foundation of liberty, to hell with 
them.203  Though the revolutionary generation had chosen to embrace pure republicanism 
as the surest security for American liberty, they understood pure republics to be at special 
risk.  Republics were the best form of government for the maximization of liberty 
because, being based immediately on the general community, they responded better to the 
needs of the general community.  But republican government was also the weakest 
because it might respond to the community’s irrational whims.  In the long run, only an 
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 essentially virtuous people could sustain a pure republic and its greater liberty.  Though 
some vice might be inevitable and non-catastrophic and institutional checks might be 
erected to counter-act vice, an excess of popular vice would always lead to the failure of 
a republic.  When vice ran amok the people divided into antagonistic factions, sacrificing 
the good of the whole for their own narrow gains.  The inevitable result would be the 
dissolution of a republic, resulting in the arbitrary rule of the strong.204  
 Before the revolution, British Americans would have argued that the mixed 
constitution of Britain was better than any hypothetical pure republic for the prolonged 
promulgation of liberty, because the weakness of republics condemned them to short 
lives ending in tyranny.  Partially republican, the British constitution sustained liberty 
through representation of the Commons in Parliament.  Partially aristocratic and 
monarchial, it provided stability and long-term security for the liberty that Britons 
enjoyed.  Stability came from the counterbalance of three distinct classes of society in 
Britain, each institutionally represented in government -- the monarchy found in the 
Crown, the nobility found in the House of Lords and the commoners found in the House 
of Commons.205   
 But most of the Americans who fought British aggression had, by the late 1770s, 
rejected the perfection or even the basic propriety of the British constitution.  They 
became convinced that Britain's mixed constitution had never worked the way it was 
supposed to work or was corrupted beyond repair.  Equally important, they became 
convinced that pure and lasting republicanism was plausible in America.  The American 
people were virtuous enough.  And many Americans came under the influence of a new 
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 school of governmental thought, most effectively discussed by the philosoph Baron de 
Montesquieu, that balanced powers could be effectively established in government even 
when countervailing institutions did not represent distinctive and opposing classes within 
society.206  America did not have the hereditary class of aristocrats to build a mixed 
constitution in any case.  Yet, in the later phase of the war and in the years following, 
American virtue and class-disassociated balances of government in the states did not 
seem to be doing so well.207     
 By the mid-1780s the highly inflationary post-war economy pitted debtors and 
creditors against one another.  Many state legislatures made inflation worse by producing 
too much paper money to assuage anxious debtors.  In some states crowds of debtors had 
threatened officials and shut down state courts to prevent judicial proceedings against 
them.  To ease the pressure on debtors many legislatures began to over produce paper 
currency, purposely driving down the value of currency.  Security of property itself 
seemed threatened by state legislators who spoke loosely of forgiving debts, effectively 
dissolving contracts between creditors and debtors.  Wilson had experienced this kind of 
arbitrary parliamentary power with the dissolution of Pennsylvania’s state bank charter in 
1785.  When government arbitrarily dissolved contracts no security for property existed, 
and no security for liberty could be maintained as a result.208  
 Congress could not solve its own problems much less help the states.  Congress, 
unable to draw sufficient funds from the states, faced a gigantic war debt.  And in the 
tense economic and political environment of the mid-1780s, various states also began to 
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 violate the Articles only to underline the impotence of a Congress that could do little 
more than verbally admonish them.  Some states placed tariffs on each other’s goods, 
made treaties or contemplated making treaties with foreign powers and violated the 
earlier Congressional peace treaty with Britain, all in violation of the Articles and the will 
of Congress.209   
 The result was a growing chorus of fearful men agreeing with continental thinkers 
like Hamilton, Madison, Wilson and Washington that the powers of Congress had to be 
increased.  Chances of an amendment to the Articles attaining the unanimous consent of 
the states continued bleak however, and in 1786 an amending convention was suggested 
by the convention at Annapolis.  Congress publicly supported the Philadelphia 
Convention, mandating that it would propose amendments for the Articles to Congress 
for consideration.  A final, catastrophic event occurred that provided additional support in 
the states for the convention because it seemed to confirm the fears of those who wanted 
to increase the powers of Congress.  In January, 1787 an ex-Continental Army Captain, 
Daniel Shay, led a large rebellion in Massachusetts that had to be suppressed violently by 
the state militia.  The rebellion probably convinced many states to participate in the 
convention that would not have otherwise sent delegates.  When the Philadelphia 
Convention convened in May, 1787 all the states but Rhode Island would send 
delegations.  Wilson, the continental nationalist, would play a central role in the 
convention.210    
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WILSON AT THE 1787 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
 
 The federal constitution of 1787 did not create a purely national political structure 
out of the thirteen states, but one that was partly national and partly federal and placed 
significantly greater power in the central government of the United States than had the 
earlier Articles.211  The new central government realized the principle of popular 
sovereignty by mandating immediate popular elections of the House of Representatives, 
possible mediated popular elections of the President, popular ratification of the 
constitution by special convention and the option of popular special conventions to ratify 
future amendments to the constitution.212  Some may have also thought that popular 
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 sovereignty had been realized through the continuation of notable powers in the hands of 
the state governments.  Many American leaders presumed states to be more 
representative of the people because of their greater locality.  The hopeful result of 
greater locality was a greater intimacy between state representatives and the 
represented.213  Though on this last point James Wilson certainly would not have agreed.   
 During the Philadelphia Convention Wilson proved to be as continentally minded 
as his Virginian contemporaries and even more dedicated to populism in government, to 
the point of being a true democrat.  The proposed constitution that the Philadelphia 
Convention produced would not be as free from state interference or as democratic as 
Wilson wanted, but he considered it sound enough in its functions and underlying 
principles to become one of its leading advocates during the contest for ratification.  
Three years after Pennsylvania ratified the new federal constitution Wilson led a 
constitutional convention to frame a new constitution for the state similar to the federal 
one.  Throughout this transformative period Wilson rejected Lockean contractualism in 
favor of a democratically instrumental understanding of constitutionalism within a 
national United States. 
 Set for May 14, 1787, not enough delegates had appeared from the various states 
to begin the Philadelphia Convention until May 29.  Nonetheless, the delegation from 
Virginia arrived early and well prepared,  James Madison being at the core of their 
preparedness.  Madison had dedicated himself to studying the history of confederations to 
prepare for the convention, and was already a highly experienced continental statesman 
who had been struggling to increase the powers of Congress for years.  Madison had 
designed a general blueprint for a wholly new central government.  It would be strong to 
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 solve the problems of Congressional weakness, republican to perpetuate American 
liberty, and involve mechanisms of institutional countervalence and filtration to insulate 
the new government from both magisterial and popular vice.214  
 James Wilson, by this time a veteran Congressman and continentally renowned 
lawyer, arrived at the Convention on May 25th with the rest of the Pennsylvania 
delegation.  It had been little more than a month since his wife Rachael died.  As the 
delegates descended on the Pennsylvania State House in May, Wilson and his six 
children were still in mourning but sorrow was not going to keep Wilson away.215  His 
appearance underlines the weight that Wilson understood the event to have.   
 A quick analysis of the debates of the Convention will make apparent Wilson’s 
sincere dedication to continental nationalism and popular sovereignty.  No evidence 
suggests that Wilson involved himself in a special study of confederations leading up to 
the Convention as did Madison.  But Wilson had dedicated his life to the study of law, 
government and its philosophy as few others had.  Throughout the Convention Wilson 
repeatedly supported Madison’s vision for a national federal government free from state 
domination, proportional representation in Congress, a joint executive-judicial veto over 
federal legislation, a powerful federal judiciary and ratification of the proposed 
constitution by special popular conventions.  Occasional disagreements appeared between 
the two statesmen but their disagreements were never divisive, and the fundamental 
principles that they operated from were alike.  Both of them embraced popular 
sovereignty, pure republicanism, institutional counterbalances based on function rather 
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 than class and the concept of a national American people.  Yet, on at least one 
fundamental point Madison and Wilson diverged.    
 Madison believed that the people had to be protected from their own passions.  
The “republican remedy” to popular irrationality was institutional “filtrations” of the 
popular will and the propagation of inherent political friction in the legislative process.  
Achieving an appropriate amount of filtration would require, among other things, putting 
some legislators one step away from the people by having them appointed rather than 
elected, and extending the terms of office for legislators and other magistrates to insulate 
them from temporary public clamor.  Conservatism could also be achieved by 
“expanding the sphere of representation,” allowing for so many factions that one could 
not dominate the governmental process thereby slowing changes and preventing 
extremism in policy.  A bicameral legislature would also increase conservative policy-
making, specifically in the legislative process.216  
 This way of thinking was alien to Wilson.  Wilson’s concern with corruption 
during the Convention focused solely on magisterial corruption.  The corruption of those 
who held power was to be checked through the counterbalance of independent and 
functionally limited branches of government as well as a counterbalance between the new 
federal government and the states.  Wilson trusted the general populace more than did 
Madison, and never admitted the existence of representatives between the people and 
governmental policy to be a positive good.  So when Madison proposed that 
representatives in the lower camera of the legislature have terms longer than one year, 
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 Wilson came out against it.217 However, Wilson supported the idea of Senators having 
six-year terms, but for very different reasons than did Madison.  Madison wanted 
Senators to have longer terms and be elected in staggered elections to insulate the Senate 
from popular passions and facilitate conservatism in the body.  New Senators would enter 
a body in which one third of its members had already been there for two to four years.  
Wilson saw the extended terms of the Senators as a necessity to gain the respect of 
prejudicially aristocratic foreign powers that would, he thought, be dealing with the 
Senate.  Staggered terms would also facilitate a more informed handling of diplomatic 
affairs over time but allow for the entry of fresh approaches into the institution.218        
 Representation was, for Wilson, an incidental attribute of free government 
necessitated only by the largeness of population.  Wilson put this populist point of view 
best himself:      
 Vigorous authority (ought) to flow immediately from the legitimate 
 source of all authority. The Government ought to possess not only the 
 force, but the mind and sense of the people at large. The legislature 
 ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation 
 is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act 
 collectively.219  
Fortunately for Wilson and Madison, who often looked to each other for support during 
the Convention, their philosophical differences never led to a breach between them.  
Their historical situation allowed them to sidestep their differences over the precise 
reliability of the “people at large.”  They were faced with greater worries, by men who 
resisted the centralization of power or the realization of other fundamental principles in 
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 the new federal structure that Wilson and Madison did hold in common.220
   When the business of the convention opened, Edmund Randolph proposed 
Madison’s plan for the Virginia delegation.  What historians have come to call the 
Virginia Plan envisioned a highly nationalistic government with representation in a 
bicameral Congress, proportionally distributed between the states, based on either free 
population or annual contributions.  Congress would have the power to lay and collect 
taxes from individuals in the states as well as enforce federal laws on individuals in the 
states.  Congress could veto state legislation that contradicted the new federal constitution 
to ensure comity among the states.  Congress could also establish an army and a navy that 
could be used against intransigent states.  The people would elect the lower house for an 
unspecified term and the lower house would select the members of the smaller, upper 
house for an unspecified term.221   
 Madison proposed a “National Executive” selected by Congress for an 
unspecified term,  “to execute the National laws...(and)...enjoy the Executive rights 
vested in Congress.”  The executive, together with members of the “National Judiciary,” 
would form a Council of Revision that could veto federal legislation that it considered 
unconstitutional, though the veto could be overridden by a second Congressional vote.  
The “National Judiciary” was to be appointed by Congress “to hold their offices during 
good behavior.”  The high court was to have jurisdiction over federal impeachments,  
cases “of a dernier sort,” cases involving international waters, and cases involving two or 
more states or parties from two or more states.  And the plan called for inferior courts 
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 with local jurisdiction over federal cases in the states.222  
 Madison’s plan guaranteed “Republican Government” to the new states that 
would soon be culled out of the western territories. An amendment process existed to be 
used “whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature 
ought not to be required.”  The final resolution of the plan called for ratification by 
special conventions following Congress’s approval.223
 The Virginia Plan expanded the perceived mission of the Convention, turning it 
from an amendment convention into a constitutional convention.  A few resisted while 
most at the Convention accepted the idea that proposing revisions could also mean 
proposing a complete replacement of the old Articles.  On May 30 Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney of South Carolina and Elbridge Gerry of  Massachusetts voiced doubts that the 
Convention had the authority to make such radical suggestions.  The convention ignored 
them, their suggestions going unanswered in Madison‘s notes.  Neither did the two men 
breach the issue again -- others would however.  Frustrated small state delegates, led by 
William Paterson, used the idea that the Convention was overreaching its bounds as an 
excuse for presenting their own counter-plan, known to posterity as the “New Jersey 
Plan.”  Paterson’s plan gave more powers to Congress but representation in Congress 
would continue to be equal among the states and would be appointed by the state 
legislatures, as it was under the Articles.224  Paterson put it flatly when he said, 
 A federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we will 
 still find an equal sovereignty to be the basis of it.  No alteration shall be 
 made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. If the  
 sovereignty of the states is to be maintained, the Representatives must be 
 drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no 
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  power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty.225
Wilson immediately took up the task of answering Paterson.  He drew from the same 
doctrine of moral necessity that he and other opposition Whigs had drawn on in the 
controversy with British Parliament.  In the interest of preserving liberty, necessity could 
allow temporary variations from common law norms or contractual requirements --
radical committees were justified in 1774 using such arguments, and it was why the 
activity of the Convention was justified in 1787.226  In addition, Wilson “conceived of 
himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose anything.”  It was a 
fine but important point.  Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and Randolph of Virginia 
echoed Wilson.  “When the salvation of the Republic was at stake” Randolph argued, “it 
would be treason...not to propose what we found necessary.”227   
 The eventual product of the Convention was very different from the Virginia 
Plan, but the influence of the Plan’s outline and underlying assumptions on the federal 
Constitution of 1787 is evident.  The similarities between the two can be attributed to the 
fact that the Virginia Plan dominated the format of the entire Convention, the 
mischievous (as Madison and Wilson doubtlessly thought of it) New Jersey Plan not 
withstanding.  Moving from resolution to resolution in the Virginia Plan, the delegates 
discussed and voted on each one.  As changes were made the resolutions were re-drawn 
to reflect the changes and discussed again. 
 Resolutions dealing with the legislature cultivated the first formative debates.  
Election of legislators and the distribution of representation, particularly in the Senate, 
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 drew heated and intricate debate throughout the Convention, filling more space in 
Madison’s notes than any other single issue.  It was in these debates that Wilson exerted 
most of his efforts, as a passionate advocate of popular election, liberal suffrage and 
proportional representation in both legislative houses.    
 On May 31, Gerry of Massachusetts and Roger Sherman of Connecticut “opposed 
the election” of the lower house “by the people.” “The evils we experience” Gerry 
exclaimed, came “from the excess of democracy.” He went on, 
 The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. 
 (Gerry) was still however republican, but had been taught by experience  
 the danger of the leveling spirit.228   
George Mason of Virginia rebutted, playing upon notions of mixed constitutionalism -- 
here is evidence that, even in 1787, the last vestiges of that antiquated way of thinking 
continued to be habitual for some.  Mason maintained that the lower house ought to be 
directly chosen by the people because it was “to be the grand depository of the 
democratic principle -- our House of Commons.”229   
 Wilson rebutted Gerry and Sherman without references to mixed government.  
His comments predicate Wilson’s spirit throughout the Convention.   Madison wrote that 
Wilson, 
 contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the 
 Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal  
 pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it 
 as broad a basis as possible.  No government could long subsist without 
 the confidence of the people.  In a republican Government this confidence 
 was peculiarly necessary.  He also thought it wrong to increase the weight 
 of the state legislatures.230   
On the same day, the debate moved to the selection of members of the upper house, that 
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 would eventually be the Senate, and Wilson took a populist stand again.   
 Wilson opposed selection of the Senate by either the states or the lower house, as 
suggested in the Virginia Plan, because the Senate “ought to be independent of both.”  He 
contended that “both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the 
people.”  Otherwise “the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissentions 
will naturally arise between them.”  Anticipating a problem between proportional 
representation for the large population of America and the desirable smallness of the 
Senate, Wilson suggested that special large districts could be drawn, transcending the 
borders of the states, for the election of Senators.  Madison protested Wilson’s idea.  
“Such a mode” Madison argued, “would destroy the influence of the smaller States 
associated with larger ones in the same district.”  It was an odd argument for the 
Virginian to make considering later arguments between him and small state delegates 
over the need for mutual trust between large and small states.231  
 Wilson then butted heads with his old mentor in law, John Dickinson, who had 
been sent to the Convention from Delaware.  Dickinson must have been surprised by 
Wilson’s stance on the election of the Senate, and the argument between Dickinson and 
Wilson over popular election quickly became a heated discussion over the nature of 
America’s impending federalism.  Dickinson favored selection of Senators by the state 
legislatures. The state legislatures would make better choices than the people, Dickinson 
thought.  The Senate should “consist of the most distinguished characters” and bear “as 
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible.”   He also wanted state 
selection of Senators because “the preservation of the states in a certain degree of agency 
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 is indispensable.”  He spoke allegorically that the various states were like planets.  The 
confederacy was a solar system and the planets “ought to be left to move freely in their 
proper orbits.”  He accused Wilson of wanting “to extinguish these planets.”232 Wilson 
answered his mentor that, 
 the British Government cannot be our model.  We have no materials for  
 a similar one.  Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and  
 primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. 
Adopting Dickinson’s allegory, Wilson observed that just as the planets are subordinate 
to the sun, so should the states be subordinate to the central government.  And it would 
not be the states that would be “devoured” by the new federal government.  “On the 
contrary” he demanded, “he wished to keep them from devouring the national 
Government.”  But Dickinson’s caution won the Convention over in the end, and they 
voted in favor of his proposal.233  
 Even after he knew that Senators would not be popularly elected, Wilson 
continued to promote proportional representation based on population for the Senate.  In 
early arguments with Paterson over proportional representation, Wilson took a truly 
democratic and passionate stand over proportionality in the legislature.  Proclaiming that 
“all authority was derived from the people” Wilson demanded that “ equal numbers of 
people ought to have an equal number of representatives.”  “This principle had been 
improperly violated in the Confederation” that Paterson wished to imitate, “owing to the 
urgent circumstances of the time.”   Paterson had claimed that “New Jersey will never 
confederate on the plan before the committee.”  Wilson countered that “Pennsylvania 
and...some other States, would not confederate on any other” and that “if New Jersey 
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 would not part with her sovereignty it is vain to talk of Government.”234     
 However on the following day, June 11, Roger Sherman of Connecticut  proposed 
that the lower house have proportional representation while the Senate would have equal 
representation between the states, as a compromise to break the impasse between the 
large and small states.  Wilson, with Alexander Hamilton of New York, made a counter-
proposal “that the right of suffrage in the 2nd branch ought to be the same rule as in the 
1st branch.” And it was agreed to but Wilson’s victory regarding the Senate would be 
short lived.  Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut was re-galvanizing Paterson’s small-state 
block around the idea of equal suffrage in the Senate as a necessary compromise.  
Wilson, along with Madison, would struggle vigilantly to the end to avoid such a 
compromise.235  
 When the issue of equality in the Senate reached a heated stalemate on June 29 
and 30,  Wilson warned that if equal representation of the states was allowed in the 
Senate the “minority (would) controul in all cases whatsoever.”  “Is it for men” that they 
were forming a government, Wilson sarcastically asked, “or for the imaginary beings 
called States?”  If the legislature of the new government was not laid upon the 
appropriate principles of popular suffrage, Wilson warned “it can be neither solid or 
lasting.”  Madison sided with Wilson, saying that a majority of states might obstruct and 
“extort measures repugnant to the wishes and interests of the Majority” of the People.  
Striking at the factional assumptions of the small-state delegates, Madison made a 
prophetic statement to a twenty-first century observer.  If “great divisions of interest in 
the United States” developed it would be between “the Northern and Southern” not the 
                                                          
234 Ibid., 97-98. 
235 Ibid., 98-104. 
102 
 small and large states.  Madison’s speculation was ignored and Ellsworth simply denied 
that the minority would dominate the majority through the Senate.  Rather, Ellsworth 
claimed, the Senate would be a defense for the minority.236   
 On the heels of this exchange between the two blocks, William Richardson Davie 
of North Carolina pointed out that if proportional representation were to be had in the 
Senate, the senatorial body would have to be very large.  A large Senate ran contrary to 
the desire of the majority in the Convention including Wilson, that the Senate was to be 
small, or at least smaller than the House.  The Senate was supposed to be a more 
conservative body to stabilize the legislative process and deal more consistently with 
foreign powers.  The smallness of the body was supposed to result in greater 
conservatism, either because it filtered the factional interests of the people into a few 
representatives who would then have to consider all factional perspectives or because 
fewer men would have more intimate professional relationships.237  
 Wilson admitted that the problem was real and “embarrassing.”  It was a problem 
that he had anticipated when, in his bid to make Senators popularly elected, he suggested 
that the states be divided into larger districts for electing Senators.  What was 
embarrassing was that Madison, his chief ally in proportional senatorial representation, 
had earlier argued forcefully against the idea of special larger districts.  Now Wilson 
suggested a different method of overcoming the problem that he presented as an alternate, 
more moderate compromise to the concerns of the small states.  He proposed that each 
state could have one Senator for every “100,000 souls,” every state with less receiving 
one.  Benjamin Franklin then proposed a different compromise that gave each state an 
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 equal number of Senators with a varying number of ballots to cast depending on the 
subject of the vote. On issues involving state sovereignty, state government or state 
citizenship, and the appointment of federal officers, each state would have an equal vote.  
On all other matters, each state would have votes proportional to wealth.  No one 
seconded Franklin’s somewhat idealistic solution.  Rufus King and James Madison did 
agreed to support Wilson’s compromise if, Madison added, the Senators could be made 
independent of the states.  Otherwise, Madison pointed out, the Senate would just be 
“another edition of (the Confederation) Congress.”  The small-state delegates, however, 
refused any compromise other than equal representation in the Senate and the stalemate 
was unbroken.   
 The frustrated Convention finally decided to form a special committee to decide 
on a compromise on the Senate.  Both Madison and Wilson knew that the committee 
spelled disaster for them and they protested it, but to no avail.  The product of the 
committee, together with a general fatigue in the Convention over the issue, would be 
catastrophic to the Madison/Wilson led large-state block, giving the day to the small-state 
delegates.238   
 On July, 5 the committee delivered its “compromise.”  Indeed, historians have 
come to call it the “great compromise.”239 It proposed proportional representation in the 
House and equal state representation in the Senate.  But, as a sop to the large-state 
delegates, only the House could originate money bills.  Madison claimed that the 
committee had went beyond its purpose.  Nonetheless, the Convention agreed to discuss 
the committee’s proposed compromise and it would dominate the rest of the discussion 
                                                          
238 Madison, Debates,  232-237. 
239 Rakove, Original Meanings, 57-58. 
104 
 over the Senate.  Over the following days, a tired Convention accepted the clauses of the 
committee report into the new Constitution over the protests of Wilson and Madison.240  
 Wilson also took a liberal stance on suffrage and office qualifications.  Early in 
the debate over equality of the Senate Rutledge of Virginia and Pierce Butler of South 
Carolina sided with Sherman’s proposed compromise, and they additionally moved that 
proportional representation in the House be based on “quotas of contribution” because 
“money was power.”  Wilson with Rufus King of New York tried to block the later 
proposal by calling for a vote to the effect that “the right of suffrage in the first branch of 
the national Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the Articles of 
Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation.”  After Benjamin 
Franklin threw his weight behind Wilson and Rufus, a vote was made in their favor.241   
 Rutledge and Butler proposed adding “according to quotas of contribution” to the 
end of “some equitable ratio of representation.”  But Wilson and Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina postponed a vote to make their own proposal based on the “Act of 
Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the States.”  
Following “some equitable ratio of representation” they proposed adding  
 in proportion to the whole number of white and other free Citizens and 
 inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those bound to 
 servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all others persons not 
 comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying  
 taxes, in each State. 
And there should be a Census “every 5-7, or 10 years.”  The vote was again made in 
Wilson’s favor, nine states to two, the two dissenters being New Jersey and Delaware.242   
 Later in the debates Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania objected to the method of 
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 determining representation in the House because he thought that “the people of 
Pennsylvania will revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves.”  And he was 
against basing representation on numbers of inhabitants in any case, preferring 
contributions of wealth.  Morris raised the specter of future western states.  “The Busy 
haunts of men not the remote wilderness” produced the “proper political Talents” claimed 
Morris.  And “if the Western people get the power into their hands,” Morris continued 
“they will ruin the Atlantic interests.”243   
 Madison leapt to diffuse Morris first.  As a southerner, Madison claimed to trust 
the “Northern Majority” and the easterners should trust the westerners for the same 
reason -- they were all economically connected.  Westerners would always want the 
markets and waterways of the “Atlantic States” for their goods, making eastern interests 
always relevant.  Once more, Madison implied, the Senate could probably be trusted to 
filter the factional vices of the people.244  Wilson admitted that no principled logic 
underlay the “admission of blacks.”  Numbers, not property was to be the basis of 
“computation,” yet chattel was being included in the formula.  Or were Blacks being 
“admitted as Citizens?” No.  The purpose of the three-fifths clause was pragmatic -- a 
compromise.  Wilson then asserted that over broad regions the holding of wealth and 
inhabitants tended to change at the same rate.  As an example he compared Philadelphia 
with the western counties of Pennsylvania.  The only difference between the wealth of 
the two was that “property was more unequally divided...here than there.”  Wilson could 
not reject the idea of representation based on wealth as being wholly onerous because it 
was too generally accepted as a morally valid method.  So, to preserve the more 
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 democratic principle in the House, Wilson skewed wealth and population together.  The 
efforts of Madison and Wilson paid off and their preferred method for computing 
representation made its way into the finished Constitution.245   
 Wilson made his firmest stand on suffrage based on numbers of inhabitants on 
July 13, when the issue returned concerning Congress’s right to re-estimate proportions.  
A clause had been added giving Congress to re-estimate based on “wealth and numbers 
of inhabitants.”  Randolph proposed striking out “wealth” and Wilson supported him.  
Wilson compared the fears of some delegates toward growing western influence to the 
“jealousy” that “misled the policy of Great Britain with regard to America.”  “The fatal 
maxims” that molded Britain’s policy “were that the Colonies were growing too fast” and 
had to be guarded against.  “Enmity” and separation was the result.   
 The majority of people wherever found ought in all questions govern 
 the minority.  If the interior of the Country should acquire this majority, 
         it will not only have the right, but will avail themselves of it whether we 
 will or no.  Property was (not) the sole or the primary object of  
 Government or society.  The cultivation and improvement of the human 
 mind was the most noble object.  With respect to this object, as well as 
 other personal rights, numbers were surely the natural and precise  
 measure of Representation. 
It was a startlingly democratic statement and connected the purpose of government to 
civil improvement.  Though most surely saw Wilson’s position as extreme, in the vote 
that immediately followed “wealth” was struck out.246
 Wilson wished to have few restrictions on legislative officeholders, thereby 
expanding the pool of possible talent from which the people and state legislatures had to 
choose.  He was against age restrictions, property qualifications, financial qualifications 
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 and a restriction to prevent pluralism between federal legislative office and other federal 
positions.  And Wilson, an immigrant, agreed that there ought to be residency 
requirements but preferred them to be shorter than many others.  He wanted the residency 
requirement for legislators to be three years as opposed to the seven that many others 
wanted.247      
 Wilson resigned himself to connecting the elector qualifications for federal 
legislative elections to those in the states for state legislative elections.  Any standard set 
by the Convention, he probably assumed, would run the risk of being more restrictive 
than state qualifications.  Discussions on elector qualifications in the Convention were 
probably leaning in a conservative direction -- statements by Ellsworth and Mason 
support such an analysis.  On August 7, Governeur Morris suggested that the “right of 
suffrage” should be restrained to “freeholders.”  Wilson disliked “the unnecessary 
innovation.”  It would be too “difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all 
the States.”  Additionally, it “would be very hard and disagreeable for the same persons 
at the same time, to vote for...the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote 
for...the National Legislature.”  On the heels of Wilson came supporting and telling 
statements from Ellsworth and Mason.  “The right of suffrage was a tender point” 
Ellsworth said, and “the people will not...subscribe to the National Constitution if it 
should subject them to be disenfranchised.”  “Eight or nine States have 
extended...suffrage beyond the freeholders” Mason added.  “What will the people there 
say, if they should be disenfranchised?”  Madison was divided over the idea.  
Contemporarily, he thought that freeholders would “be the safest depositories of 
Republican liberty.”  However, he thought that land would become more and more 
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 unequally distributed over time.  So that, in the future, such restrictions on elector 
qualifications might give rise to “Aristocracies...built on the ruins of popular forms.”  
Finally, Morris‘s proposition was voted down.248
  Discussion over the shape and nature of the new executive, was another area of 
intense involvement for Wilson.  When discussion of the executive opened on June 1, 
Wilson moved that the executive be a single person.   A nervousness poured through the 
room, so much so that a “considerable pause” occurred in the discussion.  To relax his 
fellow delegates, Wilson explained that he preferred a single executive because it would 
give the “most energy of dispatch and responsibility to the office.”  He did not “consider 
the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide.  Some of these prerogatives 
were of a Legislative nature.  Among others that of war and peace.”  Wilson envisioned 
the executive to have “only powers...strictly executive (such as) executing the laws,  and 
appointing officers, not appertaining to or appointed by the Legislature.”249    
 Edmund Randolph objected to “a unity in the Executive” as the “foetus of 
monarchy.”  He implied that Wilson was being “governed by the British Government as a 
prototype.”  And though he claimed to have respect for the “Excellent fabric” of the 
British constitution, “the fixt genius of the people of America” Randolph observed, 
“required a different form of Government.”  “Dispatch and responsibility could...be 
found in three men, as well as one” Randolph asserted, and greater independence from 
the legislature would be an additional result of a plural executive.  Gerry supported the 
idea of a single executive, but wanted to “annex...a Council...in order to give weight and 
inspire confidence.”  It was between these three ideas of a single, multiple or council 
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 appended executive, that the arguments over the executive’s form would move over the 
following days.250
 Wilson answered Randolph that he was “not governed by the British Model,” 
agreeing with Randolph that “the extent of (the Country) was so great, and the manners 
so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.”  But a 
“unity in the Executive” would not result in monarchy, rather Wilson claimed, it “would 
be the best safeguard against tyranny.”  When the issue returned three days later Wilson 
continued in this sentiment when he added, “All know that a single magistrate is not a 
King.”  On June 1, the vote on Wilson’s proposal was postponed.  Madison suggested 
that the powers of the executive be decided on before its form was decided and the 
Convention agreed.251
 At the end of the discussions on June 3, Randolph returned to the form of the 
executive, proposing that three executives exist, each “drawn from different portions of 
the Country.”  Pierce Butler of South Carolina contrarily said that he was for “a single 
magistrate,” echoing Wilson’s concern for dispatch.  The issue was postponed until the 
next day when Wilson took the floor.  Randolph had mentioned that “the temper of the 
people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy” so they would not approve of a 
single executive.  Wilson demanded that it was not true.  The people would embrace a 
single executive just as they had in the states.  “All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce 
any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Government,” 
Wilson pointed out. “Vigor” would be the result of a single executive, but three 
executives would be slowed by internal struggle and even fall victim to divisive 
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 factionalism.  Making their number odd, so that there would hypothetically always be a 
majority on any issue, was no solution because there would “commonly (be) many sides” 
to an executive issue rather than just two as in “Courts of Justice.”252   
 The elder but spry Sherman observed that all of the states also had councils 
appended to their executives, declaring that he would prefer a council.  Hugh Williamson 
of North Carolina asked Wilson if he “means to annex a Council.”  He did not because, 
according to Wilson, executive councils “oftener serves to cover, than prevent 
malpractices.”  The Convention voted in favor of Wilson’s single executive.253  Later in 
the Convention, when an executive council was again considered, Wilson’s reasoning 
reverberated.  George Mason of Virginia proposed an executive council but was defeated.  
As Wilson’s fellow Pennsylvanian Governeur Morris observed, the idea had already been 
“considered in the Committee.”  “It was judged that the President by persuading his 
Council to concur...would acquire their protection.”254             
 In discussing the method of selecting the President, beginning on June 1 as well, 
Wilson took a democratic stand just as he had on the legislature.  He was apprehensive to 
make his proposal “that it might appear chimerical.”  Wilson was for “election by the 
people.”  He pointed to the success of “election of the first magistrate by the people at 
large” in both New York and Massachusetts.  Deriving “not only both the branches of the 
Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the States but the Executive also” 
would, Wilson continued, “make them as independent as possible of each other, as well 
as of the States.”  Here Wilson clearly revealed his belief that magisterial corruption 
would be best guarded against through countervalence, not only between federal 
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 institutions but the federal and states governments.  He also revealed a trust of the 
common people that was much greater than the trust of most others in the Convention.   
 Nonetheless, Wilson proved far more willing to compromise on the issue of 
popular election of the President than he would proportionality in the Senate.  Sensing the 
uneasiness of the Convention with his idea, Wilson contrived the idea of an electoral 
college.  One day after his proposal of popular elections, Wilson proposed a system by 
which the people would elect electors and the electors would choose the President.  But 
Gerry came out against popular election because such a system would cause “a constant 
intrigue” for the office and it would give the executive a high legitimacy that would 
threaten the states.  And Hugh Williamson of North Carolina saw no point in having 
electors since they “would stand in the same relation to (the people) as the State 
Legislatures” yet electoral colleges would require more effort and money.  Apparently, 
Williamson preferred selection of the President by the state legislatures.  Wilson’s 
proposal was defeated.255
 Yet, Wilson would not let the idea of popular election of the President die so early 
in the contest.  On July 17, Wilson would ally with Governeur Morris to argue the 
proposition again.  It was Morris that breached the issue.  He objected to the retained 
provision in the Virginia Plan that the legislature would appoint the executive.  The 
executive would be a “mere creature of the Legislature.”  Morris instead proposed 
popular election in which the people “will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished 
character, or services.”  Sherman balked that the people often are “not sufficiently 
informed” and would be unable to give a majority to any individual because they “will 
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 vote for some man into their own State.”  If such a system would work at all he added, 
the large states would most likely dominate the Presidency.  Wilson rose to support 
Morris and refute Sherman.  He concurred with Morris that appointment of the executive 
by the legislature would make the executive “too dependent to stand as a mediator 
between the intrigues...of the Representatives and the general liberties and interests of the 
people.”  The executive was to be a counterbalance to the legislature, with its legitimacy 
equally drawn from the people.  The large states would never form a “cabal” to dominate 
the executive because the electors would not meet in the same place to decide on their 
votes.  And Wilson suggested a compromise to serve Sherman’s more practical concern 
for functionality.  If the majority could not decide on a single man then it could be thrown 
to the legislature. Pinckney and Mason sided with Sherman however, and the Convention 
voted down the still unlikely measure.  Luther Martin of Maryland then proposed that 
electors choose the executive, and that the electors be chosen by the state legislatures. 
The Convention voted down this proposal but it would soon be resurrected.256            
 Over the next two days the Convention’s attitude toward the legislative selection 
of the executive would change, and Wilson saw a small, short-lived glimmer of hope that 
the Convention might embrace popular election.  In discussions over the term and re-
eligibility of the President many in the Convention preferred to make the executive re-
eligible for additional terms, because they valued experience in the executive.  But the 
President’s re-eligibility seemed to have made many, who had before been willing to 
accept appointment by the national legislature, reconsider their views.  King returned to 
Luther Martin’s earlier idea of state selected electors, advancing it once again.  Paterson 
wholly supported King, as would Paterson’s partner in the small-state block, Ellsworth.  
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 It is clear that by July 19, the leaders of the small-state block had decided that Martin’s 
earlier proposal was in their best interest and were waiting for the issue to be rejoined.257   
 Because many were turning against selection by the national legislature, Wilson 
thought that “the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the 
people.”  And Wilson’s hope was not uncalled for.  Madison himself, the architect of the 
Virginia Plan that had suggested executive appointment by the national legislature, had 
turned against the idea of legislative appointment.  When it appeared that only two 
plausible choices for selection of the President existed: electors chosen by the people or 
electors chosen by the state legislatures, Madison chose the people.  He sided with 
Wilson, saying that “the people at large was in his opinion the fittest (method of 
appointment) in itself.”  But Madison had made his decision too late and the small-state 
block would win the day.  Wilson had initially introduced the idea of an electoral college 
as a compromise between his democratic preferences and the reticence of his associates.  
In the hands of Martin and King, however, it became a compromise between continental 
nationalists and the supporters of continued state power.  Madison and Wilson would not 
be won over by the formula, but enough would be in the Convention to secure its 
adoption.  And yet the issue was still not settled.258  
 At the end of the discussion on July 25 William Houstoun of Georgia and Richard 
Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina proposed that the selection of the President “be 
reconsidered.”  The Convention agreed and the next day Houstoun, with Spaight 
seconding, proposed that the electors for choosing the President should be, themselves, 
chosen by the national legislature.  The Convention assented to the proposal but then 
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 returned again to the re-eligibility of the executive, demonstrating the intimacy of the two 
issues for the delegates. The connection laid in a general concern for the independence of 
the executive from the national legislature.  The state legislatures, being divided would 
find it more difficult to join in manipulating the President than the national legislature.  
The national legislature might hold re-election over the head of the executive thereby 
controlling him.  Making the President ineligible to a second term would give additional 
protection to the executive.  Concerns over inexperience in the executive were assuaged 
by the idea of longer rather than shorter terms for the Presidency.259  
 Wilson disliked the idea of ineligibility for second terms and longer terms.  
Reminding the Convention that he still preferred popular election, Wilson alternately 
proposed that if the national legislature was to select the executive electors, the electors 
might be chosen randomly by drawing lots.  Daniel Carroll of Maryland seconded the 
motion.  Randomness would take the deliberative power to manipulate the executive out 
of legislator hands.  But randomness was itself considered inappropriate by Gerry and 
King. “Committing too much to chance” would result in the choice of “unworthy men.”  
Also the random lots may all fall to men from one or two states, allowing their electors to 
dominate the choice.260
 On July 25, Madison made an exceptional speech outlining the various “mode(s) 
that has been, or perhaps can be proposed” for Presidential selection.  He described the 
frailties of every mode and again threw his support behind popular election of the 
electors. “With all its imperfections he liked this best.”  Ellsworth objected in a short 
remark that popular election was impractical because a majority would be too difficult to 
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 achieve and in any case, the large states would come to dominate the executive.  
Madison’s plea for popular election was again ignored.261  Eventually it was Mason’s 
proposal that ended this particular row over executive selection.  Chosen by the national 
legislature, the President would serve seven years and be ineligible for a second term.262  
But the Convention as a whole remained unsatisfied with its progress on the issue of 
selection as evidenced later in the Convention.   
 On August 27 Carroll would, with Wilson seconding, motion for popular election 
of the executive and the motion was easily defeated.263  But dissatisfaction was sufficient 
that a committee of eleven, selected to consider and report on “postponed parts of the 
Constitution,” felt at liberty to entirely alter the method of selecting the executive in their 
report.  The committee returned a report that had the electors selected in each state “as its 
Legislature may direct,” in proportion to the “whole number of Senators and members of 
the House...to which the State may be entitled.”  This alteration set off a new row that 
lasted three days, but this method of selection found its way into the Constitution along 
with four-year terms and re-eligibility on September 6.264  The nebulousness of the clause 
about state selection -- “as its Legislatures may direct” -- left open the possibility of 
popular elections of electors in the states if the state legislatures decided to allow them.  
Three allies of Wilson on popular election, Madison, Morris and Carroll, were in the 
committee of eleven that proposed this wording.  Though it is purely conjecture, perhaps 
they made the clause nebulous deliberately to leave open the possibility of popular 
Presidential elections directed by the state legislatures.  
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  When Wilson first made his proposal for  a “unity in the executive” he assuaged 
fears of despotism by saying that he envisioned purely executive powers for the national 
executive.  He would also be against the power of the executive to convene the Senate 
when the House was not in session.265  Nonetheless, the executive powers that Wilson 
envisioned were quite extensive.  Wilson was far more concerned with parliamentary 
tyranny than any “foetus of monarchy” and saw a powerful President as an ideal 
counterbalance to the state legislatures and Congress.  But  concerns of tyranny by most 
in the Convention ran in the opposite direction and Wilson’s ideas were often 
frustrated.266   
 Wilson supported the power of the President to pardon both before and after 
convictions as “necessary...to obtain the testimony of accomplices.”267  He agreed that the 
President ought to be impeachable but demanded that Senators also be impeachable and 
seemed unsure where to place the power of impeachment.268  Along with Madison, 
Wilson vehemently opposed Dickinson’s early proposal that the President be 
impeachable on application by the majority of state legislatures.269  Wilson was also 
against requiring Senatorial consent for Presidential appointments as “blending...the 
Legislature with the Executive.”  The primary point of “unity in the Executive was that 
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.”  Legislative meddling in 
appointments, including the appointment of judges would only weaken the responsibility 
of the President.270   
                                                          
265 Ibid., 46-47, 608. 
266 Ibid., 464-465. 
267 Ibid., 535. 
268 Ibid., 332-335. 
269 Ibid., 55-56. 
270 Ibid., 67-598-601. 
117 
  Yet, perhaps most startling to a modern observer will be Wilson’s desire for the 
President to have an absolute veto over federal legislation.  It was not, however, an 
unheard of position to take during the period.  In crafting the state constitution of 
Massachusetts, John Adams had unsuccessfully pushed for the governor to have an 
absolute veto (an executive who would be popularly elected at that.)  Men like Wilson 
and Adams saw an absolute veto as a protection for the executive, preventing the 
“legislature from swallowing up” the executive.  But an absolute veto was not to be 
accepted by the delegates at the Constitutional Convention any more than it had been 
earlier in Massachusetts.  Madison contrarily “supposed...a proper proportion of each 
(legislative) branch...required to overrule...the Executive...would answer the same 
purpose as an absolute veto.”  Franklin additionally pointed out that a “negative” could 
be used to “extort money.”271  Eventually, Wilson supported a 3/4ths requirement for a 
Congressional override of the Presidential veto as opposed to a 2/3ds requirement to 
override.272  Wilson, however, was also a loyal promoter of Madison’s idea of a joint 
Judicial-Executive Council vested with the veto power and thought that there should be a 
powerful federal judiciary in general.273  
 The later point involves the idea of how national or federal the new constitution 
was to be.  Wilson, like Madison, was a continental nationalist who promoted powerful 
inferior national tribunals with final jurisdiction over state courts in “many cases,” 
particularly admiralty cases.274  Most telling though was Wilson’s and Madison’s 
insistence that Congress have a veto power over the state legislatures.  Not only in the 
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 interest of comity but in the interest of preserving the new government, Congress had to 
have some control over state legislation according to Wilson.  The danger was greater 
that the states would “sacrifice...the general interest” than that the “whole will 
unnecessarily sacrifice a part.”275  Later, Wilson compared the new government to a 
“wide arch” and Congressional veto of state laws was “the keystone.”  Anticipating 
judicial review of the constitutionality of laws Wilson held that federal judges might be 
able to determine the unconstitutionality of a state law, but that was not good enough. “It 
will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when 
passed.”276  Congressional veto of state laws was not agreed to of course, the supremacy 
clause was meant to substitute it, and over the last two hundred years the acceptance of 
judicial review has given that clause some force.277  
 As the Constitutional Convention neared its end the thoughts of the delegates 
turned to ratification.  Wilson wanted the proposed Constitution to bypass Congress and 
go directly to the states for ratification where only a bare majority of seven would allow it 
to go into effect.  Madison worried that even if the ratification of nine states was required 
to affect the new government, the population of those states might consist of less than a 
majority of the whole American people.  The result would be a constitution forced onto 
the majority by the minority.  Dickinson queried whether it could be considered 
appropriate to by-pass Congress since the present “Confederacy” rested on Congress.  
Wilson answered the uncertainty of both Madison and Dickinson on August 30.  “The 
States only which ratify can be bound” Wilson suggested to Madison, those that did not 
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 ratify would not have the Constitution thrust upon them.  Looking to Dickinson, Wilson 
boldly asserted that “a House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous regard 
to ordinary rights.”  “We must,” he continued “go to the original powers of Society.”   
 The next day Madison proposed that “seven or more States entitled to thirty three 
members at least in the House of Representatives” be required to put the Constitution into 
effect.  “The people were” Madison remarked, “the fountain of all power, and by 
resorting to them, all difficulties were got over.”  “They could alter constitutions as they 
pleased,” ruminated Madison, and “it was a principle in the Bills of rights, that first 
principles might be resorted to.”  Wilson appreciated Madison’s popular logic, 
acknowledging constitutions as instruments of the people.  He seconded.278  Such 
exigencies were made unnecessary however, because the Convention adopted Wilson’s 
doctrine that states not ratifying should not be forcibly compelled into the Union.  
Though the Convention appreciated Wilson’s observation on non-ratifying states, they 
rejected his attempt to by-pass Congress.  Congress would have to assent to the new 
Constitution before it went to the states where it would require ratification in nine states 
to make it active.  States not ratifying the Constitution would not be compelled to live 
under it, but would be allowed to join afterward.279   
 The final product of the Convention was not as national or democratic as Wilson 
had wanted, but it had enough of these attributes for Wilson to later argue the democratic 
nationalism of the new Constitution.  Indeed, Wilson would be a key proponent in its 
ratification.  Once the proposed Constitution had been issued by Congress to the states 
for ratification, Wilson and Robert Morris easily secured preparations for a ratification 
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 convention in the Republican dominated Pennsylvania Assembly.  As the federalist and 
anti-federalist ranks formed in Pennsylvania, it became quickly apparent that the new 
fissures followed the old factional lines very closely.  Dedicated Constitutionalists tended 
to become anti-federalists while Republicans became federalists, supporting the new 
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 In the ratification controversy that followed the Philadelphia convention, Wilson 
proved to be a dogged Federalist partisan.  Wilson’s dedication to popular 
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 instrumentalism and continental nationalism was interwoven throughout his partisan 
polemics.  He put forward his theoretical principle of civil revolution, embodied, he 
claimed, in the amendment process of the proposed 1787 federal Constitution.  And his 
faith in the People to rule themselves carried through to the new Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1790.      
 The federal Constitution, with its bicameralism, and single executive selected by 
electors, was much closer to what Republicans wanted for Pennsylvania than what the 
Constitutionalists cherished in their 1776 Constitution.  Adoption of the federal 
Constitution would be a virtual indictment of the Constitutionalists, setting the foundation 
for the destruction of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the permanent pre-eminence of 
the Republicans.  The Constitutionalists knew their danger, and their fears proved well 
founded.  The adoption of the federal Constitution was their death knell; resistance to it 
was their last meaningful effort to resist.  And even this last effort was doomed to failure. 
The Constitutionalists became marginalized by 1787, developing into a faction of western 
farmers that consistently alienated Philadelphians.  Just as the Republicans dominated the 
Assembly, so would they dominate the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.  The 
westerners only slender hope was to use the specter of tyranny to win over fence-setters 
among the easterners while tiring the federalist leadership with repetitive arguments, and 
that is exactly what they attempted.281 So Wilson’s defiance of the anti-federalists inside 
and outside the convention was of secondary importance.   
 The greatest importance of Wilson’s efforts came from the contents of his 
orations.  The masterfulness of Wilson’s reasoning and delivery amazed his observers 
and received the attention and applause of federalists in other states who often co-opted 
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 his arguments.282   
 On October 6, Wilson was elected to attend the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention.  He made his acceptance speech before a large group in front of the 
Pennsylvania State House.  Anti-federalist polemics had already become diffused 
throughout Pennsylvania and, in what posterity commonly calls the “State House Yard 
Speech,” Wilson used his forum to refute some of the “insidious attempts” of the anti-
federalists to “clandestinely and industriously...pervert and destroy the new plan.”   The 
speech was telling of Wilson’s thought following the Constitutional Convention, and 
predicated the arguments Wilson used against the anti-federalists in the ratification 
convention.   
 The anti-federalists charged that the new Constitution was a tool of despotism, 
evidenced by the lack of a bill of rights.  Historian Edmund S. Morgan has said that this 
argument was one of the most convincing made against the Constitution.  According to 
Morgan, the majority of federalists denied the need for a bill of rights on the basis that the 
government of the new Constitution would be purely republican, resting on the principle 
of popular sovereignty.  The people had no need to limit their own power.  Pigeonholing 
James Wilson into this group opinion, Morgan claimed that Wilson thought that the 
popular power of amendment was a sufficient replacement for any bill of rights.  Indeed, 
the bills of rights that existed in the earlier state republics were hypothetically antiquated 
tools of mixed constitutionalism, relevant when the Commons needed protection from the 
monarch.  Morgan speculated that the presence of bills of rights in those first, purely 
republican state constitutions “recognized the fictional quality of  popular sovereignty.”  
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 Yet, Morgan’s interpretation of Wilson’s thought is simply wrong.283  Wilson never 
argued that popular sovereignty and the popular amendment process replaced bills of 
rights.  In fact, Wilson was more than happy to acknowledge that in some instances bills 
of rights were very necessary under republican government.  The key determinant for 
Wilson was precisely how the functional powers that the people delegated were presumed 
to be transferred. 
 Answering for a lack of a bill of rights, Wilson stated that when the people 
established their state governments they gave their representatives every legislative power 
not “in explicit terms reserved” to the people.  So in the states bills of rights were 
necessary to limit the power of the government.  In other words, the people delegated a 
whole species of power with nebulous parameters and a bill of rights helped to define the 
extent of government powers through negative assertions.  “But in delegating foederal 
powers” Wilson contradistinguished “another criterion was necessarily introduced,” 
indeed, an opposite criterion.  It was “positive grant,” not “tacit implication” that 
legitimized federal power.  So that “everything that is not given” to the federal 
government “is reserved” to the people so that a bill of rights was not necessary.  Only 
specific and itemized functional powers were going to be transferred to the new 
government upon ratification, not an entire species of governmental powers. 
 Wilson used a popular concern for “Liberty of the Press” as his example.  It could 
not be violated by the federal government because the federal government had not been 
given any power to regulate the press.  In fact, a bill of rights would more likely 
undermine popular rights in the long run since “a formal declaration upon the subject” of 
the press or any other right “might (be) construed to imply that some degree of power 
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 was given, since we undertook to define its extent.”  Wilson rejected the doctrine of 
implied powers that he had helped pioneer under the Articles, because of how power was 
to be delegated to the new government.284   
 Wilson continued to engage complaints about the lack of a jury guarantee in civil 
trials and the probability of a standing army under the government.  On these issues 
Wilson was wholly dismissive, contending that the guarantee of juries in criminal cases 
was sufficient to secure liberty and that standing armies were necessary for national 
security.285  
 Interestingly, anti-federalist polemics forced Wilson to defend the Senate.  It was 
an institution that he was not fond of himself because he thought it threatened 
interference with majoritarian will by an arbitrary popular minority via the small states.286  
Anti-federalists had predicted the development of “a baneful aristocracy in the foederal 
senate.”  Wilson considered the idea completely unreasonable.  The Senate had “two 
characters, the one legislative and the other executive.”  As legislators, Senators could do 
nothing without the House of Representatives.  As executors, Senators could do nothing 
without the assent of the President.  “I do not know of any act which the senate can of 
itself perform” Wilson continued, and so no chance of senatorial despotism existed.  He 
admitted that the Senate was the product of compromise “between contending interests,” 
but that the fact “ought rather to command a generous applause, than to excite jealousy 
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 and reproach.”287    
 The anti-federalist accusation, Wilson argued, that the new Constitution would 
make the state governments into irrelevancies was erroneous.  He pointed out that 
without the states the federal government could not function.  The President and the 
Senate could not be selected without the state legislatures -- neither could Representatives 
to the federal House because their qualifications were attached to the state legislatures. 
 “The power of direct taxation” should not be feared either, Wilson told the crowd.  
It would rarely be used because imposts would prove sufficient to fund the government 
most of the time.  Direct taxation was necessary in cases of emergency and may also raise 
money to be used, he observed, to relieve the immense public debt that Pennsylvania 
presently suffered under.  And whether money was raised by impost or direct taxation 
“no...reason to apprehend oppression” existed because the federal government would 
only have such authority based on “universal assent” -- through popular representation, 
was Wilson‘s implication.288
 Wilson finished by accusing the anti-federalist of being interested partisans, 
dedicated to preserving their “place of profit under the present establishment.”  Boldly, 
he admitted that he was “not a blind admirer of this plan of government, and that there 
are some parts of it, which if my wish had prevailed, would have certainly been altered.”  
Nonetheless, Wilson  proclaimed, the proposed Constitution was, over all, a brilliant 
achievement.  He concluded, 
 When I reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every  
 man has an equal pretension to assert his own, I am satisfied that any thing 
 nearer to perfection could not have been accomplished.  If there are  
 errors, it should be remembered that the seeds of reformation are sown 
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  in the work itself.  Regarding it then...with a candid and disinterested 
 mind, I am bold to assert, that it is the best form of government which 
 has ever been offered to the world.289  
Wilson was ready for the ratification convention -- and he needed to be.  He was a 
renowned orator and lawyer, and the only member of the Constitutional Convention to 
attend the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, and so carried the greatest responsibility on 
his shoulders.  But before ratification was achieved, Wilson would be worn to a frazzle 
answering the constant and repetitive attacks of the western anti-federalists Robert 
Whitehill, William Findley and John Smilie.290  
 The federalist Thomas McKean opened the main business of the ratification 
convention on November 24 proposing that, though each clause should be discussed, the 
whole Constitution was to be accepted or rejected and not just parts of it.  Wilson 
followed with an extensive explanatory speech, infused with historical observations, to 
promote the proposed Constitution as a positive good.  The speech touched on many 
elements of Wilson’s developed political thought.  He began where he left off in his State 
House Yard Speech describing the political and conceptual difficulties that the 
Constitutional Convention faced and according to Wilson, overcame using “general 
principles.” 
 Establishing government  “for a single city...require(d) the strongest genius,” 
much less one for vast region that will hold “yet unformed, myriads of the human race” 
set to expand to the west over “regions hitherto uncultivated.”  Indeed, the delegates at 
the Constitutional Convention had understood there to be implications in their work for 
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 all humanity.  “The great struggle for liberty in this country, if it is unsuccessful” 
according to Wilson, “will probably be the last one which she will have for her 
existence...in any part of the globe.”  America was to be a model to the world for liberty 
and the kind of political activity and principles that would support it.  So the 
responsibility of the Constitutional Convention had been great and “the difficulty of the 
business was equal to its magnitude.”  Both the difficulty and magnitude had 
“astonished” Wilson.  And he thought it was amazing that a diverse group of men from 
diverse regions of the continent were able to compromise and reach an acceptable 
finished product.  By implication the responsibility belonged to all Americans and 
certainly those considering ratification of the new Constitution.  It was a heavy message 
designed to produce a serious atmosphere in the ratifying convention, bent in favor of 
accepting the new government.291
 Numerous disagreements arose among the Founders, but two general obstacles 
most troubled the Convention according to Wilson.  The first was that the “sense of 
independence and freedom” among the people made them difficult to govern, making a 
long-lasting, centralized continental government implausible.  Second, contemporary 
political theory contradicted the American effort to erect a government that was both 
continental and wholly republican.  Appended to this second concern was the more 
practical concern of how national or how federal the continental government was to be -- 
a concern exacerbated by a common understanding of the real differences between the 
people of the various states.292  
 On the first issue, Wilson confided that the “high spirited” nature of the people 
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 had never worried him as it had others.  Yes, they were high spirited but they also 
“possess(ed) sound sense,” he declared.  “They would,” Wilson continued “be...pleased 
with that system of government, which would best promote their freedom and 
happiness.”  As a federalist, Wilson believed that the plan for such a government was 
before the ratifying convention.293  He could discern no reason for the people to reject the 
new constitution because it would solidly rest on their sovereign authority.   
 Wilson concurred with other early modern writers in their variation on 
Aristotelian categories of government, a concept that had come to Americans by various 
other sources not least Montesquieu.  There were three “simple species of government -- 
monarchy, aristocracy (and) a republik or democracy.”294  Wilson does not make the rigid 
distinction between a republic and a democracy the way Madison later would in The 
Federalist.295  The new constitution with its countervailing governmental institutions, 
efficient variations in function, and federalism (pointedly NOT mixed government) 
would allow the new government to have the positive attributes of all these forms of 
government without their requisite failings.  Yet, “in its principle” the new government 
would still be “purely democratical.”  “The streams of power” Wilson happily continued 
“(ran) in different directions, in different dimensions, and at different heights...but...they 
all originally flow from THE PEOPLE.”296   Wilson would go even further and describe 
what later historians have referred to as Wilson‘s “revolution principle.”297
                                                                                                                                                                             
292 Ibid., 165-166, 174. 
293 Ibid., 165. 
294 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 272-330. 
295 Madison, “Representative Republics and Direct Democracies” or “Federalist, Number 14” in Federalist, 
150-155. 
296 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 180-181. 
297 Pascal, Political Ideas, 29-47.  Also see Dennison, “Revolution Principle” in The Review of Politics, 39 
(1977). 
129 
  “Writers on different governments will give different answers” to where 
sovereignty resides, Wilson admitted.  Blackstone placed it in British Parliament.  Wilson 
no longer refuted Blackstone but simply observed that in American governments “the 
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people.”  Their “constitutions 
were superior to (their) legislatures; so the people are superior to (their) constitutions.”  
“The people may change the constitutions,” Wilson deduced “whenever and however 
they pleased.”  Once more, the Revolutionary generation had proven that political 
revolutions could result in progress and that they were not inherently evil.298   
 Contemporary, un-transferrable popular sovereignty was to be the American 
“panacea of politicks.”  Bravely Wilson bellowed over his audience, some of whom must 
have been astounded at the “aristocrat’s” doctrine, “there can be no disorder in the 
community but may here receive a radical cure.”  The one exception was a corruption in 
the people at large themselves, for which “there is no remedy -- from their power...there 
is no appeal.”  But Wilson did not think the people corrupt.  And in the new constitution 
an amendment process was included that could fully realize this new American 
understanding through a peaceful and lawful process.  No good reason existed for the 
“high spirited” people to rebel en masse against the new government.299     
 The second problem of the expansive republic was one that arose from a broad 
acceptance among the founders of the political thought of Montesqueiu.  They considered 
the French philosoph a high political authority.  His writing was well known by Wilson 
and most of his colleagues.  Montesqueiu thought that republics were most often 
destroyed by internal factionalism arising from differences among members of the 
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 republic.  Great diversity in culture or regional environment, and therefore economy, only 
exacerbated differences of interest and the propensity for factionalism.  On the other 
hand, greater homogeny relaxed differences and the propensity for factional strife.  
Because diversity only increased as the size of a state increased republics only survived 
for prolonged periods when they were small; factional strife doomed large republics.  So, 
in the interest of stability, larger nations could not be wholly republican if at all 
republican.  The larger or more diverse the state, the greater necessity for concentrated 
power separate from the broader community that might control violent or stagnating 
divisions in the political society.300  As Wilson described Montesquieu’s thinking, “small 
states (are) to be governed as a republick; middling ones, (by) a monarch; and...large 
empires...by a despotic prince.”301  But the founders wanted to establish a pure republic 
over a vast continent without the appended prediction of inevitable doom.  
 James Madison struck at the fundamental assumptions of Montesquieu both in the 
Constitutional Convention and later as one of three that took on the synonym “Publius.”  
According to Madison, factionalism was inevitable in even the smallest republics.  And 
the fewer the factions, he argued, the more likely one faction would come to dominate 
tyrannically over the opposing factions.  Perhaps drawing from a common American 
assumption in the states that smaller legislative bodies were inherently more 
conservative, Madison hypothesized that the more factions there were in relation to the 
representatives of government the better.  Because if there was a plethora of factional 
interests no single faction would be able to long dominate a representative or 
governmental policy.  Therefore the deleterious effect of factionalism on republics could 
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 be remedied by “enlarge(ing) the sphere” of the participatory community.  Inspired by 
James Harrington’s and David Hume’s fictive models of ideal extended republics, 
Madison proposed that a larger republic was preferable to a small one because the larger 
population would magnify the diversity of interests in the state and therefore potential 
factions.302  
 Wilson, on the other hand, denied Montesquieu’s prediction of doom obliquely, 
using the concept of “Federal Liberty,” a concept imbedded in the proposed constitution, 
that if applied would be a unique blessing for the United States.  He did not embrace 
Madison’s theory that “enlarged spheres” would counteract domineering factionalism -- 
filtering popular passions in the legislative process.   
 Montesquieu had suggested that the happiest extensive territorial state was one of 
many small republics confederated under a monarchy.  Such a state might balance 
republican liberty with monarchial dispatch and the defensive capabilities of a larger 
population.  The philosoph’s ideal model was really a reconfigured version of the British 
concept of mixed government.303  Wilson thought that the new government combined the 
best attributes of monarchy (and aristocracy) with purely republican forms.  This new 
republicanism would sit in the place of Montesquieu’s monarch.  Once more, the federal 
nature of the system itself promoted the security and even progress of American liberty.  
“Civil government,” Wilson reminded his listeners “was necessary to the perfection of 
society.”  “Civil liberty” was formed when individuals gave up “part of (their) natural 
liberty” to the community.  The proper goal of civil society was to better secure and 
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 perfect the liberty that was retained.  As Wilson put it, “The liberty of every member is 
increased by this introduction, for each gains more by the limitation of the freedom of 
every other member, than he loses by the limitation of his own.”  Wilson then 
extrapolated this broadly accepted idea into an understanding of the proposed federal 
system.  The states, by giving up their sovereignty and certain liberties to the federal 
government, would have the liberties they retained better secured and advanced upon.  
The happy effect would be felt by the citizens of the states.  Perhaps inspired by Wilson, 
Alexander Hamilton later used a similar argument during the ratification contest in New 
York.304  
 Following Wilson’s speech the western and eastern factions began a day-long 
argument over procedure.305  Once the real debates got underway, the argumentation 
between Wilson and the anti-federalists in the convention stayed very much within the 
confines of the wrangle leading up to the convention.  Most interesting were Wilson’s 
comments on the rejection of state sovereignty and the non-contractual nature of the 
federal constitution.   Wilson emphatically answered anti-federalist objections to the 
activity of the earlier Constitutional Convention and their abandonment of state 
sovereignty on December 11.    
 William Findley had mentioned that the delegates, he thought, assumed 
themselves to be forming a new contract for the American states.  Wilson rebutted, 
 I cannot answer for what every member thought; but I believe it 
 cannot be said that they thought they were making a contract, 
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  because I cannot discover the least trace of compact in the system.306
It took at least two parties in the forming of a contract, Wilson remonstrated.  But in the 
legitimization of the constitution only one party acted -- the People.  “I am,” Wilson 
sarcastically observed “unable to conceive who the parties could be.”  Wilson plied his 
case to the situation of ratification. 
 This (new government) is not...founded upon a compact; it is founded 
 upon the power of the people.  From...their ratification alone it is to 
 take its constitutional authenticity; without that it is no more than tabula 
 rasa. 
Wilson rejected the idea that the state governments were, or even could be sovereign and 
concurrently any idea that a national constitution could be thought of as a treaty between 
them.307   
 The twenty-three day long, federalist-dominated Pennsylvania ratification 
convention was the first to meet and the second to ratify the constitution, following 
Delaware.308  Three years after ratification and the official institution of the new form of 
government, the Constitutionalist prediction of their own final defeat came true.  In 1790, 
Pennsylvania Republicans succeeded in calling for a state constitutional convention.  
Wilson dominated the constitution-making process, forwarding a product that was similar 
to the federal constitution and yet exceedingly Wilsonian.309   
 The 1790 Constitution had a single executive, a bicameral legislature and a 
judiciary that served during good behavior.  The governor held a limited veto of 
legislation as in the federal Constitution but would appoint judges without the 
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 interference of the legislature.  Popular elections selected both the governor and the 
legislators of both legislative houses.  Conservatives from Wilson’s own federalist ranks, 
including McKean, had objected to the immediate election of Senators but Wilson had 
backed them down.  Wilson also secured liberal parameters for suffrage.310  A fellow 
delegate remarked that “with a few exceptions” Wilson was “on the democratic or anti-
federal side of the house.”311  His erstwhile federalist allies must have been mortified.  
 Because general species of power were delegated to the Legislature and Governor 
rather than specific enumerated powers, a bill of rights (perhaps more correctly 
understood as points of governmental limitation) was necessary.  It was a point that no 
one seemed to disagree on.  Article IX of the Pennsylvania Constitution involved twenty-
six sections limiting the powers of the Legislature and Governor in very specific ways.312   
 The state constitutional convention had their proposed constitution printed and 
distributed to the Pennsylvanian public.  After a week of receiving feedback they 
reconvened and, assuming themselves capable of acting as a popular ratifying 
convention, ratified the new constitution in the name of the People.313  
 Wilson’s arguments during the constitutional crisis of the 1780s show him to be a 
continental nationalist, who trusted the People at large to choose capable leaders through 
direct election.  Danger in republican systems came primarily, for Wilson, through 
magisterial corruption.  Even the most capable men could be corrupted by power. 
Wilson’s republican remedy was more adequate checks and balances in government, and 
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 a full realization of popular sovereignty that included a democratic spirit in governance 
and  instrumental constitutionalism.  Wilson could not accept the contra-popular 
rationalizations of Madison’s remedy, such as larger constituencies filtering out popular 
passions, because within the context of the legislative process the immediate popular will 
was to be wholly trusted.  But like Madison, Wilson envisioned a continental republic 
and rejected the idea of the 1787 federal constitution as a Lockean contract in favor of a 
view of the constitution as an instrument of the People at large.          






















THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
 
 During his 1790/1791 law lectures at the University of Pennsylvania, Wilson 
elucidated his view of popular sovereignty, describing its origins, essential nature and 
limitations.  He also connected his understanding of popular sovereignty and 
constitutional instrumentality to a larger concept of “civil society” whose progress was to 
be preserved and facilitated by government.  Wilson’s overall vision of society and 
ultimately constitutional government was revealed to be progressive.   
 Before engaging some of Wilson’s more in-depth conceptual arguments, it will be 
productive to first return to exactly what Wilson thought progress was or might be in the 
late eighteenth century United States.  Even before his lectures, Wilson’s business 
activities are telling in regard to his view of socio-economic development.         
 As discussed before, Wilson was a supporter of banking and governments 
chartering banks.  But the late 1780s brought a hypothetical embarrassment for Wilson 
that, because of his professional trajectory, he avoided.  In his arguments during the 
ratification controversy, Wilson rejected the idea of implied powers for the 1787 federal 
Constitution.  Unlike the state constitutions or the Articles of Confederation, the 1787 
Constitution did not grant all legislative powers to Congress, rather the instrument 
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 granted only very specific legislative powers.  So, according to Wilson, a bill of rights 
was not necessary under the 1787 federal Constitution, unlike under the state 
constitutions that did grant very general categories of governmental power.   
 Because of his arguments during ratification it would have been difficult for 
Wilson to resurrect his doctrine of implied powers that he employed under the Articles to 
justify the Bank of North America, to argue the constitutionality of a federally chartered 
bank under the 1787 Constitution.  No clause in the enumerated powers of Congress gave 
Congress the power to charter banks.  But re-working Wilson’s earlier doctrine of 
implied powers is exactly what Alexander Hamilton did in 1791 when he argued for a 
Bank of the United States under the “necessary and proper” clause of the new federal 
constitution. 
 Congress had let the charter of the Bank of North America terminate in 1786, 
though it continued under a Pennsylvania state charter (it had been re-chartered by a 
Republican dominated Pennsylvania Assembly.)  In 1790 Hamilton proposed a national 
bank that was rigorously resisted by James Madison, who argued that Hamilton’s notion 
of implied powers were inapplicable to the federal Constitution. Congress sided with 
Hamilton, however, as did President George Washington contrary to the advise of 
Thomas Jefferson.314   
 Wilson never left a public record of what he thought about the contention between 
his old Federalist allies.  He would not return to Congress after 1787, but re-entered the 
federal government as a founding member of the Supreme Court in 1790.  He was, 
perhaps blissfully, absent for the revival of the bank controversy.  What can be said is 
that Wilson supported the general idea of banks being chartered by governments and he 
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 continued to take loans from the Bank of North America to fuel his land speculations.  
 It was in the arena of western lands, immigration and foreign investment that 
Wilson saw the best resources for American social and economic development in his own 
time.  Wilson became a lavish land speculator following American Independence to the 
point of being addicted to the business.  As early as 1790 many of his close associates 
began to worry about Wilson’s mounting debt and his debt problems hindered his judicial 
career.  Wilson had hoped to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and he 
wrote to President Washington offering his services.  Eventually, Wilson was only 
appointed Associate Justice to the chagrinned surprise of some of his friends.  Whispered 
rumors of Wilson’s precarious financial situation had influenced Washington‘s decision.  
The lands that Wilson bought and the mills that he built on many of them simply were 
not returning the profits that he had anticipated, and yet he continued to take out loans to 
buy new properties.315  
 His obsession with land speculation says much about Wilson.  On the surface it 
may suggest an impulsive personality as a whole, but such a conclusion would not be 
supported when looking at other areas of Wilson’s life history.  Like most Americans to 
this very day, for Wilson no better enterprise existed than one that would make him rich 
and advance the prosperity of the whole society at the same time.  The development of 
western lands offered such a dual opportunity to Wilson’s generation.  It was only a 
matter of time until the immigrants poured across the sea in even greater numbers to 
enjoy the enlightened freedoms of federal America.  As Wilson observed, Americans had 
“formed and now enjoy a Constitution excellent in its organization, and still more 
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 excellent in its...Principles.”  The oppressed of Europe would clamor for American 
liberty and the promised wealth of American lands.316
 Among Wilson’s notes may be found a proposal made to an unknown recipient 
titled “Prospectus of an Association for the Promotion of Lands for Settlement.”  It is an 
ambitious plan to form a private association for the settlement of western lands by 
European immigrants, using excess European capital.  This Association would seek out 
Europeans wishing to immigrate.  Given land and services in the form of loans, 
immigrants were to slowly repay the Association in either capital or surplus crops over a 
period of eight years.  Transported across the ocean on reliable, Associate-approved 
ships, the new immigrants might take carriages and wagons provided by the Association 
to their new lands in the west.  The plan allotted each family as much as two to three 
hundred acres apiece.  Necessary buildings and works for drainage were to be built by the 
Association before the immigrants arrived, as well as a subsistence garden planted to 
insure their survival through their first years.  The immigrants also had the option of 
hiring on loan, from the Association, a guide to teach them necessary farming skills.  
Unfortunately for hundreds of thousands of immigrants over the following decades, 
Wilson’s highly ambitious but humane plan never became more than a hazily envisioned 
dream.317  
 Wilson’s debts mounted over the 1790s until the bottom fell out of the land 
market in 1798.  This recession financially ruined the Associate Supreme Court Justice.  
Wilson fled from his creditors to South Carolina, where he died penniless from malaria.  
His young second wife Hannah, whom Wilson had married in 1793, must have been 
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 devastated.318  
 Yet, Wilson’s ideas about progress were not confined to economics.  And even 
economic progress itself was intimately connected, in Wilson‘s mind, to the political 
health and progress of society.  In the fearful atmosphere of the later Confederation 
period, Wilson jotted notes in favor of centralized regulation of commerce that, combined 
with the natural “Richness of ... Soil, Numbers, and values of ... Productions” in the 
United States, would make America into an economic power-house.  Though politically 
lacking in regard to central regulation, the United States was otherwise already sufficient 
in political acumen to seize the economic prosperity that was in her reach.  Wilson 
complemented the people of the states, saying that “the Genius of their Governments is 
favorable to Trade, because it is favorable to Equality and Industry, the ONLY pillars on 
which Trade can be supported.”  By “Equality,” Wilson probably meant equitable laws 
and political practices.  After 1787, when the problem of lax central authority was 
supposedly solved, Wilson assumed that the perfected political situation of America, and 
its communication across the Atlantic, would be part of the impetus for a new confluence 
of freedom and immigrants.319
 Nonetheless, in Wilson’s speeches and later lectures at the University of 
Pennsylvania, “progress” generally had more to do with political, intellectual and moral 
advancement than economic development.  In a celebratory speech, glorifying the 1787 
federal Constitution following a federalist parade to celebrate the first anniversary of the 
Constitution’s ratification, Wilson spoke of purely moral and political advancement.  
Wilson happily proclaimed that, 
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  A progressive State is necessary to the Happiness and Perfection of 
 Man.  Whatever attainments may be already possessed, attainments 
 still higher ought to be pursued.  It is our Duty, therefore, to press 
 forward, and to make increasing Advances in every Thing that can 
 support, improve, refine and embellish Society.320
The Constitution and its underlying principles Wilson defined as advancements.  
Specifically, Americans had discovered a moral imperative that “all the derivative 
Movements in Government must spring from the original Movements of the People at 
large.” This placed the initial duty and right of progress squarely in the hands of the 
people at large.  Government was only a facilitator -- a helpmate.   
 One of the most important ways that the people exercised their duty was in voting 
-- their “first connection in politics.”  (Another important democratic duty, in Wilson’s 
opinion, was the duty of jurors to represent the People in the legal process.)  Deliberation 
and voting itself therefore must be understood, according to Wilson, as a moral obligation 
comparable to that of a soldier’s duty to defend his country.  In a portion edited out by 
Wilson, he wrote of the celebration of the Constitution itself being an advancement 
because it compelled contemplation of fundamental political principles.  He ended his 
speech prayerfully.  “The Commencement of our Government has been supremely 
glorious,” Wilson proclaimed.  “Let our progress in any Excellence be proportionally 
great.”321  Wilson’s progressive line of thought would be continued in his law lectures. 
 Wilson’s reputation throughout the states for genius in law had long proceeded his 
appointment to the embryonic Supreme Court.  As early as 1782, Wilson’s reputation 
was broadly enough known for the Virginian, General Washington, to request Wilson’s 
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 services in mentoring his nephew, Bushrod Washington, in the legal profession.  
Ironically, it would be Bushrod who took Wilson’s empty seat on the Supreme Court 
following Wilson’s ignominious and untimely death.322   
 In 1790 the Board of Trustees of the College of Philadelphia, that included 
Wilson, approved the addition of law lectures to the school’s curriculum.  And Wilson, 
only recently appointed to the Supreme Court, was the most sensible choice to give the 
lectures.  Wilson commenced organizing his law lectures in the winter of the same year.  
Considering the rapidity of their construction Wilson’s lectures are succinct and well 
organized, pooling and rationalizing together most of the conceptual elements important 
to Wilson and his generation.   
 Other than A Defense of the Constitutions of the United States by John Adams, 
Wilson’s lectures in law are the closest the Revolutionary generation ever came to 
producing an in-depth philosophical treatise involving the principles of their 
revolutionary struggles.  And the law lectures may be more representative of political 
thought in the United States at the time than A Defense, a treatise that was not well-
received.323  Wilson’s lectures both plumbed the depths of epistemology while hugging 
the borders of theology and pragmatism.  In them, Wilson propounded precepts of human 
intellect, sociability and the human relationship to natural and divine law. These 
fundamental precepts were, in turn, used to construct a theory of society, government and 
political sovereignty.  The middle-aged professor of law then took care to connect these 
appropriate principles to the new political and legal reality of post-Confederation 
America.  It is not implausible that Wilson might have become the Revolutionary 
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 generations most profound political theorist had he not drowned in debt and died early at 
the age of 56.324  
 Of course, Wilson did not organize his lectures as a political treatise because they 
were to be an introductory law lecture for students.  And even a lecture centered on broad 
philosophical principles demanded a different structure than that of a formal 
philosophical work.  To a person expecting Wilson’s lecture to read as a philosophical 
treatise, Wilson’s organization will often appear illogical, if not backward.325 He gave 
two introductory lectures, one for select students and a list of worthy contemporaries, and 
the other just for the students.  President George Washington and Vice-President John 
Adams attended Wilson’s first lecture and Wilson’s purple prose flew to great heights, 
explicitly glorifying America and implicitly glorifying Washington.  Both introductions 
stressed the importance of a law education, the need for a philosophically unique 
American understanding of law and a correct sensibility of law among the People at 
large.326 Throughout the rest of the lectures Wilson moved through various general 
categories of law and law-related issues in each section, moving into his epistemology in 
the middle of the lectures. 
 “A system of human nature” Wilson explained to his students “is not expected 
from this chair.”  It was, he continued “too vast for me; it is too vast for any one man, 
however great his genius.”  For Wilson the human mind was, to some extent, an inherent 
mystery -- exceedingly complex, and after a point purely metaphysical.327  Yet a basic 
understanding of its rudimentary functions in the daily world was not outside the human 
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 grasp.  Indeed, it had to be grasped according to Wilson as a prerequisite for a proficient 
philosophical understanding of law. “In truth” Wilson declared eloquently “law can never 
attain either the extent or the elevation of science, unless it be raised upon the science of 
man.” For Wilson, the science of man was inextricably entwined with an understanding 
of “mind,” since “every art and in every disquisition, the powers of the mind are the 
instruments.”328  And despite his initial claim, Wilson explored the depths of 
epistemology quite deeply from his law chair.  
 As both historians Jean-Marc Pascal and Mark David Hall have remarked, the 
Scottish common sense philosophers heavily influenced Wilson.  Like them Wilson 
rooted his epistemological and moral thought in the concept of a commonly held intuitive 
sense of morality.  In a section of lecture titled “Man, as an Individual” Wilson most 
visibly reveals the common sense influence on his thought.329  He rejected the precepts of 
men that he called “the ideal philosophers,” who argued the inability of the human mind 
to perceive anything but ideas and questioned the existence of anything outside the mind.  
Human perception could and did perceive external objects, said Wilson, and the contrary 
assumptions of the “ideal philosophers” from Descartes to Hume were untenable.  
 Yet, perception was not only an impression of an external stimulus upon the mind 
but also the intellectual apprehension of the stimulating object.  Three kinds of perception 
existed according to Wilson.  Perception of external objects via the five senses was the 
most obvious. “Contemplation” was another type of perception, by which a person 
perceived internal, intellectual objects; that is ideas. The third, and perhaps most 
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 important type of perception to Wilson (certainly the most fundamental) was moral 
perception.  Moral perception apprehended the laws of God.  This perception was 
intuitive or “self-evident” in nature and was immune to demonstrative or logical proofs.  
“Laws may be promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us” 
declared Wilson.  A primal understanding of very basic truths was “engraven by God on 
the hearts of men ... the promulgator as well as the author of natural law.”330 An example 
of a self-evident truth would be the tautological statement that material existence exists.  
Another self-evident truth was the inalienable human rights to life and liberty.331  But 
some inconclusive historical evidence might be found for the general notion of self-
evidential and universal truths. Wilson cited fundamental moral precepts common to 
most civilizations during most periods of time, such as the assumption that the majority 
of what was sensed was real, or that general moral concepts and human desires could be 
commonly found represented in every language.332  
 Yet, the moral law of God was general in its command.  Though the human 
“heart” or intuitive perception might inform humanity of general precepts it did not 
inform human beings on how to apply those general precepts within their specific 
situation.  Neither did divine law compel obedience.  Human beings possessed free wills 
and the power to reason (more examples of self-evident truths) and people attempted 
reason to extrapolate and apply God’s general law to their specific and ever-changing 
situations.  All human beings possessed the intuitive perception equally, but not all would 
choose to follow God’s law or had an equal ability to reason.  Poor reasoning or 
judgment corrupted the application of God’s law or even created fictions that caused 
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 humanity to doubt the veracity of the intuitive laws.  Proper reason and obedience to the 
“self-evident” was the root of good in the world while poor reasoning was the intellectual 
root of evil and corruption in the world.  Wilson thought that as civil society advanced in 
its morality the less likely that society would fall into error.  But if a society fell into error 
it would suffer from social or spiritual diminution -- again, history offering its evidence.  
That diminution might be evident in either the extremes of anarchy or tyranny.333
 The people of the United States had achieved a great advance in the progression 
of civil society during their Revolution, according to Wilson.  The travails of American 
Whig opposition during the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s and 70s and then the Revolution 
itself had allowed, or perhaps pushed, Americans to discover the great truth of 
contemporary popular sovereignty.  Forced to focus on certain self-evident truths, and to 
reject old perversions of reasoning Americans had discovered the moral imperative that 
all legitimate Earthly power had to be derived from the People at large.  
 “Sovereignty,” the idea that there could only be one highest power in any civil 
society, was a natural law.  Like the source of the Nile River, analogized Wilson, 
philosophers had long searched for the source of sovereign power.  But all had either 
oversimplified the issue or clung to pre-extent assumptions so closely that their reasoning 
corrupted the idea of sovereignty or failed the realization of its true source.  And Wilson 
hypothesized that the corruption of the idea of sovereignty lay at the root of the Imperial 
Crisis that necessitated the Revolution; the corrupt worldview turned into corrupt 
political assumptions that misled British policy.334    
 Wilson covered some of the least appreciable concepts of sovereignty through 
                                                                                                                                                                             
332 Wilson, Works, Vol. I ed. Andrews, 105-153, 247-252 
333 Ibid., 95-125, 157-158. 
147 
 history in his lecture on “Law and Obligation.”  The centerpiece of the lecture was his 
definition of law.  In his basic definition of law Wilson conjoins elements of legal 
commentators William Blackstone and Richard Hooker.  From Blackstone, Wilson drew 
the concept of the law as a rule.  As such it was “an instrument...distinguish(ed)...from a 
sudden, or transient, or particular order (command)...and to denote that it carries along 
with it a power and principle of obligation.”335  But why that obligation existed, and from 
where law derived its authority was a point of disagreement between Wilson and 
Blackstone. Wilson also appended to Blackstone’s “rule of action” what Wilson 
considered to be Hooker’s “fuller and stronger conception of law.”  Law, according to 
Hooker and Wilson “assigns to each the kind, that it moderates the force and power, that 
it appoints the form and measure of working.” Wilson’s preference for the less brutish, 
more utilitarian definition of law is telling. He wanted to think of the law as a 
constructive tool in its own right, not just a curmudgeon of the powerful.336  
 Wilson turned then to the central issue on his mind -- the nature of morally 
legitimate authority -- the proper source of sovereignty.  Blackstone had continued in his 
definition of law to say that the “rule of action” was “prescribed by some superior, and 
which the inferior is bound to obey.” Wilson railed “A superior!” 
 Let us make a solemn pause-Can there be no law without a superior? 
 Is it essential to law, that inferiority be involved in the obligation to 
 obey it? Are these distinctions at the root of all legislation?337
To all of these questions, in Wilson’s analytical, drawn-out way, he answered “no,” at 
least in regard to human law. 
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  Two approaches to thinking about superiority existed according to Wilson: either 
superiority derived from power alone or superiority derived from a combination of power 
and moral right.  In other words, either superior authority was right because of might 
alone, or it was right for reasons distinct of the power that made it effective.  Wilson 
rejected the first “strange” position out of hand, denying that power in and of itself 
granted any special right.  Governors who ruled by strength alone had no greater or lesser 
right to rule than the right of a People who could muster enough strength, to rebel against 
their governance.  The position was strange and unacceptable because it involved no real 
sense of obligation and was inherently dangerous to liberty.  Wilson added, “Bare force, 
far from producing obligation to obey, produces an obligation to resist.”338
 Wilson preferred the second general position.  But in many instances thinkers 
who, likewise, took up the moralistic position fell into an equally damaging set of errors, 
or had been erroneously interpreted.  To “superiority of power” they had “superadded 
pre-eminence or superior excellence of nature.”339  Dionysus of Halicarnasus, Cicero, and 
Aristotle (according to some interpretations that Wilson found dubious) had all fallen into 
this error of political thinking that the most virtuous ought to rule.340   
 The philosophical position of rule by the most virtuous was practically untenable, 
claimed Wilson. “How is excellence to be rated or ascertained?” Wilson queried with an 
implicative question.  No objectively satisfactory way existed, neither was there any 
individual or group objective or all-knowing enough to make a sufficiently trustworthy 
judgment.  Even if it was not a virtual impossibility, Wilson continued that few would be 
all virtuous -- there would be gradations of excellence.  Was “there to be a gradation of 
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 law as well as excellence?”  No, all would be confusion.341
 Some had tried to overcome the problem of determining the superior right to rule 
by two other distinctive means.  One line of thought, derived from Pauline biblical text 
and culminating more contemporarily in the work of Jean Domat, claimed that rulers -- 
monarchs in particular -- had been given their positions by God and ruled by divine right. 
God had chosen those most appropriate for his own designs, which was always for the 
good of humanity. Wilson scoffed at Domat’s logic, saying no evidence supported his 
assertion; indeed, princes had often been found destructively inept.  Quoting a 
commentator during the reign of Charles II, Wilson quipped that “the greatest part of 
mankind” had not “come into the world with saddles on their backs and bridles in their 
mouths.” Neither had a “few” been born “ready booted and spurred to ride the rest.” And 
it was no surprise, Wilson continued, that such an absurd doctrine of “superiority” would 
be embraced by men of pride, and that such an “inverted way of teaching and thinking” 
would turn “kings into tyrants, without knowing or even suspecting that they are so.”342    
 Another way of overcoming the moral problem of the right to rule under the 
precept of superiority was through a theory of prehistoric social contract. Wilson returned 
to William Blackstone’s Commentaries On the Laws of England.  Blackstone, like John 
Locke, thought that society had come together for mutual protection and instituted 
government for self-preservation.  The institution of governance involved a contract 
between those who would be ruled and those who would rule: those who would submit 
and those who would legislate in  superiority.  The product of the contractual relationship 
was civil society through law.  Wilson declaimed Blackstonian doctrine with horrific 
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 imagery. “What is left the people?” Wilson asked. “Nothing. What are they? Slaves. 
What will be their portion? That of beasts -- instinct, compliance, and punishment.” 
Wilson was also happy to point out an inconsistency in Blackstone’s historicism. 
Blackstone had made superiority a requirement of law, yet he envisions a state of natural 
society authoritatively legislating a contract in which the much vaunted superior is itself 
constructed.343  
      Wilson could not accept any of these solutions for superiority above, or even the 
necessity of superiority in the making of laws, for three basic reasons.  First, the very 
notion of superiority always “contained the germ of...the divine right...to rule.”  As such 
it was impious, presupposing a single person or group as wielding the authority of a 
demigod over the human race.344  
      Second, the theory of superiority, particularly as proponents of rule by excellence in 
virtue and contract theorists envisioned it, inverted the order of things. Their doctrines 
made government the end of society, but the truth was, according to Wilson, that 
advancement in civil society was the end of government.345 Wilson lamented,  
          How often has the end been sacrificed to the means! Government was  
          instituted for the happiness of society: how often has the happiness of 
          society been offered as victim to the idol of government! Let government 
          -- even the constitution, be...the handmaids; let them not be...the mistresses 
          of the state (civil society).346   
Jean Barbeyrac had said that society was the “scaffolding” upon which the “building” of 
government was constructed. The reverse was true.347
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  According to Wilson, two general kinds of society could be understood: natural 
society and civil society.  Human beings were inherently social animals, began Wilson in 
his lecture “Of Man, As a Member of Society.”  He rejected the egoist principle that 
human beings were wholly motivated by selfishness.  Self-love was a real and primal 
force, but sociability was also an equally primal force of its own, not a mere derivative of 
self-love. Human beings had always socialized, at least in loose groups.  It was this loose 
socialization that Wilson called “natural society.”  Civil society or the “state” occurred 
when a group entered into a mutual, collective contract. “These engagements are 
obligatory, because  they are mutual,” he argued.  And so the state was “a complete body 
of free persons, united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their 
own, and to do justice for others.”  The implicit result is “an artificial person,” in “a state 
of natural liberty” with other civil societies.  In that “person” the incorporated “wills and 
power of all the members (will) be united in such a manner, that they shall never act nor 
desire but one and the same thing, in whatever relates to the end, for which the society 
was established.”348   
 One of the best reasons for the formation of civil society (and eventually 
government), aside from base preservation, was the enhancement of liberty.  Civil society 
lessened some of humanity’s natural liberties but enhanced other liberties by restraining 
the actions of other humans.  Wilson was optimistic, believing that there could be and 
ought to be a net gain of liberty in the development of civil society.  In “a natural state” 
claimed Wilson, humanity would “enjoy less liberty, and suffer more interruption and 
inconvenience” than in a properly constructed civil society, because “every other 
individual would act uncontroulled by others.”  In other words, anarchy was its own kind 
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 of tyranny.349  
 What was most important to Wilson was that civil society pre-dated civil 
government.  Government was a construct of civil society and part of civil society once 
constructed, but unlike other political thinkers, for Wilson government was not 
essentially necessary for civil society to exist.  So for Wilson, change in government did 
not have to mean the dissolution of civil society as it did for other thinkers, and the 
American Revolution offered Wilson his own best evidence.  Government was 
functionally necessary, however, for the prolongation and “perfection” of civil society, 
particularly as the society grew and became more complex. “Without government, 
society, in the present state of things, cannot flourish; far less can it reach perfection.” 
And so the purpose of government was to aid civil society in its own preservation and 
advancement, and ultimately therefore, in attaining the goals to which a civil society 
might properly aspire.  Government was a utility, an instrument of a civil society that was 
the People at large, bound together by a web of orderly and respectful community 
relationships.350
 The final reason that Wilson accepted no doctrine of right to rule by superiority is 
that it was practically contrary to the manifestation of liberty.  The American concept of 
liberty, one that Wilson wholly embraced, was inseparable from what modern civil 
libertarians might call positive rights -- the right to be represented and to be ruled by 
some kind of consent.  Obligation was not the result of superior power over an inferior, 
whether defined by brute force, a supposed excellence or an impious claim to divine 
support.  After showing the logical inconsistencies and dangerousness of all these models 
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 of obligation through superiority, Wilson proclaimed that obligation to human authority 
can only be established through consent.  Both an individual’s obligation to legislative 
and common law authority derived from an implicit consent to them, extrapolated from 
the explicit consent to membership in the civil society.351    
 But according to Locke, Puffendorff and Barbeyrac, the People had already 
transferred their sovereign power to the governments that they formed.352  “I see no 
necessity for it” raked Wilson. 
 I see no propriety in it: it is derogatory...from the genuine principles of 
 legitimate sovereignty, and inconsistent with the best theory, and the  
 best exercise too, of supreme power.353
The power given to the government was purely functional, not the sovereign power.  And 
in America at least, a “free state, such as ours, the sovereign or supreme power resides in 
the people.”354 Blackstone had argued that the legislative power was (and had to be) the 
sovereign power in any state.  Wilson convincingly argued the contrary by using 
historical examples from British and recent American history.  Even when a legislature 
was not considered the sovereign its laws could be obligatory and effectual.355
 The People at large in the United States could be trusted to rule.  Though not all 
could reason well all had an intuitive sense of right and wrong, so that if a majority of 
Citizens thought a general principle correct or the character of a person sufficient to hold 
office, their judgment could be trusted.  Out of necessity it would have to be the majority 
that actual exercised the sovereign power of the whole.  Mistakes could be expected, but 
the majority, particularly one drawn from a large populace could be trusted to have good 
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 judgment in relation to their self-preservation and the preservation of the larger society 
(in which they had more vested by definition of being the majority.)  The human heart 
was its own divine oracle receiving general principles, and the more people who thought 
a moral position to be correct the less likely the moral position was to be incorrect -- the 
less likely it was being corrupted by poor reasoning.  Wilson’s political cosmology 
juggled ideas of divine will, probability in good judgment and democracy.356  
 Yet, a majority (perhaps even a whole society) could hypothetically become 
corrupt, but apparently for Wilson, the people of the United States were sufficiently 
virtuous to healthfully govern themselves.  The fact that sovereignty resided in the People 
at large and was to be exercised by the majority did not mean that morality was 
subjective, prostrated to the will of the majority.  An objective morality commanded for 
Wilson -- a law of God.  Popular sovereignty itself was a valid derivative of that law, a 
law perceptible by the intuitive sense.  But sovereignty simply gave a supreme political 
power over Earthly human affairs -- moral legitimacy for political preeminence, but not 
moral or social omnipotence.  God’s general law was still higher and demanded 
obedience, even of the majority. The inalienable rights of humanity, including life, 
liberty, obligation by consent, free immigration, to name but a few, formed part of that 
law.  The majority had no moral right to contravene God’s law and in fact had the prime 
responsibility of determining it and realizing it on Earth.  No human intervention ought to 
exert itself, denying the will of the majority in a civil society, but if the majority did 
contravene God’s law they could expect a diminution in their civil society.  The laws of 
nature were another conduit of God’s law.  Nature would insure the diminution of an 
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 immoral society through tyranny, civil war, and anarchy.357  
 In his lecture, “Of Government,” Wilson made a startling claim for a Whig writer 
of eighteenth century political philosophy.  He suggested that of all forms of government, 
monarchy was probably the first because it was the simplest.358  The oft held notion that 
antiquity of practice was concurrent, at least loosely, to primal truths was abandoned.  
The historicism of Thomas Paine, for example, spoke of the first government as being 
some kind of direct democracy.  Monarchy was a later corruption.  Like Paine, Wilson 
envisioned communities coming together under their own free compunction and 
organizing without monarchs.359  The difference is, for Wilson, that was not 
“government.”  Community law and therefore communal governance could and did exist, 
at some pre-historic point, without institutional government.  And admitting that 
monarchy was first of all officiated governments was of no danger within the Wilsonian 
doctrine because of how progress fit into Wilson’s moral and political matrix of 
thought.360  
 Government, like anything else in civilization and of humanity, was in a constant 
state of either advancement or devolution.  Or as Wilson put it, “perfected” or 
“degraded.”  The application of God’s law required variation in varying situations and the 
human ability to realize those laws might improve as human consciousness and 
civilization improved.361  Wilson maintained that all “the works of human invention are 
progressive:” 
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  And frequently are not completed, till a slow and lengthened series 
 of gradual improvements, remotely distant from one another both in 
 place and time. To the theory and practice of government, this 
 observation is applicable with...peculiar force. If the discoveries 
 ...are difficult and slow, how much more arduous must it be to obtain, 
 in practice, the advantage of those discoveries!362
In other words, it was one achievement to conceptualize a right political principle, quite 
another to understand how best to apply it.  The American Revolution had facilitated a 
rapid advance in both principles and applications.  Americans had not only discovered the 
true root of sovereignty but had experimented with its realization in politics and 
government.363  Wilson’s implication was that monarchy, as a governmental institution, 
was antiquated and unworthy of a politically advanced people. 
 The sociopolitical discoveries of Americans, or their factual corroboration of what 
was before mere shadowy theory, was multiplicitous according to Wilson.  Again, 
government was itself only a tool, essentially devised to advance and stabilize civil 
society.  And civil society was a tool to promote and secure survival and human liberty. 
But it was not only life and liberty that civil society and government were meant to 
promote and secure.  In a more general sense, civil society existed to facilitate human 
happiness which ultimately required human progress in mental processes, knowledge, 
morality, society, economics, the arts and government.  And for Wilson progress was not 
a morally neutral concept that only denoted a rapid and brute increase in resources and 
utility.  Progress was a moral idea that denoted a qualitative increase in right versus 
wrong.  As such, progress described the proper velocity of civilization: the drive of civil 
society to its moral goals.            
 In his lecture “Of the Law of Nations,” Wilson declared that God vested the 
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 People at large of every state with the supreme power, and therefore supreme obligation,  
“for the happiness of each, and for the happiness of all.”364  The civil state had general 
functions discernable by its nature and purpose.  It was, “in general, the duty of the state 
to preserve itself” and “its members.”  And it had the “right, and is under the obligation” 
to do all that was necessary, not contravening higher moral laws, to achieve that goal.365  
It was the “right, and generally is the duty,” according to Wilson, of the state to do 
numerous general acts.  Wilson’s list is long and tells a tales of an Enlightenment mind, 
both pragmatic and highly moralistic.  Of his list, three hold the highest ground along 
with self-preservation: happiness, justice and progress.366  
 “Happiness is the center, to which men and nations are attracted: it is therefore 
the duty of a nation to consult its happiness,” Wilson told his students. “The arts, the 
sciences, philosophy, virtue, and religion, all contribute to happiness, all” he continued, 
“ought to receive the encouragement of the nation.”  Wilson loosely hinted at a need for a 
broader, more rigorous and uniform system of education, warning that “impressions that 
are made first, sink deepest” and what is taught will either “produce abundance of good, 
or abundance of evil.”367   
 “Justice” was another part of the “sacred law of nations.” Like any moral person, 
it was the duty of the state “to do no wrong or injury” and, in fact, “to contribute to the 
perfection and happiness of others” -- “not only forbidden to do evil” but “commanded to 
do good to one another.”368   
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  And finally, “it is the glorious destiny of man,” Wilson had earlier observed “to 
be always progressive.  It is his happiness, to press on towards” the future.369  Both 
happiness and justice rested on the ability to progress within the parameters, and 
according to the direction of God’s law.  “A nation should aim at its perfection,” 
proclaimed Wilson. 
 The advantage and improvement of the citizens are the ends proposed 
 by the social union. Whatever will render that union more perfect will 
 promote these ends. The same principles, therefore, which show that 
 a man ought to pursue the perfection of his nature, will show, likewise 
 that the citizens ought to contribute everything in their power to the 
 perfection of the state.  
In order to approach perfection, or a higher refinement, citizens should resist “everything, 
which would...retard the progress of the state” and “acquire everything, without which its 
perfection cannot be...obtained.”370  
 The federal Constitution was a progressive plan of government, not only because 
it had advanced the understanding and application of political truth but because it 
facilitated the progress of the civil society -- fulfilling the purpose of government.  It 
facilitated progress by adhering the political process to the broader civil society as closely 
as possible.   
 “Representation is the chain of communication between the people and those, to 
whom, they have committed the exercise the powers of government,” declared Wilson in 
his lecture “On the Legislative Department.”  And the government under the 1787 federal 
Constitution was the first government in post-Antiquity to be “founded solely on 
representation” of the rightful sovereign, the People at large.371    
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  Both the House of Representatives and the Senate represented the People, though 
“some have considered the senators as...representing the sovereignty...of the several 
states.  While the members of the other house immediately represent the people.”  But 
such an opinion was “founded” in the fallacious doctrine “that the legislative power is the 
supreme power of the state.”  Wilson vehemently reiterated, “The supreme power I 
showed to reside in the people.”  “The people have delegated to the several legislatures” 
he continued, “the choice of senators, while they have retained in their own hands the 
choice of representatives.”372
 The Presidency too, was rooted in the representative principle.  Wilson, always 
eager to take another jab at Blackstone, pointed out that Blackstone had purported that 
the Saxons had originally elected their rulers but switched to hereditary succession 
because “dear-bought experience ... evinced the convenience.”  “If elective title is a 
distemper in the body-politic” quipped Wilson incredulously, perhaps to the amusement 
of his students, “the history ... of England would (suggest) that a hereditary title is a 
remedy still worse than the disease.”373  Whatever “intrigues ... cabals ... tumults, and 
convulsions” might be produced by the “election of our first magistrate, are avoided” by 
making the election mediate rather than immediate -- through the use of electors.  
 Moving through the various duties and powers of the chief executive Wilson 
came to the pardon power and made an interesting observation, again counter-arguing 
Blackstone.  Blackstone had maintained that “the power of pardoning is a power 
incommunicatable to the democratical species of government.”  Contrarily, Wilson spoke 
of the American experience.  “The best and purest of all” governmental species was “the 
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 democratical,” being defined as “that, in which the supreme power remains with the 
people.”  And it “is capable of being formed...in such a manner, as to exclude the 
inconveniences, and to secure the advantages of all the others (species of government.)”   
It was a “principle of democracy...that the law is higher than the magistrate...the 
constitution is higher than both...and the people (are) higher than all three.”  The pardon 
was perfectly compatible with democracy because it was simply another possible 
governmental function that the people at large had delegated, as it happened, to the 
President.374
 Though the Judiciary was not elected, the principles of representation and rule by 
consent penetrated even that branch of government.  Judges sat during good behavior, 
which meant that they might be removed by the representatives of the People if they 
violated the People‘s trust.  But more importantly, the common law bound and limited the 
judiciary.  Wilson pointed out in his lecture “Of Juries” that jurors “must decide for law 
as well as fact” in the eighteenth century.  It was an attribute of jurisprudence that Wilson 
whole-heartedly embraced, particularly in criminal cases where the consequences of 
conviction would be the heaviest.375  “The sentiments of the majority shall govern” after 
all “is...the general rule of society.”  And juries were representatives of the broader civil 
society.376  Because juries could interpret the law, they could direct its progress.  The 
process by which common law came into existence and changed involved the People at 
large.  It was only the broad acceptance or rejection of certain legal principles by multiple 
generations of the People that gave common law its force and existence through tradition.  
So, common law was a conduit of popular sovereignty, much like political representation 
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 itself.377
 The realization of sovereignty was important for progress because the exercise of 
sovereign power by the People, through representation and governance by consent, gave 
them the highest power to move the government in “the true line of public liberty and 
happiness.”378  But the American Constitution went one step further still.  The sovereign 
People of the United States held the power to amend their constitution through a plausible 
civil process whenever they chose to do so.  As such, the United States Constitution 
related to the People “as clay in the hands of the potter...to improve...refine...and 
finish...as they please.”  That was not to say that the people would often amend their 
constitution, because they probably would not.  Wilson did not think that the people 
would change their government fundamentally “without a proportioned propelling 
cause.”  But that government would eventually have to be altered by the People was 
inevitable as civil society changed, hopefully for the good.  To place the amendment 
power in some other body would have been an invitation to tyranny; allowing for no 
amendments at all would produce “mistakes and mischeifs of...different kinds” including 
“giddy inconsistency...unthinking rashness (and) unmanly languor.”  But no such 
mistakes had been made in forming the United States Constitution.  The principles of 
popular sovereignty had been realized and allowed America “her preservation, her 
happiness, and her perfection.”379  And humanity’s “own perfection and happiness” was 
the divine purpose of human government.380
 Wilson’s United States was a progressive state, guided by a free and sovereign 
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 American people.  The 1787 federal Constitution was their chief political and legal 






 Neo-Whig interpretations have dominated the historiography of the American 
Revolution for better than thirty years, but the conspiratorial sensibilities of the older 
materialist scholars have not been entirely abandoned.  Some historians, while accepting 
the integrity of much of what the Revolutionary generation said, have nonetheless 
claimed to detect a cabalistic deceit among the American elites of the era.   
 Historian Gordon S. Wood had a particularly untrusting view of the federal 
Constitutional framers.  The framers used Revolution era concepts, according to Wood, 
twisting populist ideas to legitimize the aristocrat-friendly government that their distrust 
of the people demanded.  As historian George M. Dennison later described Wood’s 
opinion, “Federalists transformed a viable revolutionary tradition into a rhetorical facade 
to maintain a system of aristocratic politics.”381  An eighteenth century anti-federalist 
could not have said it better.  And more recently the historian Edmund S. Morgan has 
taken a broadly suspicious view of popular sovereignty and its historical application.  The 
elite revolutionaries of the English Civil War and the American Revolution used the 
concept of popular sovereignty to justify their rebellion and usurpation of power.  It was a 
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 tool, according to Morgan, to gain the support of the masses who had the numbers 
necessary for successful rebellions.  But once embraced by the unwashed masses, the 
“fiction” of popular sovereignty had to be perpetuated in the new order.  The illusion of 
control had to be given to the populous through various governmental mechanisms like 
voting for representatives (constituency/representation itself being a mere fiction) and 
popular ratification that supposedly realized popular sovereignty.382  Through this 
historical lens the Founding Fathers become like the pigs in George Orwell’s Animal 
Farm whom, in order to secure their preeminence, perverted the ideas of the revolution 
that brought them to power.383  
 If the professional lifeblood of the historian is the words of the past, then critical 
thinking is the heartbeat of their interpretations.  Some of the challenges to the profession 
are implicit in its directives.  A desire to interpret human record may slide easily into an 
uncritical acceptance of a record’s holistic veracity.  And a critical sensibility may 
devolve into a prejudicial cynicism.  However much the less-than-sparkling interpretation 
of the Wood/Morgan stamp is or is not deserved by the American Revolutionary 
generation will continue as a contentious question.   
 Yet what is certain, after viewing Wilson’s efforts during the constitutional 
conventions of 1787 and 1790, and the contents of his law lectures, is that such mistrust 
has no veracity in interpreting the ethos of James Wilson.384  For Wilson, popular 
sovereignty and the instrumentality in government and law that it required, was no mere 
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 contrived fiction but a fundamental truth discovered through the fiery baptism of the 
American Revolution. 
 Wilson was not without his inconsistencies.  Like many of the Founders he held a 
domestic slave while glorifying and developing a philosophy of liberty.  Though he 
demanded that juries were necessary in criminal trials he equivocated on their need in 
civil cases, and his explanation was never quite satisfactory.  He thought it was sufficient 
to point out the impracticality of having juries in all civil cases without bothering to 
revisit his overall moral philosophy concerning the need for juries.   
 Also, Wilson placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of intellectual 
development, headed one of America’s earliest post-Confederation law lecture, and 
pronounced the need for a general understanding of law and government by the common 
people.  The idea of public education, however, was conspicuously missing from 
Wilson’s writings.  As the historian Mark David Hall observed, Wilson seemed to have 
assumed that the public could learn what was necessary from observing a virtuous 
leadership and the equitable processes of free government.385  
 Yet, all human beings are full of inconsistencies and what is more interesting and 
important about Wilson is not his inconsistencies, but his philosophical consistencies.  As 
a whole, Wilson’s political thought is remarkably consistent and cohesive, easily 
blending what many historians have traditionally understood as conceptual 
contradictions.  And reading Wilson’s works, one would have a difficult time doubting 
the sincerity of Wilson’s theories of popular sovereignty, progressive civil society and the 
instrumentality of law and government.  His was a sincere doctrine both populist, 
constitutional and progressive. 
165 
  The historian James H. Read has actually criticized Wilson for being too 
consistent -- stubbornly doctrinaire in the face of confuting experience.  As Wilson made 
clear in numerous speeches and in his law lectures, the majority exercised the sovereignty 
of the People (and perhaps pluralities when majorities cannot be formed, though Wilson 
never spoke of pluralities.)  There was to be no non-majoritarian human check on the will 
of the majority.  Read accused Wilson of naïveté, contrasting his faith in the People to 
Madison’s more “realistic” skepticism.  Wilson foolishly ignored the possibility of 
majoritarian tyranny, according to Read, veiling his own eyes with a common sense 
doctrine of human morality.  What made Wilson’s philosophical failure more damning is 
not only his association with men like Madison who knew better, but Wilson’s own 
experience as the victim of a riot.386    
 However, on final analysis Read’s criticism is unfair.  Even Madison understood 
that the minority could be protected only with the assent of the majority: consenting to 
lawful rule through representation or tradition.  Under this consideration the difference 
between Wilson and Madison appears to be the depth of their particular philosophical 
considerations, rather than the essences of them.  Wilson simply peeled the conceptual 
onion closer to the core, and felt it more important to dwell there.  Such a thought brings 
to the fore the next greatest difference between the thought of Wilson and Madison.  The 
particular threats to American republicanism and liberty was viewed differently by the 
two men.  
 Read found it difficult to understand how Wilson could have continued to be the 
doctrinaire majoritarian that he was, following the attack of his house by what Wilson 
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 believed to be a politically motivated mob. Wilson never put the Fort Wilson incident 
into conceptual perspective, not in writing anyway.  He does not mention Philadelphian 
mobs in his law lectures.  But the Wilsonian answer to Read’s criticism is easily 
surmised.  The crowd that attacked Wilson’s home was not a majority, they were a 
scurrilous and populous minority.  And if that minority had obeyed the spirit of the 
majority of people in the city of Philadelphia (who were not out attacking houses) the riot 
would never have happened.  The crowd was a misinformed minority of malcontents, 
misled by corrupt Constitutionalist leaders.    
 Then there was the problem of mobs breaking out against creditor-friendly courts 
throughout the states in the mid to late 1780s.  Many founders, it is undeniable, saw these 
problems as symptoms of too much democracy in the states.  But Wilson did not see the 
problem as one of too much democracy (or it does not appear so when looking at his 
contributions in the Philadelphia Convention.)  Wilson supported continental nationalism 
in 1787 because he always had been a continental nationalist.  Unlike other men, he did 
not need fear to motivate his support for central government.  And the crowd violence 
exercised against the governments of the states could also be rationalized as the activities 
of rogue minority groups within the political society.  Again, Wilson did not ever write 
on the issue but such a rationale would make sense within the context of his overall 
thought.     
 In our post-Holocaust, post-Civil Rights movement age it may indeed seem naive 
to put too much trust in the majority.  Read’s reaction to Wilson is understandable. But 
Read’s criticism is not wholly consistent with the material that Wilson proffered in his 
writings.  Read claimed that Wilson never even thought of the possibility of majority 
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 tyranny, though most within his generation certainly did worry over it.  But in Wilson’s 
law lectures he did mention the possibility that a whole political society might be 
corrupted.387  And in his opening speech before the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, 
Wilson warned that there could be no appeal from a corrupt majority.388  These kinds of 
comments cannot come from a man for whom the possibility of majoritarian tyranny was 
beyond the intellectual horizon.  Wilson did understand that a majority could 
hypothetically be tyrannical, though he assumed the probability of it to be slight.  And the 
only cure for such a corruption was the providence of God acting in the flow of history.  
He did not think that a truly willful and constant majority could be (or ought to be) 
denied their will by human coercion. 
 The fact that Wilson never went into detail concerning majoritarian corruption 
and tyranny does not suggest simple-mindedness but a particular understanding of the 
problems of his time.  The majority had not oppressed humanity in the generations 
immediately preceding his, or in his generation, and he did not consider it a probability in 
the foreseeable future.  For Wilson, the problem of corruption and tyranny had always 
been a problem of grasping minorities and poor governance.  Few people making an 
argument in favor of a solution to their contemporary problems will counter-argue 
themselves for the sake of holistically-turned future philosophers and historians.  If denial 
of the popular will was the chief problem of Wilson’s own time, why would Wilson 
confuse his listeners by remonstrating deeply on the hypothetical possibilities of popular 
tyranny?  He would not and he did not.  
              Wilson, whether considered a naive doctrinaire or an insightful but shrewd 
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 polemicist, has something to offer to the modern historian and American citizen.  With 
Wilson, the researcher can peek into the thinking of a radical American mind of the 
revolutionary generation.  In some respects that mind was representative of the 
generation, while in others Wilson’s thought may be considered eccentric, demonstrating 
the plasticity of eighteenth century radicalism (Wilson’s refusal to distinguish between 
American republicanism and democracy comes to mind.)  Either way, Wilson’s thinking 
is suggestive and is made up of the same philosophic essentials that compose the cultural 
foundations of the American republic.  The extent that Wilson’s thought was 
representative of his overall generation, both inside and outside of the Revolution’s elite 
leadership, certainly deserves more study.       
 
    
      
  
       
 
           
  












                                                         REFERENCES 
 
Primary Sources:  
 
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison. The Federalist, ed. Benjamin F.                
 Wright. MetroBooks, 1967. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Adrienne     
 Koch and William Peden. New York: Random House, Inc., 1972. 
 
Madison, James. Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. Adrienne    
 Koch. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987.  
 
Madison, James. The Papers of James Madison, ed. Robert A. Rutland. 17 Volumes. 
 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962-1985.  
 
McMaster, John Bach and Frederick D. Stone, ed. Pennsylvania and the Federal  
            Constitution,1787-1788. 2 Volumes. New York: Da Capo Press, 1970. 
 
Paine, Thomas. Common Sense. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1997. 
 
Thorpe, Newton. American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws, 1492-1908. 
 7 Volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909. 
 
Wilson, James. Selected Political Essays of James Wilson, ed. Randolph G. Adams. New 
 York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930. 
 
Wilson, James. The Works of James Wilson, ed. James DeWitt Andrews. 2 Volumes.  
 Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1896.  
 
Wilson, James. The Works of James Wilson, ed. Robert Green McCloskey. 2 Volumes.  
 Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, 1967. 
 
Wilson, James. James Wilson Papers, 1742-1798. Unpublished: Archives of The         
  Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 
 
Secondary Sources (Monographs and Literary Works): 
 
Bailyn, Bernard. Faces of the Revolution: Personalities and Themes in the Struggle for  
 American Independence. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. 
 
    . The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge:  
            Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967 
 
Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. 
170 
  New York: The Free Press, 1986. 
 
Brunhouse, Robert L. The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania. New York: Octagon 
 Books, 1971. 
 
Burnett, Edmund Cody. The Continental Congress. New York: The MacMillan   
 Company, 1941. 
 
Cook, Don. The Long Fuse: How England Lost the Colonies, 1760-1785. New York: The  
 Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995. 
 
Countryman, Edward. Americans: A Collision of Histories. New York: Hill and Wang,  
 1996. 
 
Delahanty, Mary T. The Integralist Philosophy of James Wilson. New York: Pageant 
 Press, Inc., 1969. 
 
Foner, Eric. Tom Paine and Revolutionary America. New York: Oxford University Press, 
 1977. 
 
Freeman, Douglas Southall. George Washington: A Biography. 7 Volumes. New York:  
 Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948-1957. 
 
Greene, Jack P. Intellectual Heritage of the Constitutional Era: The Delegate’s  
            Library. Philadelphia: The Library of Congress, 1986.  
 
Hall, Mark David. The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson, 1742-1798              
 Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997.  
 
Jensen, Merrill. The Making of the American Constitution. New York: Robert E. Krieger 
 Publishing Company, 1964. 
 
Ketchum, Ralph. James Madison: A Biography. New York: The MacMillan Company,    
 1971. 
 
Maier, Pauline. From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development    
 of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776. New York: Norton & Company, 
 1991. 
 
McCullough, David. John Adams. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. 
 
Molho, Anthony and Gordon S. Wood. Imagined Histories: American Historians 
Interpret  the Past. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 
Morgan, Edmund S. ed. The American Revolution: Two Centuries of Interpretation.  
  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965. 
171 
  
         . Inventing the People: the Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England  
  and America. New York: Norton, 1989. 
 
Nelson, William E. Marbury vs. Madison: The Origin and Legacy of Judicial Review.  
 Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. 
 
Orwell, George. Animal Farm: A Fairy Tale. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company,  
 1946. 
 
Pascal, Jean-Marc. The Political Ideas of James Wilson, 1742-1798. New York: Garland  
             Publishing, Inc, 1991.  
 
Pocock, J.G.A. ed. Three British Revolutions, 1641, 1688 and 1776. Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1980.  
 
            . Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic  
  Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.                             
 
Rakove, Jack N. Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. 
 New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. 
 
Read, James H. Power vs. Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson and Jefferson.  
            Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000.  
 
Reid, John Phillip. The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution.    
 Chicago: The University Press, 1988. 
 
      . Constitutionalism in the Age of the American Revolution (abridged).  
           Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. 
 
     . Constitutionalism in the Age of the American Revolution. Madison: 
 University of Wisconsin Press, 1986. 
 
Risjord, Norman K. Jefferson’s America, 1760-1815. Madison: Madison House 
 Publishers, Inc., 1991.  
 
Rosswurm, Steven. Arms, Country and Class: The Philadelphia Militia and the “Lower 
 Sort” During the American Revolution, 1775-1783. New Brunswick: Rutgers 
 University Press, 1987. 
 
Ryerson, Richard Alan. The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of       
 Philadelphia, 1765-1776. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1978. 
 
Smith, Charles Page. James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798. Chapel Hill: The  
            University of North Carolina Press, 1956. 
172 
  
Wood, Gordon S. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787.  Chapel Hill:  
            University of North Carolina Press, 1969.  
 
    . The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Vintage  
   Books, 1991.   
 
Zobel, Hillard B. The Boston Massacre. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970. 
 
Secondary Sources (Articles): 
 
Adams, Randolph C. “The Legal Theories of James Wilson.” University of Pennsylvania 
 Law Review and Law Register, 68 (June, 1920).     
 
Alexander, John K. “The Fort Wilson Incident of 1779: A Case Study of the   
 Revolutionary Crowd.” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 31   
 (October, 1974). 
 
Appleby, Joyce. “Republicanism in Old and New Contexts.” William and Mary   
 Quarterly, Third Series, 43 (January, 1986). 
 
Banning, Lance. “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New 
 American Republic.” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 4 (January, 
 1986). 
 
Conrad, Stephen A. “James Wilson’s ‘Assimilation of the Common Law Mind’.”   
 Northwestern University Law Review, 84 (1989).  
 
        . “Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson’s Theory of Federal  
 Union.” Law and Social Inquiry: Journal of the American Bar Association,13 
 (1988). 
 
Dennison, George M. “The ‘The Revolution Principle’: Ideology and Constitutionalism   
 in the Thought of James Wilson.” The Review of Politics, 39 (1977). 
 
Ireland, OS. "The Crux of Politics: Religion and Party in Pennsylvania, 1778-1789."  
            William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 42, No. 4 (Oct., 1985). 
 
Jillson, Calvin C. and Cecil L. Eubanks. "The Political Structure of Constitution  
            Making." American Journal of Political Science, 28, No. 3 (Aug.,    
                       1984). 
 
Kenyon, Cecelia M. "Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution - An                   
            Old Fashioned Interpretation." William & Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 19 
 (April, 1962). 
 
173 
 Kramnick, Issac. “Republican Revisionism Revisited.” The American Historical   
 Review, 87 (June, 1982).  
 
Leavelle, Arnaud B. "James Wilson and the Relation of the Scottish Metaphysics to  
            American Political Thought." Political Science Quarterly, 57, Issue 3 (Sept., 
 1942). 
 
Pocock, J.G.A. “Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia 
 Americana.” Journal of the History of Ideas, 48 (April-June, 1987). 
 
Rodgers, Daniel T. “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept.” The Journal of American 
 History, 79 (June, 1992). 
 
Rossum, Ralph. “James Wilson and the ‘Pyramid of Government’.” The Political Science 
 Reviewer, 6 (1976). 
 
Thompson, E.P. “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.” 




           
  
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
